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the	 thesis	 constructs	 a	 theoretical	 and	methodological	 foundation	 to	 analyze	 intertextual	 narrative	 structures	
emerging	in	a	distributed	manner	across	a	system	of	news	texts	dealing	with	scandal.	With	this,	the	thesis	attempts	
to	 answer	 why	 the	 Lava-Jato	 scandal	 ended	 with	 such	 surprising	 and	 self-contradictory	 results,	 and	 how,	








En	 bølge	 af	 korruptionsafsløringer	 ramte	 Brasilien	 i	 2014-2018.	 I	 kølvandet	 på	 en	 usædvanligt	 effektiv	
politiundersøgelse	af	politisk	korruption	blev	 landets	præsident,	Dilma	Rousseff,	 suget	med	af	bølgen	og	afsat	
gennem	 en	 rigsretssag	 i	 2016.	 Bag	 rigsretssagen	 stod	 medlemmer	 af	 den	 politiske	 elite	 som	 selv	 var	 under	
efterforskning	i	sagskomplekset	kendt	som	Operation	Bil-Vask	(Operação	Lava-Jato),	men	afsættelsen	fandt	sted	
før	Rousseff	blev	sigtet	for	korruption.	Både	Rousseff,	hendes	folkekære	forgænger	Lula	og	deres	parti	blev	trukket	
med	 af	 skandalens	 bemærkelsesværdige	 temporalitet	 og	 transponering	 af	 krisestemning.	 Mens	




strukturer	 i	 Brasiliens	medielandskab.	 Trods	modviljen	mod	 narrativ	 teori	 i	 gængse	medie-teoretiske	 tilgange	
opbygges	der	i	afhandlingen	et	teoretisk	og	metodisk	grundlag	til	at	analysere	den	slags	intertekstuelle	narrative	
strukturer	 som	 opstår	 i	 et	 distribueret	 tekstunivers	 på	 tværs	 af	 nyheder	 om	 skandaler.	 På	 dette	 fundament	














































































































































Political	 corruption	 is	 a	 central	 concern	 to	 any	 democracy.	 However,	 the	 problems	 of	 political	
corruption	go	beyond	sub-optimal	decision-making	and	the	economic	loss	to	society.	The	outcome	
of	a	corruption	scandal	should	not	be	conceived	as	an	isolated	matter	-	as	individuals	being	held	
accountable,	 or	 failing	 to	 be	 held	 accountable.	 Corruption	 scandals	 can	 have	 wildly	 varying	





















conquests	made	 in	Brazil	 in	 the	 last	decade	and	manifesting	 the	prevalent	Latin-American	trend	
towards	(or	back	to)	neo-liberal	economic	politics.	The	ousting	was	the	climax	of	a	monumental	
process,	 breaking	 the	 13	 years	 of	 a	 neo-developmental	 state-centered	 model	 of	 governance,	
spearheaded	 by	 the	 Brazilian	Worker’s	 Party	 (PT).	 As	 key	 figures	 of	 the	 PT	 cadre,	 including	 ex-
President	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva,	became	indicted,	charged	and	sentenced,	the	party	image	was	












the	probe	even	after	 the	obtainment	and	publication	of	hard	evidence	of	 their	 corruption.	 This	
unequal	application	of	the	rule	of	law	appears	at	least	as	a	contradiction	in	terms,	if	not	a	way	of	






and	 obliterated	 the	 citizens’	 already	 negligible	 trust	 in	 political	 authorities	 and	 institutions.	





principle	 should	 strengthen	 democracy,	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case	 laid	 bare	 a	 range	 of	 accountability	
problems	in	the	political	system,	the	judicial	system,	and	the	media	system,	exacerbating	crises	and	
tensions	 between	 actors	 of	 those	 systems	 (Damgaard	 2018b).	 Political	 life	 was	 shaped	 by	 the	





for	 narrating	 solutions	 to	 the	 contradictions	 and	 tensions	 of	 political	 and	 social	 struggles	 that	
emerge	in	scandals.	When	disclosure	demands	closure,	and	political	crisis	provokes	calls	for	regime	
change,	 it	 is	 urgent	 to	 analyze	 the	 deep	 structures	 underpinning	 the	 media’s	 emplotment	 of	
scandalous	events	and	projections	of	possible	solutions.	In	line	with	theories	of	the	discursive	turn	
in	social	and	political	sciences	(Torfing	2005:22),	I	believe	it	necessary	to	pay	attention	to	narratives,	
or,	 as	 Frederic	 Jameson	 remarked	 in	 The	 Political	 Unconscious,	 to	 detect	 “the	 structure	 of	 a	
particular	 political	 fantasy”	 because	 “the	 fantasy	 or	 protonarrative	 [is]	 the	 vehicle	 for	 our	
experience	of	the	real”	(Jameson	1981:33).	Adapting	Jameson’s	literary	theory,	I	propose	to	transfer	
this	 attention	 to	 narrative	 structures	 to	 the	 study	 of	 political	 discourse	 in	 the	 news,	 ultimately	
breaking	 down	 the	 disciplinary	 limits	 between	 studies	 of	 political	 science	 and	 of	 media	
representations.	Because	media	representations	of	corruption	invoke	a	distinct	set	of	narratives	and	
metaphors	(Breit	2011,	Forsberg	and	Severinsson	2015,	Kajsiu	2014),	and	because	such	narratives	









object	 of	 the	 agenda	 will	 within	 them	 contain	 some	 of	 these	 “conditions	 of	 the	 process	 of	
reception.”	While	a	scandal	obviously	also	comprises	other	elements	such	as	judicial	processes	and	




encompassed	 and	 what	 is	 excluded	 by	 the	 scandal	 might	 change	 dynamically,	 related	 to	 the	
strategic	 interests	of	 the	actors,	and	 that	might	bring	with	 it	 changing	usage,	 connotations,	and	
definitions	of	the	term	“corruption”–	and	for	this	reason,	I	will	refrain	from	providing	a	definition	of	
the	 term.	Corruption	may	be	 thought	of	 as	 an	 “empty	 signifier”	par	 excellence	 (Koechlin	2013).	
Analyzing	 the	 media	 representations	 of	 corruption	 is	 but	 the	 first	 step	 to	 understanding	 what	
corruption	comes	to	signify	in	a	local	context,	and	how	the	formatting	of	corruption	scandals	come	
to	shape	a	political	field	in	the	way	that	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	did	in	Brazil.	The	next	step	is	to	







concept	 of	 narrative	 treated	 methodically	 and	 deployed	 to	 excavate	 systems	 of	 meaning	 (e.g.	
Silverstone	1981,	Hartley	1982).	Recently,	several	scholars	(e.g.	Matheson	2010,	Montgomery	2007)	
have	even	argued	emphatically	that	news	should	not	be	treated	as	narratives.	Therefore,	after	a	
review	 of	 these	 different	 arguments,	 I	 will	 start	 the	 thesis	 by	 assembling	 a	 methodology	 for	
reconstructing	the	unfolding	narratives	that	informed	production	of	news	on	the	Lava-Jato	scandal	
in	the	mainstream	media	of	Brazil.	This	method	is	then	deployed	to	analyze	how	the	disequilibrium	

















arbitrating	 political	 accountability?	 The	 period	 of	 2014-2018	 provided	 a	 multitude	 of	 Brazilian	
corruption	cases	of	different	magnitude	in	the	public	eye,	but	the	explosion	of	high-level	corruption	










about	 the	 phrase	 “making	 the	 news”:	 What	 (event)	 makes	 the	 news?	 Who	 makes	 the	 news?	
Semantically,	 “the	news”	 is	 betwixt	 and	between	hard	 realities,	 social	 construction,	 and	 textual	
performance.	Temporally,	events	are	newsworthy	only	if	they	can	be	incorporated	into	meaningful	
wholes	and	assembled	to	connect	previous	and	future	events	deemed	important.	Thus,	already	in	
the	 construal	 and	 construction	 of	 each	 event	 as	 newsworthy,	 journalistic	 production	 sets	 into	
motion	mechanisms	 of	 narrative	 imagination:	 The	 news,	 in	 each	 instance,	 is	 performed	 as	 one	
meaningful	 moment	 that	 arrests	 the	 flow	 of	 time	 (Bødker	 2016),	 narrates,	 and	 thereby	 “puts	







stage,	 triggering	 electoral	 accountability	 (or	 vertical	 accountability,	 see	Mainwaring	 and	Welna	
2003).	In	a	much	less	transparent	way,	scandals	may	also	configure	the	political	field	in	the	periods	
between	elections	by	locating	candidates	and	parties	in	adverse	narrative	environments,	as	objects	










designating	a	consistent	 if	 fluid	repertoire	of	media	discourse	and	imagery	 in	the	global	flows	of	
imagination.	“The	imagination	has	become	an	organized	field	of	social	practices”	(1996:31),	and	this	
field,	which	Appadurai	terms	the	imaginary,	is	both	a	form	of	practice	and	a	site	for	negotiation	of	
agency	 and	 possibility.	 Stemming	 from	 Benedict	 Anderson’s	 notion	 of	 imagined	 communities	
(1983),	 Appadurai	 envisioned	 that	 this	 field	 was	 organized	 by	 sometimes	 homogeneous	 (e.g.,	
Americanized)	and	sometimes	heterogeneous	cultural	flows	(see	also	Fiske	1994).	These	flows	run	












Roland	 Barthes	 (1977:79),	 and	 Catherine	 Riessman	 added	 “memoir,	 biography,	 autobiography,	
diaries,	 archival	 documents,	 social	 service	 and	 health	 records,	 other	 organizational	 documents,	
scientific	theories,	folk	ballads,	photographs,	and	other	art	work”	to	Barthes’	list	(2008:4).	Thus,	it	













of	 the	 concept	 “scandal,”	however.	 I	will	 use	 the	word	 “case”	 to	 refer	 to	 legal	processes,	while	
“scandal”	 will	 refer	 to	 the	 media	 representation	 of	 an	 action	 regarded	 as	 transgressive	 (Adut	
2008:13,	 Allern	 and	 Pollack	 2012,	 Thompson	 2000).	 Throughout	 the	 thesis	 I	 work	 under	 the	
assumption	 that	acts	and	events	perceived	as	 transgression,	corruption,	and	scandal,	are	 in	 fact	
defined	 as	 such	 through	 media-borne	 discursive	 activities;	 interpretation	 and	 narration,	 in	




perspectives.	 Thereby,	 they	 mutually	 constitute	 disclosed	 information	 as	 scandalous,	 construct	
certain	 acts	 as	 corrupt,	 and	define	what	 is	 “historic.”	 To	 constitute	 something	 as	 “historic”	 and	
“transgressive”	requires	more	than	description,	as	Koselleck	observed	(1985:106),	and	should	be	
seen	 essentially	 as	 an	 act	 of	 narration.	 The	 recycling	 of	 narratives	 should	 however	 not	 blind	
researchers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 constitution	 of	 events	 as	 scandalous	 is	 often	 a	 contested	 act	







depict	 the	state	of	 the	world	as	close	 to	 reality	as	possible	 in	 service	of	 the	general	 readership,	











In	 the	 age	 of	 fake	 news	 and	 post-factuality,	 simple	 distinctions	 of	 objective/fictional	 and	 hard	
news/soft	news	are	clearly	challenged,	although	the	challenge	may	not	necessarily	arise	from	within	
the	 legacy	news	media.	 In	any	case,	despite	 the	claims	 to	objective	 reporting	and	 fact-centered	
news,	news	media	may	still	draw	upon	narrative	resources	found	in	a	cultural	stock	(Alexander	and	
Jacobs	 1998:29),	 reflecting	 a	 publicly	 shared	 symbolic	 system	 (Geertz	 1973)	 in	 their	 textual	
production.	Even	 in	 the	 supposedly	golden	age	of	 investigative	 journalism,	even	 in	 the	carefully	
patrolled	newsrooms	of	public	 service	outlets,	 the	 substratum	of	news	media	 is	 not	necessarily	
distinct	 from	 fictional	 or	 mythological	 cultural	 strata	 present	 in	 the	 mediascape	 (Hall	 1984,	
Silverstone	1981).	Taking	one	 step	back	 from	 the	 linguistic	and	 text-centered	approach	of	news	
discourse	analysis	found	in	seminal	studies	(such	as	Bell	1991,	Fowler	1991,	Fairclough	1995,	Hartley	
1982,	van	Dijk	1988),	 I	argue	 in	Chapter	2	 that	narrative	structures	still	 function	by	tying	events	




















































and	 paraphrases	 of	 the	 texts	 as	 they	 appeared,	 Chapter	 5	 abstracts	 the	 chronology	 and	 causal	
relations	of	events,	as	well	as	the	subject-actants	in	order	to	analytically	construct	the	fabulas	of	the	







































describe	 the	 dimensions	 of	 temporality,	 spatiality,	 and	 focalization	 in	 diverse	 genres.	 Scandals,	
however,	emerge	in	news	media,	and	the	extant	academic	literature	on	news	discourse	of	the	last	
decades	does	not	generally	incline	towards	narrative	analysis.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	review	the	state	

























story-telling	 in	media	 or	 in	 face-to-face	 communication.	 Newspaper	 texts,	 especially	 front-page	
texts,	have	developed	unique	features:	
	










to	 be	 more	 precise,	 the	 urge	 to	 fictionalize	 events	 (Kormelink	 and	 Costera	 Meijer	 2015).	 The	
professional	ideology	of	avoiding	narrativization	of	real	events,	however,	exists	in	tension	with	the	
equally	present	demand	for	getting	to	the	core	of	the	story,	which	means	accentuating	news	values	




the	 properties	 of	 narratives,	 depending	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 narrative:	 Is	 narrative	 simply	 an	
account	of	two	or	more	temporally	ordered	events	(Labov	and	Waletzky	1967)	or	should	we	look	

















words,	apart	 from	the	 story	world.	His	 view,	however,	 ties	 together	 the	concepts	of	 fiction	and	
narrative.	Contrary	to	Matheson,	one	could	also	see	narrative	as	a	mode,	rather	than	a	substance;	
a	mode	of	organizing	speech	or	text	which	works	in	many	kind	of	genres	and	discourse	types	(Bal	














(Bruner	1986,	 Somers	1994,	 Polletta	 et	 al.	 2011,	 Polkinghorne	1988,	Riessman	2008).	 This	 turn,	




















typically	 “fail	 to	 consider	 in	 any	 detail	 the	 structural	 properties	 of	 narratives	 and	 the	 possible	
implications	 of	 these	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 news	 as	 narrative,”	 mentioning	 Altheide	 (1974,	 1985),	
Dahlgren	(1981,	1985),	Fiske	(1987),	Gans	(1980),	Hallin	and	Mancini	(1985),	Hartley	(1982),	Manoff	
(1989),	 Manoff	 and	 Schudson	 (1987),	 Schudson	 (1982,	 1989)	 and	 Tuchman	 (1976,	 1978)	 in	 an	









with	 the	 framework	 of	 narrative	 analysis	 proposed	 by	 Labov	 and	 Waletzky,	 but	 some	
		 15	
methodological	problems	arose	from	applying	structural	narrative	analysis	to	news	studies,	as	we	








this	 argument,	 the	 opening	 clause	 of	 one	 chapter	 in	 The	 Language	 of	 News	 Media	 affirmed:	
“Journalists	do	not	write	articles.	 They	write	 stories.”	 (ibid.:147).	Going	a	 little	deeper,	Bell	 saw	
abstracts	as	optional,	but	common,	and	Orientation	and	Evaluation	he	found	to	be	compressed	in	
the	 lead	sentence	of	 reports,	but,	 like	other	researchers,	he	acknowledged	that	 the	structure	of	
news	 text	 is	 not	 linear,	 especially	 in	 regard	 to	 chronology.	 Bell	 affirmed	 that	 news	 texts	 of	 the	
“report”	genre	usually	consist	of	Headline,	Lead,	any	number	of	satellites	describing	episodes	(and	






texts,	 unlike	personal	narratives,	 do	not	 recycle	 and	 reorder	elements	 in	order	 to	build	up	 to	 a	
Resolution.	 Indeed,	 resolution	may	be	suspended	because	news	 frequently	unfolds	 in	media	 res	
(Motta	2013:97),	with	the	possibility	of	resolution	always	located	in	the	future.	Furthermore,	Bell	

















forth	by	Montgomery,	who	used	 to	use	 a	 Labovian	model	 for	 analyzing	 talk	 radio	 (1991)	 and	 a	




demonstrating	 “here	and	now”	 -	 rather	 than	 through	narration.	Montgomery	 today	argues	 that	
television	news	only	“intermittently	relies	on	narrative	[…]	television	news	is	not	so	much	about	
telling	 the	 structure	 of	 events	 as	 about	 showing	 where	 incidents	 are	 located”	 (Montgomery	
2007:108).	Contesting	Bell’s	story-centric	perspective	(ibid.:90-91),	he	characterizes	televised	news	
as	 a	 “curious	 kind	 of	mimesis	 as	much	 as	 it	 is	 diegesis”	 (ibid.:108),	 drawing	 on	 the	Aristotelian	






point	 of	 view	 “from	 which	 the	 viewer	 can	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 story”	 (ibid.:251).	 Sense-making	
requires	some	story-telling	on	broadcast	news,	as	deixis	and	direct	representation	of	voices	is	not	
always	enough	to	reliably	let	the	viewer	sort	out	the	intended	points	of	view.	Similarly,	one	could	













While	 the	 concept	 of	 narrative	 caught	 the	 attention	 and	 inspired	 a	 range	 of	 social	 and	 human	
science	approaches,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	the	concept	remained	marginal	in	the	CDA	tradition	
led	by	Teun	van	Dijk.	Unpacking	his	critique	is	worthwhile	here,	because	it	clarifies	the	differences	
between	 the	 content	or	event-material	 dealt	with	 in	news	 text	 and	 the	narrative	 clauses	 found	
therein,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 composite	 narratives	 that	 emerge	 in	 unfolding	 intertextual	
systems,	on	the	other.	
	

















“Dispensing	with	 suspense”	 (Bird	 and	Dardenne	 1988:76),	 news	 can	 thus	 not	 claim	 any	 kind	 of	
emplotment,	since	the	goal	of	news	is	to	provide	the	gist	of	the	“story”	up	front	and	then	elaborate	
on	details	later.	In	this	functional	view,	emplotment	is	therefore	not	to	be	found	in	news	texts,	and,	

















































emphasized	 that	 any	 given	 text	 should	 thus	 not	 be	 conceived	of	 as	 a	 homogeneous	 expression	
within	a	single	genre	or	order	of	discourse,	but	rather	a	stitched-together	work.		
	
Intertextual	 analysis	 draws	attention	 to	 the	dependence	of	 texts	upon	 society	 and	history	 in	 the	 form	 the	
resources	made	available	within	the	order	of	discourse	(genres,	discourses,	etc.);	genres	according	to	Bakhtin	
are	'the	drive	belts	from	the	history	of	society	to	the	history	of	language’	[…]	from	this	perspective,	accounts	
of	 individual	 genres	 and	 discourse	 types	 appear	 to	 be	 largely	 accounts	 of	 ideal	 types,	 for	 actual	 texts	 are	
generally	to	a	greater	or	lesser	degree	constituted	through	mixing	these	types.	(ibid.:194-5)	
	
Fairclough	 refers	 to	 both	 Bakhtin’s	 writings	 (especially	 Bakhtin	 1981,	 containing	 the	 dialogical	
notion	of	textual	heteroglossia)	and	Kristeva	in	his	development	of	intertextuality,	but	Faircloug	has	
a	less	embracing	view	of	intertextual	systems	than	Kristeva.	According	to	the	editor	of	Kristeva’s	
Desire	 in	 Language,	 Kristeva	was	misread	by	many,	 and	probably	 Fairclough	as	well	 (Roudiez	 in	
Kristeva	1980:15).	Rather	than	particular	texts	or	identifiable	authors	in	dialogue	with	other	texts	
or	 authors,	 Kristeva’s	 original	 vision	 of	 intertextuality	 was	 oriented	 to	 textual	 systems	 of	 signs	
spanning	centuries	and	the	operations	and	functions	of	these	systems.	Jameson	contributed	to	this	
line	 of	 thinking	 by	 showing	 how	 textual	 systems	 could	 sediment	 into	 specific	 forms,	 carrying	





texts	 are	 realized	 in	 linguistic	 features”	 (ibid.:195).	 Taking	my	 cue	 from	 Fairclough,	 I	 think	 that	
intertextuality	could	be	a	key	to	discovering	narratives	not	just	in,	but	across	or	between	texts	and	
speech	events.	For	now,	I	will	reserve	a	theoretical	space	for	narratives,	so	that	I	can	argue	for	the	
importance	 of	 narrative	 a	 little	 later,	 all	 the	 while	 maintaining	 the	 insight	 of	 Fairclough	 that	





















scientific	 fields	 makes	 some	 preliminary	 disentanglement	 necessary.	 Initially,	 the	 concept	 was	









in	 the	 fields	 of	 political	 science,	 social	 movement	 theory	 and	 psychology.	 Between	 all	 these	
“frames,”	however,	the	scope	is	not	clear	in	each	field	nor	across	the	board	(Aalberg,	Strömbäck	








that	 even	animals	may	 signal	 to	Goffman's	 ”how	 to	 interact	 in	 a	 restaurant”	 and	even	 ”how	 to	
behave	rudely	as	a	waiter	in	this	restaurant	without	apparently	breaking	decorum”	(Goffman	1959,	
1974).	 In	 economics	 and	 prospect	 theory,	 Kahneman	 and	 Tversky	 (1979,	 1982)	 performed	
experiments	concerning	test	subjects’	responses	to	inversely	worded	frames,	and	the	concepts	of	
equivalency	 framing	 (concerning	 logically	 but	 not	 emotionally	 equivalent	 wordings	 of	 a	 given	




Shanto	 Iyengar	 (1990),	 in	 a	 famous	 study	 of	 news	 frames	 of	 the	 American	 poor,	 distinguished	
between	 episodic	 frames	 and	 thematic	 frames,	 which	 he	 thought	 stimulated	 variations	 in	 the	
audiences’	 attributions	 of	 responsibility.	 Reducing	 frames	 to	 attribution	 of	 either	 personal	 or	






that	 news	 texts	 covering	 scandals	 in	 fact	 bring	 more	 issues	 to	 the	 table	 than	 just	 the	 guilt	 of	
particular	individuals.			
	
Communication	 scholars	 often	 take	 the	 formulation	 of	 Entman	 (1993)	 as	 the	 canonical.	 Here,	
Entman	takes	the	function	of	frames,	or	rather	the	process	of	framing,	to	be	transfer	of	salience.	In	
this	 definition,	 framing	 “essentially	 involves	 selection	 and	 salience.	 To	 frame	 is	 to	 select	 some	
aspects	of	a	perceived	reality	and	make	them	more	salient	in	a	communicating	text,	in	such	a	way	








provides	meaning	 to	 an	unfolding	 strip	 of	 events	 ...The	 frame	 suggests	what	 the	 controversy	 is	
about,	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 issue”	 (1987:143;	 compare	 with	 Appadurai	 1996:35	 quoted	 in	 the	










benefitted	 from	kickbacks	 from	 the	 sub-contracts	 of	 Petrobras,	 the	 scandal	 became	part	 of	 the	



















Congress)	 from	 judicial	 persecution.	 In	 this	way,	 it	was	not	 a	 legitimate	 attempt	 to	 remove	 the	
President,	but	a	subversive	strike	to	secure	impunity	for	the	corrupt	political	elite	that	had	grown	
disenchanted	with	Rousseff’s	leadership.	Facing	off	against	this	narrative,	an	inverted	tale	was	also	







In	news	 texts	of	2016,	portions	both	 large	and	 small	 of	 either	or	both	narratives	were	 recycled	
endlessly.	Characteristic	wordings	for	each	narrative	(such	as	golpe)	provided	short-hand	cues	on	










applying	 a	 frame	 research	 design	 to	 extensive	 scandals	 such	 as	 the	 Lava-Jato	 scandal	 (and,	
admittedly,	 precisely	 what	makes	 frame	 analysis	 interesting	 for	 comparative	 research	 between	
political	 contexts,	 while	 narratives	 are	 more	 unwieldy).	 Another	 problem	 is	 the	 fact	 that	
conventional	framing	analysis	impedes	access	to	the	diachronic	level	of	analysis,	being	locked	up	in	
the	synchrony	of	“frame	A	versus	frame	B.”	To	analyze	evolving	scandals	over	time,	with	frames	that	
emerge,	merge,	or	supersede	earlier	ones,	 this	 research	design	 is	 then	 inadequate,	as	would	be	
more	 advanced	 models	 of	 competitive	 frames	 (Chong	 and	 Druckman	 2007).	 Even	 to	 find	 out	
whether	 or	 not	 frames	 engender	 changes	 in	 political	 beliefs	 or	 preferences	 would	 require	 the	
researcher	to	isolate	audiences	from	external	interventions,	but	such	an	artificial	sequestering	of	
the	audience	 (Sniderman	and	Theriault	2004)	 is	hardly	 feasible.	 It	would	have	been	hopeless	 to	










in	 the	above	examples,	 it	 is	an	 imminently	strategical	practice	 to	deploy	specific	narratives	 (and	
		 22	
frames	 organized	 by	 these	 narratives)	 in	 the	most	 prestigious	 news	media.	 It	 is	 a	 political	 and	
communicative	 practice	 that	 journalists	 partake	 in,	 knowingly,	 albeit	 presumably	with	 different	
goals	than	political	actors.	Whereas	the	point	of	narrating,	for	the	political	actor,	would	be	to	define	
agency	and	political	space	in	strategic	terms	to	his	or	her	cause,	the	journalist	will,	ideally,	faithfully	








might	 suspect	 that	 frames	 may	 only	 be	 “selected”	 by	 news	 text	 producers	 if	 they	 fit	 within	
established	 narratives:	 For	 instance,	 Petrobras	 could	 never	 be	 represented	 as	 anything	 but	
“broken,”	because	that	would	not	fit	with	primary	definition	of	the	problem	(Hall	et	al.	1978:57-59),	







yet	 another	 concept	 adjacent	 to	 “frame.”	 While	 van	 Dijk	 (1988),	 as	 we	 saw,	 explicitly	 denies	
narratives	conceptual	space	in	news	texts	(locating	narratives	instead	in	the	minds	of	text	readers	






Jamieson	 1997:46).	 Gamson	 and	 Modigliani’s	 accounts	 of	 strips	 of	 events	 seem	 to	 be	 located	
outside	of	specific	texts,	like	those	generic	scripts	and	like	several	related	concepts	not	discussed	
here,	such	as	public	narratives	(Green,	Strange,	and	Brock	2002)	and	story	lines	(Hajer	2005).	Unlike	
scripts,	 however,	 I	 assume	 that	 such	 narrative-based	 accounts	 of	 strips	 of	 events	 (Appadurai	
1996:35)	must	 logically	have	definite,	non-generic	content,	and	have	identifiable	story	elements.	
Why?	Because	such	accounts	or	the	various	types	of	“organizing	ideas”	precisely	pick	out	and	pull	
together	 events,	 rather	 than	 generically	 calling	up	 themes.	A	border-line	 case	 is	 the	 concept	of	





















These	 examples	 overlap	 each	other	 to	 different	 degrees	 and	 in	 different	 dimensions:	 Some	are	
located	mentally,	some	textually;	the	elaboration	varies;	and	some	concepts	could	be	nested	within	












Researchers	 of	 scandals,	 like	 other	 media	 scholars,	 have	 also	 remarked	 on	 the	 relevance	 of	




























quality	 of	 mediated	 scandals.	 He	 constructs	 a	 basic	 as	 well	 as	 a	 more	 elaborate	model	 of	 the	
scandal’s	unfolding	events	(2000:24-5),	a	model	which	was	also	partly	present	in	his	contribution	to	
Lull	and	Hinerman’s	volume	(1997:39).	Thompson	specifically	sees	scandal	as	“a	kind	of	narrative	












thinking	 is	 central	 to	 Pujas’	 research	 design	 (2002),	 to	 Canel	 and	 Sanders	 (2006),	 and	 to	 the	
contributions	 in	 the	 volume	 edited	 by	 Allern	 and	 Pollack	 (2012).	 Canel	 and	 Sanders	 made	 an	
inventory	 of	 framing	 devices	 across	 Spanish	 and	 British	 scandals,	 but	 failed	 to	 connect	 this	 to	
outcomes	 (2006:154-68).	 Pujas	 highlighted	 the	 factors	 in	 the	 legal	 system	 and	 the	 journalistic	
profession	that	had	an	impact	on	the	trajectory	of	two	similar	scandals	in	France	and	Spain,	while	
several	 of	 the	 Scandinavian	 political	 scandals	 compared	 by	 Allern	 and	 Pollack	 explored	 how	
variables	of	gender	and	political	career	length	influenced	the	outcome.	Allern	and	Pollack	expands	
Thompson’s	framework	and,	like	him,	acknowledge	the	narrative	and	dramatic	aspects	of	scandals	
(2012:17-9),	 but	 in	 their	 conclusion	 to	 seven	hypotheses	 about	 scandals	 emphasize	 intra-media	
agenda-setting	 and	 framings	 of	 personal	 wrong-doing	 as	 the	 significant	 parameters	 of	 scandal	
coverage	(ibid.:181-8).	
	
A	 literature	 review	 of	 Brazilian	 scandal	 research	 (Silva	 2013:164)	 showed	 that	 Brazilian	 authors	
frequently	base	their	work	on	Thompson	(e.g.	Chaia	2015,	Feres	Júnior	and	Sassara	2016,	Miguel	
and	Coutinho	2007).	Other	Brazilian	researchers	study	scandals	and	public	opinion	in	an	aggregate	











(e.g.	 Lull	 and	 Hinerman	 1997:13).	 When	 historical	 and	 sociological	 analyses	 thus	 remain	








role	 (Goffman	 1956)	 of	 public	 office-holders,	 scandals	 embody	 just	 about	 every	 news	 value:	
relevance,	 drama,	 scandal,	 negativity,	 conflict,	 human	 interest,	 proximity,	 and	 suspense.	 These	
newsworthiness	criteria	(originally	discussed	in	Galtung	and	Ruge	1965,	see	also	Bell	1991:155-160)	































Portugal	 and	 the	 US),	 pundits	 even	 shift	 careers	 to	 become	 central	 political	 actors.	 The	 most	
frequently	researched	questions	relating	to	pundits	have	to	do	with	their	ascension	in	the	media	





little	knowledge,	and	our	 intuitions	about	 the	genre	need	 to	be	qualified	 […]	 there	 is	 to	my	knowledge	no	
research	taking	a	textual,	evaluative	approach	to	political	commentary	(Bengtsson	2015:12)	
	
Thus,	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 find	 research	 that	 explores	how,	why,	 and	 in	which	ways	 commentary	 is	
distinct	 from	 regular	 reporting,	 even	 though	 commentary	 deals	 in	 fact-centered	 news	 (but	 see	
Letukas	2014,	especially	ch.	6).	To	answer	such	questions	and	 the	previous	question	concerning	
attribution	 of	 meaning,	 we	 need	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 extant	 literature	 on	 political	 pundits	 and	
commentators,	as	well	as	the	literature	discussed	in	the	previous	sections.		
	










While	 not	 delving	 further	 into	 the	 emplotment	 of	 events	 presented	 by	 such	 interpreting	
newsworkers	and	pundits,	it	seems	clear	that	Nimmo	and	Combs	see	interpretation	as	a	plot-centric	
practice.	The	meaning	of	events	depends	on	other	events	 in	the	past	and	expectations	of	future	
events.	 Likewise,	 Nord,	 Enli,	 and	 Stúr	 (2012:91)	 describe	 pundits	 commenting	 on	 scandals	 as	
“professional	storytellers.”	Perhaps	 it	 is	a	general	condition	that	thinking	about	political	action	–	
such	as	the	cognitive	processes	of	audiences,	journalists,	pundits	and	professional	politicians	–	is	
























Punditry	 frequently	 involves	 prediction,	 and	 this	 was	 first	 pointed	 out	 by	 Alterman	 (1992)	 and	
Sigelman,	Manheim	and	Pierce	(1996).	Forecasts	of	political	events	“feed	the	insatiable	appetite	of	






















the	 production	 of	 journalistic	 material	 distributed	 on	 many	 authors	 and	 editors	 in	 news	
organizations,	 the	 news	 values	 and	 interpretation	 practices	 work	 in	 tandem	 to	 construct	 and	




















et	 al.	 1978:61),	 other	 public	 interpretations	 current	 en	 vogue,	 and	 the	 interpretations	 and	
justifications	given	by	the	implicated	political	actors.	This	means	that	pundits	partake	in	the	general	
economy	of	telling	stories,	but	with	a	distinct	license	to	connect	or,	rather,	emplot	events,	through	






In	 this	 chapter,	 I	have	 identified	several	 theoretical	 lacunas	and	a	 range	of	problems	 relating	 to	
nomenclature.	 Although	 the	 concept	 of	 narrative	 has	 cropped	 up	 repeatedly	 in	 seminal	media	
studies,	somehow	it	has	done	so	without	a	common	methodology	coalescing	that	might	address	
how	 news	 narratives	 are	 different	 from	 literary	 narratives	 (Pietilä	 1992:61).	 Thus,	 we	 are	 left	
without	the	desirable	analytical	precision	that	could	be	attained	after	the	narrative	turn	and	the	
complex	vocabulary	developed	in	the	wake	of	French	structuralism.	Worse	still,	research	has	lost	
sight	 of	 the	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 overlaps,	 and	might	 be	 fooled	 into	 believing	 in	 a	 “simple	
distinction	between	narratives	about	the	real	and	the	narratives	of	fiction”	(Hall	1984:5-6).	
	
For	 reasons	 that	 have	 to	 do	 with	 diverging	 theoretical	 approaches	 and	 disciplinary	 scopes,	
nomenclature	 problems	 have	 emerged	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 definitions	 of	 narrative	 (whether	
“narrative”	 refers	 to	 a	 full-bodied	 plot	with	 a	moral	 subject	 or	merely	 to	 a	 chain	 of	 events),	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 exact	 relationship	 between	 news	 production	 and	 narration,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
































studies	have	not	assembled	a	coherent	 set	of	 tools	 to	grasp	 the	way	 that	distributed	narratives	







article.	 This	 relates	 to	 the	 second	 theoretical	 limit:	 the	 bounded	 view	 of	 narrative	 authorship,	
attributing	 texts	 to	 identifiable	authors.	 This	 is	 an	unacknowledged	positivist	 (or	 at	 least	 a	 text-
centered)	stance	that	may	have	blinded	media	research	to	the	aggregate	aspect	of	news	and	its	
reliance	on	collective,	non-authored	narratives.	News	organizations	 churn	out	 texts	by	 recycling	
texts	spewing	forth	from	numerous	national	and	 international	news	agencies	(Aguiar	2014),	and	
news	media	outlets	are	comprised	of	layers	of	editors	cutting	and	trimming	sentences	to	produce	
texts	 that,	ultimately,	can	hardly	be	attributed	 to	single	authors	 (Bell	1991).	 In	 this	aspect	news	
stories	 appear	 like	 the	 camp-fire	 story,	 like	myth	and	 folklore:	 shared,	 evolving,	 and	 laden	with	
cultural	significance.	I	would	argue	that	the	story	ambience	of	earlier	epochs,	when	communities	
recycled	 and	 imperceptibly	 developed	 their	myths	 and	 legends	 through	 essentially	 un-authored	
story-telling,	 is	not	so	different	from	modern	mediascapes	where	news	organizations	 incessantly	
spin	news	stories	out	of	public	events.	Precisely	because	narrative	structures	emerge	“between”	






That	cultures	and	cultural	 identity	 is	defined	by	 the	stories	 told	was	an	 inaugural	 insight	 for	 the	













modern-day	 journalism	 in	 different	media	 systems?	 Do	 such	 patterns	 align	 or	 create	 space	 for	
contestation?	Which	production	processes	of	contemporary	media	are	influenced	by	an	explicit	or	
tacit	 inclination	 towards	pre-existing	narrative	patterns?	What	does	 the	degree	of	 alignment	or	










a	problematic	 assumption:	 Texts	may	be	heterogeneous	and	 try	out	 various	narratives	 to	make	
sense	of	events	and	to	articulate	multiple	visions	of	society,	and	so	coherence	cannot	be	assumed.	
Rather,	it	is	the	contestation	of	social	boundaries	and	the	posed	solutions	to	societal	tensions	and	



















Media	 scholars	may	 see	narratives	 in	 news,	 but	 rarely	 stop	 to	describe	 the	way	 that	 narratives	
emerge	in	news,	or	declare	their	procedure	or	theoretical	grounds	for	detecting	such	narratives.	
This	leaves	fundamental	questions	of	how	news	texts	could	be	analyzed	as	narratives	given	their	
non-fictional	 material,	 and	 how	 the	 narratives	 emerging	 in	 news	 intersect	 with	 other	 kinds	 of	
narrative	production	in	culture.	These	are	the	main	issues	to	be	addressed	in	this	chapter,	as	I	seek	
to	 establish	 the	methodological	 ground	 for	 the	 later	 analysis	 of	 news,	 and	 thereby	 remedy	 the	
lacunas	pointed	out	in	the	previous	chapter.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	develop	a	model	to	address	the	
way	that	news	on	scandals	articulate	narrative	structures	drawn	from	a	cultural	stock	or	repertoire,	
and	 argue	 that	 this	 can	 generate	 insights	 into	 the	 political	 unconscious	 (Jameson	 1981)	 of	 the	










The	 idea	of	 intertextuality	emerged	 in	parallel	with	French	structuralism,	and	was	articulated	by	
Julia	 Kristeva	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 earlier	 writings	 by	Mikhail	 Bakhtin.	 Bakhtin	 saw	 any	 discourse	 as	






















(ibid.).	 Later	 discourse	 analysts,	 such	 as	 Fairclough,	 took	 a	more	 limited	 view	 of	 intertextuality,	
arguing	 that	 “intertextual	 properties	 of	 texts	 are	 realized	 in	 linguistic	 features”	 (Fairclough	
1992:195).	He	asserted	 that	 intertextual	analysis	 should	 show	“how	 texts	 selectively	draw	upon	
orders	of	discourse	-	the	particular	configurations	of	conventionalized	practices	(genres,	discourses,	












and	 the	 range	 of	 discursive	 practices	 (Fairclough	 1995:58)	 arising	 in	 news	media	 genres.	 News	
narratives	emerge	in	intertextual	strings	of	texts	that	relate	and	build	on	top	of	each	other	(Cornfield	
1992:49).	 This	 argument	 is	 in	 line	 with	 recent	 research	 into	 narratives	 across	 speech	 events,	
underscoring	the	dialogic	nature	of	narrative	discourse	(Agha	and	Wortham	2005,	Hiramoto	and	












found	 in	 novels,	 for	 instance.	 Journalists	 may	 know	 the	 typical	 stages	 of	 scandals	 (e.g.	 Tiffen	
2002:291,	Lull	and	Hinerman	1997:11-13,	Thompson	2000:24ff),	but	the	narration	of	real	events	is	
always	at	risk	of	not	reaching	narrative	closure	(Silverstone	1981:136ff),	and	may	peter	out	at	any	














implicit	 regression	ad	nauseam	 resulting	 from	Bakhtinian	 thought:	How	can	we	ever	analytically	
close	off	a	chain	of	 linked	speech	events?	My	answer	would	be	that	 in	the	case	of	scandals,	 it	 is	
feasible	to	do	so	and	even	jettison	the	entire	metaphor	of	the	chain	used	by	Wortham	and	Rhodes,	




































































the	 social	 sciences:	 1)	 relationality	 of	 parts,	 2)	 causal	 emplotment,	 3)	 selective	 appropriation,	 and	 4)	










episodes	 is	 presented	 or	 experienced	 in	 anything	 resembling	 chronological	 order.	 This	 is	 done	 through	
"emplotment."	It	 is	emplotment	that	gives	significance	to	independent	instances,	not	their	chronological	or	
categorical	order.	And	it	is	emplotment	that	translates	events	into	episodes.	As	a	mode	of	explanation,	causal	
emplotment	 is	 an	 accounting	 (however	 fantastic	 or	 implicit)	 of	why	 a	 narrative	 has	 the	 story	 line	 it	 does.	
(Somers	1994:616)		
	













on	 the	 form	of	 references	 to	 the	person	Lula	as	a	public	 figure,	and	while	 reference	 is	 certainly	
intertextual,	it	is	not	narrativity.	References	may	shade	into	something	more,	however.	For	instance,	
the	phrase	“nunca	antes	neste	país”	–	never	before	 in	this	country	–	has	been	a	staple	 in	Lula’s	
public	 speeches,	a	catchphrase	of	his	 that	highlighted	 the	so-called	social	 conquests	 (of	political	
rights	 and	 social	 security)	 during	 his	 presidential	 periods	 (Kitzberger	 2010:26).	 Quotes	 or	
paraphrases	 of	 this	 figure	 of	 speech	 that	 appear	 in	 news	 texts	 may	 either	 be	 considered	 as	 a	
reference	 to	 specific	 speeches	 or	 more	 generally	 a	 reference	 to	 his	 reputation	 as	 orator	 and	
president.	 While	 also	 intertextual,	 the	 referenced	 event	 (a	 given	 speech)	 is	 not	 necessarily	
connected	causally	 to	other	events,	nor	necessarily	 reported	as	such.	A	 reference	 to	 the	phrase	
“republic	of	Curitiba”	 (Castro	2016,	see	Chapter	5	and	 footnote	9),	on	 the	other	hand,	could	be	









news	 text	mentioning	 corruption	 is	 full-blown	 narrative,	 and	 intertextual	 references	may	 be	 so	
blurry	 as	 to	 defy	 categorization.	 In	 principle,	 to	 identify	 a	 narrative	 in	 public	 media	 texts,	 the	
researcher	 must	 do	 what	 any	 discourse	 analyst	 does:	 Tentatively	 home	 in	 on	 the	 discursive	
phenomenon,	while	gradually	sharpening	the	attempts	to	produce	a	formal	definition	 in	a	back-
and-forth	manner.	At	the	outset,	this	means	trying	to	come	up	with	some	defining	features	of	the	


















markers	 that	 journalists	 use	 in	 order	 to	 abbreviate	 reference	 to	 such	 event	 structures.	 This	
intertextual	 referencing	 practice	 constructs	 a	 repertoire	 of	 short-hand	 lingo	 for	 easy-to-read	

















Roberto	 Costa	 was	 arrested	 on	 March	 20,	 2014.	 Commenting	 on	 the	 arrest,	 the	 political	
commentator	Eliane	Cantanhêde,	writing	for	Folha	at	that	time,	wrote	
	






that	 the	money-laundering	 ring	of	 the	doleiro	Alberto	Youssef	 came	under	public	 scrutiny.	Both	
cases	are	seen	as	potentially	problematic	for	the	“weakened”	President	Rousseff.	“The	Petrobras	
scandal,”	at	 this	moment,	meant	the	 full	purchase	of	 the	Texan	oil	 refinery	Pasadena	 in	2006,	a	
purchase	that	was	forced	upon	Petrobras	through	a	so-called	put	option	in	the	contract	whereby	





























is	 to	 start	 with	 some	 discursive	markers	 or	 signposts	 found	 in	 texts	 (references	 to	 scandals	 in	
Petrobras,	 to	 Rousseff’s	 corruption,	 Lula,	 Eduardo	 Cunha,	 etc.),	 and	 then	work	 out	 if	 the	 texts	
present	events	in	recurring	“narrative-based	accounts	of	strips	of	reality”	(Appadurai	1996:35).	The	
example	 above	 also	 shows	 the	 dilemma	 of	 delimiting	 narratives	 that	 really	 are	 emergent	 and	
evolving	 textual	phenomena.	 If	 one	 rigorously	pursued	 the	narrative	of	 “the	Petrobras	 scandal”	





later	 examples	 of	 media	 texts,	 I	 will	 show	 how	 the	 proposition	 is	 formulated	 in	 and	 through	
narratives.	Having	discussed	the	working	definition	of	plot	and	narratives	in	news	texts,	and	having	





The	narrative	 structures	 that	emerge	 in	 textual	 configurations	of	events	across	news	 texts	have	
certain	trajectories,	structures,	and	temporal	properties.	“Narrative	structure”	has	been	used	a	little	







generic	 types	 of	 narratives.	 Bal’s	 terminology,	 which	 expands	 formalist	 (Shklovsky	 1925)	 and	
		 38	
structuralist	 (Genette	1980)	categories	of	narrative	 layers,	provides	a	useful	 tool	 for	making	this	
distinction	between	(news)	texts,	specific	story-tellings	of	shared	event	structures,	and	the	shared	
event	 structures	 in	 themselves.	 An	 on-going	 discussion	 of	 levels	 of	 text	 analysis	 in	 the	 field	 of	















possible	mode	of	 language,	 open	 to	 all	 forms.	 The	 distinction	 of	histoire	 and	 narrative	discours	
helped	 to	 uncover	 the	 different	 ways	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 recite	 or	 tell	 the	 same	 narrative	 in	 very	
different	ways	without	changing	the	underlying	causal-historical	structure	of	events	(the	histoire)	
by	way	of	temporal	shifts	(flashbacks,	divinations,	etc.)	or	changing	viewpoints	of	the	narrators.	A	
similar	 distinction	was	 used	 by	 Russian	 formalists,	 one	 of	whom	 coined	 the	 terminological	 pair	
fabula-syushet	with	fabula	being	the	raw	material,	a	purely	abstract	sequence	(the	analytical	ground	
zero),	 and	 syushet	 being	 the	 sequence	 that	 actually	 happens	 to	 be	 narrated	 and	 realized	 in	 a	
particular	way	(Shklovsky	1925).		
	
Once	 the	 fabula-syushet	 distinction	 was	 introduced,	 it	 became	 possible	 to	 analyze	 the	 formal	
features	 of	 emplotment,	 that	 is,	 the	 many	 ways	 in	 which	 causal	 sequences	 of	 events	 can	 be	
reshuffled	in	the	narration.	Bal’s	later	standard	work	on	narratology	keeps	narrative	as	a	general	
term,	but	avoids	using	the	term	for	specific	analytical	levels	of	narratives	(Bal	1997).	Bal	argued	for	
a	 triple	 division	 (instead	 of	 the	 dichotomy)	with	 the	 terminology	 fabula-story-text.	 The	 Russian	
formalists’	concept	of	fabula	is	preferred	in	Bal	over	Genette’s	concept	of	story	(but	retains	basically	
the	same	meaning),	while	“story”	moves	position	 in	 the	model	and	now	designates	 the	realized	
























Let	me	 provide	 one	 compact	 example	 of	 how	 this	 distinction	 could	work:	 Three	media	 outlets	
produce	texts	on	the	same	event,	and	in	doing	so	they	are	reporting	the	same	story	(actor	A	said	or	
























While	 news	 is	 normally	written	 in	 the	 past	 tense,	 news	 that	 deals	with	 scandals	 features	more	
complex	temporal	structures.	In	this	section,	I	will	show	that	it	is	crucial	to	understand	the	tempus	






Analyzing	 the	 pseudo-autobiographical	 complexity	 of	À	 la	 recherche	 du	 temps	 perdu	 by	Marcel	
Proust,	 Genette	 created	 fine-grained	 categories	 of	 temporal	 analysis	 across	 the	 fabula-syushet	





above).	The	various	 types	of	discordance	between	the	orderings	of	 fabula	and	story	are	 termed	






Brooks	 have	 observed	 (using	 the	 Russian	 formalist	 terminology)	 that	 ”the	 fabula	 –	 'what	 really	
happened'	–	is	in	fact	a	mental	construction	that	the	reader	derives	from	the	sjuzet	[sic],	which	is	
all	 that	 he	 ever	 directly	 knows”	 (1992:13).	 Seen	 this	way,	 the	 fabula	 as	 such	 is	 an	 unreachable	
signified.	 For	 practical	 analytical	 purposes,	 however,	 this	 theoretical	 difficulty	 is	 generally	
disregarded;	so,	according	to	Genette:	”[We]	implicitly	assume	the	existence	of	a	kind	of	zero	degree	
that	 would	 be	 a	 condition	 of	 perfect	 temporal	 correspondence	 [between	 story	 and	 fabula]”	
(1980:36).	Working	with	the	fabula/story	distinction	allows	for	a	crucial	observation	concerning	the	
mental	work	involved	in	the	sense-making	and	writing	practices	described	above.	This	observation	
concerns	 the	 plot	 directionality,	 storytelling	 orientation,	 or	 emplotment,	 of	 the	 news	 texts	 in	
scandals:	 audience	members	 (and	 journalists	 or	 researchers)	 construct	 knowledge	 about	 'what	
really	happened'	on	the	basis	of	the	texts	they	encounter	and	the	stories	that	are	emplotted	in	the	
texts.	 To	 follow	 a	 story	 means	 “understanding	 the	 successive	 actions,	 thought,	 and	 feelings	 in	








really	 happened.	 That	 narrative	 desire,	 in	 which	 we	 indulge	 when	 reading	 detective	 stories,	 is	
mirrored	 in	 the	production	and	consumption	of	 journalistic	 texts	about	secrecy,	corruption,	and	















and-now	events	such	as	natural	disasters,	 the	past	of	corruption	scandals	 is	 furthermore	always	
doubled,	in	the	sense	that	two	(or	even	more)	conflicting	emplotments	exist	to	account	for	the	past.	






objectivity	which	 constrain	newsworkers	 (Albuquerque	and	da	Silva	2009:389,	Biroli	 and	Miguel	
2012,	Tuchman	1972).	Statements	that	are	difficult	to	fact-check	and	future	horizons	must	always	
be	treated	delicately	by	 journalists	so	as	to	stay	within	the	normally	accepted	limits	of	objective	
reporting	 and	 the	 taken-for-granted	 web	 of	 facticity.	 The	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 past,	 due	 to	 the	










All	 of	 this	 requires	 (mainstream)	 journalists	 to	 emphasize	 that	 statements	 and	 predictions	 are	
merely	 possibly	 true	 in	 order	 to	 stay	 on	 safe	 professional	 ground.	 Such	 grammatical	 and	
hypothetical	 hedging	 means	 that	 revelations	 and	 corruption	 stories	 branch	 into	 the	 territory	
discussed	in	literary	theory	of	the	fictional.	In	terms	of	temporality	and	narratology,	this	produces	
several	kinds	of	retrospective	tense,	zig-zag,	ellipsis	and	heterodiegetic	analepses	that	goes	back,	






If	 the	 past	 is	 complex	 and	 fundamentally	 in	 doubt,	 the	 present	 tempus	 of	 news	 reporting	 on	
corruption	scandals	seems	more	straightforward.	The	“now”	of	daily	newspapers	is	conventionally	
established	by	the	media	format	itself.	Anderson	argued	(and	I	return	to	this	below)	that	the	“date	
at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 newspaper,	 the	 single	 most	 important	 emblem	 on	 it,	 provides	 the	 essential	
connection	-	the	steady	onward	clocking	of	homogeneous,	empty	time.	Within	that	time,	'the	world'	
ambles	sturdily	ahead”	(Anderson	1983:33).	The	emblematic	date	is	then	unfolded	in	the	present	




is	a	 “distinctive	and	 tyrannical	aspect	of	daily	 journalism	 [:]	 the	 injunction	 that	 the	elements	be	
assembled,	arrayed,	and	accounted	for	in	the	lead,	the	topic	sentence,	or	at	best	–	here	is	where	
the	 inverted	 pyramid	 comes	 in	 –	 the	 first	 paragraph”	 (Carey	 1987:148).	 Leads	 have	 a	 specific	




than	telling,	the	deictic	 function	 locates	stories	at	a	 live	or	recent	“now”	and	at	a	tangible	place	
(Montgomery	2007:104).	
	
The	 medium	 of	 television	 is	 fundamentally	 attuned	 to	 “the	 essential	 temporal	 structure	 and	
dynamic	 of	 the	 living	 moment”	 (Scannell	 2014:174-175).	 Emulating	 this,	 and	 transgressing	 the	
somewhat	more	historical	“now”	of	the	newspapers’	date-line	and	the	live-cast	visual	cues,	web	
media	are	becoming	just	as	obsessed	with	temporality	and	liveness	as	television.	This	has	meant	










(Genette	1980:40,	67),	but	 in	analysis	of	scandal	reporting,	the	future	tense	 is	as	rich	an	area	 in	
temporal	complexity	as	the	past	tense.	Since	narrative	closure	is	usually	delayed	in	scandals,	the	
two	main	kinds	of	prolepses	 -	anticipation	and	expectation	 -	are	very	present	 in	such	 texts.	The	
distinction	 between	 anticipation	 and	 expectation	 extends	 Genette’s	 vocabulary.	 These	 two	










Future	temporality	 	 	 	 (Direction	of	Causality	)	 	 	 	
Expectation:	 	 	 rA	 	 e	---->		 	 	 	 eB	













tend	 to	 cluster	 their	 reports	 and	 questions	 around	 a	 shared	 set	 of	 events	 on	 the	 horizon,	 the	












discourse	construct	specific	 frames	for	 the	 interpretation	of	 reported	events	and,	crucially,	 their	
consequences.	Some	news	frames	make	future	events	salient	in	order	to	let	the	reader	perceive	the	
likely	 resolution	of	conflict,	 say,	or	political	 struggles.	A	 framing	of	 struggle	may	be	 linked	 to	an	
intertextual	fabula.	For	example,	in	news	texts	on	scandals,	the	story	arcs	deployed	to	make	sense	
of	denunciations	and	consequences	 invoke	certain	futures	for	the	political	arena.	These	possible	








oeuvre,	 to	want	 resolution.	Although	many	possible	patterns	of	media	 text	consumption	can	be	





Whereas	 literature,	 according	 to	 Bal,	 has	 some	 structural	 limitations	 regarding	 anticipation	 and	




order	 to	 present	 coherency	 and	 legitimize	 claims	 of	 newsworthiness.	 Conjecture	 enters	 the	












pundits	 allows	 for	 this	 exchange	 of	 authority	 and	 conjecture:	 Assessments	 of	 political	 strength,	
intentionality,	 space	 for	 agency	 etc.	 is	 discussed	 with	 the	 commentator,	 as	 are	 the	 possible	
consequences	 of	 transpired	 events.	 Through	 these	 two-ways,	 the	 behind-the-scenes	 are	
represented	and	the	“real”	intentions	of	the	actors	are	described	and	evaluated.		
	





































































This,	of	course,	makes	 for	good	television	as	well	as	 flaming	headlines:	As	 the	scandal	breaks,	critique	and	
condemnation	forms	the	bulk	of	the	news	material	until	(if	ever)	evidence	is	produced	and	a	juridical	process	















The	 actants	 are	 not	 necessarily	 locked	 in	 the	 corners	 of	 such	 a	 system,	 but	may	move	 around,	
depending	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	 scandal	 (see	 for	 example	Gronbeck	 1997	 on	 the	 Clinton	
couple’s	skilled	management	of	the	Lewinsky	affair).	Before	I	consider	the	dynamic	possibilities	of	





characters	 were	 reducible	 to	 their	 narrative	 functions;	 the	 hero	 of	 a	 quest	 tale	 was	 never	 a	
psychological	subject	like	in	a	novel,	but	a	vehicle	for	the	development	of	the	story	(Propp	1928).	In	
the	 later	French	structuralism	of	Lévi-Strauss	and	especially	Greimas,	 the	characters	came	to	be	
seen	 as	 invested	with	 values.	 To	be	more	precise,	 to	Greimas	 a	 character	 “is	 defined,	 in	 a	way	
analogous	to	society,	by	the	assumption	of	contents	in	which	he	invests	and	which	constitute	his	
personality,	and	by	the	disclaiming	of	contents	which	he	rejects”	(Greimas	and	Rastier	1968:95-96).	







	 	 Social	system	 (Lévi-Strauss)	 	 	 	 Individual	system	
Permitted	and	unacceptable	sexual	relations	 	 Desired	and	feared	sexual	relations	
(matrimonial)	 	 (abnormal)	
Prescribed									 forbidden	 	 	 	 desired	 	 feared	
		 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 X	




























limited	 space	 to	 be	 “private,”	 while	 state	 representatives	 in	 Congress	 in	 some	 situations	 are	
expected	to	think	of	their	local	constituencies	first,	and	the	common	good	second.	
	
Such	 a	 schema	of	 political	 transgressions	 could	 be	overlaid	 in	 scandals	with	 another	 schema	of	










Innocent	 	 Guilty	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 X	
Not	guilty	 	 Not	innocent	
Punished	 	 Punished	 	
	








In	 a	 narrative	 about	 a	 corruption	 investigation	 and	 consequent	 trial,	 the	 logical	 protagonists	 of	










Competent	 	 Partisan	 	 	 	
	 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	













From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 what	 is	 problematical	 about	 Propp's	 character-functions	 (hero,	 donor,	 villain)	 or	








Non-person	 actors	 are	 possible	 within	 a	 fabula,	 according	 to	 Bal.	 Immaterial	 concepts	 are	
sometimes	 implied	 as	 actors	 -	 Justice	 could	 be	 an	 object,	 and	 the	 justice	 system	 could	 be	 an	
opponent,	just	as	groups	(parties,	coalitions,	populations,	judicial	or	media	professionals)	should	be	
considered	as	actors.	The	Constitution	of	1988	frequently	emerges	as	a	factor	in	discussions	and	















and	 methods	 of	 Lévi-Strauss	 and	 Greimas	 in	 order	 to	 propose	 an	 imminently	 political	 (and	
Althusserian	 Marxist)	 reading	 of	 literature.	 This	 came	 just	 at	 the	 moment	 where	 French	 post-
structuralism	 (from	 Derrida,	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari	 to	 Baudrillard	 and	 Lyotard)	 had	 gained	
prominence	in	 international	 literature	and	cultural	studies.	Jameson	however	 insisted	that	 it	still	
made	 sense	 to	 search	 for	 structures	 in	 the	 socially	 symbolic	 acts	of	 literature,	 although	he	 (like	
Deleuze)	balked	at	the	idea	of	reducing	all	such	acts	to	one	set	of	meaning	through	the	application	




hedging	 off	 the	 private	 and	 psychological	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 reification	 of	 the	 symptom	 of	
contemporary	life.	His	project,	in	The	Political	Unconscious,	is	to	detect	the	traces	of	class	struggles	
in	the	“single	vast	unfinished	plot”	of	human	history,	and	to	restore	“to	the	surface	of	the	text	the	

















of	 any	 specific	 and	 historical	 human	 community,	 on	 the	 contrary	 constitute	 the	 empty	 slots	 and	 logical	



























unconsciousness.	 Like	 premodern	 narrators,	 the	 journalistic	 storytelling	 voice	 is	 a	 cultural,	 non-









national	 community	 is	 partly	 constructed	 by	 the	 media	 practices	 that	 invoke	 this	 community	
textually	 (Anderson	 1983:28-46)	 or,	 to	 be	 more	 precise,	 practices	 that	 invoke	 this	 community	
intertextually.	Media	discourse	articulating	concepts	of	nation	and	nationality	groups	together	and	
organizes	 individuals	 in	specific	ways,	all	 the	while	excluding	other	groupings	and	other	ways	of	





















Iraq,	 the	 discovery	 of	 a	 rare	 fossil	 in	 Zimbabwe,	 and	 a	 speech	 by	 Mitterrand.	 Why	 are	 these	 events	 so	








Mali	has	disappeared	or	 that	 famine	has	wiped	out	all	 its	 citizens.	The	novelistic	 format	of	 the	newspaper	
assures	 them	 that	 somewhere	 out	 there	 the	 'character'	 Mali	 moves	 along	 quietly,	 awaiting	 its	 next	
reappearance	in	the	plot.	(ibid.:33)	
	
Nations	may	 thus	 appear	 as	 quasi-characters,	 historical	 entities	moving	 forward	 in	 time,	 in	 the	
















in	 Latin	 America	was	 tied	 to	 the	 projects	 of	 establishing	modern	media	 (Martín-Barbero	 1997).	





































a	 distributed	 or	 decentered	 way,	 as	 fragments	 of	 a	 veritably	 un-authored	 cultural	 production.	




project	 identity-formation	 (Polletta	 1998:139).	 Because	 news	 texts	 partake	 in	 intertextually	






Before	 I	 can	commence	such	an	analysis	of	 the	Lava-Jato	case,	however,	 I	will	 first	describe	 the	
Brazilian	mediascape	 in	 order	 to	 characterize	 the	 contemporary	 political	 journalism,	 the	 recent	












The	 first	 sections	of	 this	chapter	provide	background	knowledge	 for	 readers	unfamiliar	with	 the	
Brazilian	media	 system.	 First,	 I	will	 outline	 the	 basic	 descriptive	 parameters	 used	 by	Hallin	 and	
Mancini	(2004,	2011)	in	their	comparative	analysis	of	media	systems.	Several	scholars	of	Brazilian	













and	political	 bases,	while	 the	parameter	 third	 covers	 the	 relationship	between	 state	and	media	
industry.	These	two	parameters	can	be	thought	of	as	explanatory	factors	for	textual	phenomena	
such	as	advocacy	journalism,	political	instrumentalization	and	ideological	bias,	which	are	discussed	
extensively	 among	 Brazilian	 scholars	 as	 the	 background	 of	 the	 latest	 decade	 of	 scandals	 (e.g.	
Lattman-Weltman	 and	 Chagas	 2016,	 Nascimento	 2013,	 Feres	 Júnior	 2016:284).	 The	 latter	 two	
parameters	 (concerning	 political	 parallelism	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state)	 are	 described	 here	 with	
emphasis	on	the	coverage	of	parties	and	governments,	and	the	ideological	leanings	of	the	central	
media	outlets	in	Brazil.	I	have	opted	not	to	discuss	the	parameter	of	professionalization,	and	the	






coverage	 of	 the	 protests	 in	 June	 2013.	 These	 examples	 constitute	 the	 historical	 precedents	
immediately	 leading	up	 to	 the	political	 scandals	of	2014-2018,	but	 they	also	 illustrate	 the	 three	
parameters	of	the	media	systems	model.		
	
This	 chapter	 also	 explains	 the	 choice	 and	 limits	 of	 the	 empirical	 scope	 in	 this	 dissertation.	One	
important	starting	point	for	this	chapter	(and	for	the	sampling	strategy	chosen	for	this	thesis)	is	the	
concentration	of	ownership	and	vertical	integration	of	Brazilian	media,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	strong	








The	Grupo	Globo	 is	 owned	 by	 one	 family,	 like	 the	 rest	 of	 large	 Brazilian	media	 conglomerates.	
Globo’s	 owners	 are	 brothers	 who	 inherited	 the	 executive	 positions	 from	 their	 father,	 Roberto	
Marinho,	 who	 held	 much	 political	 influence	 since	 the	 dictatorship	 period	 and	 throughout	 the	
transition	(Lima	2004).	Today,	the	media	business	empire	of	the	Marinhos	mostly	faces	challenges	

























that	 the	news	agencies	 associated	with	 two	newspapers	 (Folha	 and	Estado)	 are	 responsible	 for	 90%	of	 all	
agency-credited	news	published	by	the	newspapers…	Adding	the	Globo	agency,	the	percentage	is	95%.	This	

























In	the	second	half	of	the	19th	century,	 (relatively)	 large-scale	 industrial	print	runs	of	newspapers	
emerged	 in	 the	Southeastern	state	capitals	 (such	as	Estado	de	São	Paulo,	 founded	 in	1875	as	A	
Província	 de	 São	 Paulo;	 Jornal	 do	 Brasil,	 founded	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 1891;	 and	Correio	 do	 Povo,	
founded	in	Porto	Alegre	in	1895).	O	Globo	and	Folha	de	São	Paulo	(then	Folha	da	Manhã)	were	both	
founded	in	1925	(Azevedo	2006:93).	The	relative	circulation	of	such	newspapers	reached	an	apogee	
in	 the	1950’s	but	declined	 soon	after:	 “In	 the	early	 fifties,	 the	newspaper	 industry	 in	Brazil	was	




Opinião,	 Repórter,	 Movimento,	 and	 Pif-Paf	 as	 some	 of	 the	 most	 important	 and	 most	 read	













weeklies	 (Nascimento	2013)	has	taken	strong	anti-PT	stances	 in	the	 last	 two	decades	 (Biroli	and	
Miguel	2012:39ff).	CartaCapital,	 founded	as	a	monthly	magazine	by	Mino	Carta	 in	1994	 (weekly	
since	2001),	provides	a	counterpoint	to	the	three	mainstream	weeklies	for	a	left-wing	audience.	In	
2014-2016,	CartaCapital	 had	 only	 a	 few	 competitors	 competing	 for	 that	 target	 audience,	most	
prominently	the	printed	magazines	Caros	Amigos	and	Revista	Piauí,	(Damgaard	2018b:26).		
	



























Newspaper	 2005	 2010	 2015	 2016	
Folha	de	S.	Paulo	 309383	 295558	 175441	 154700	
O	Globo	 276385	 257262	 183404	 181000	
Extra	 267225	 248119	 136000	 128000	
Estado	de	S.	Paulo	 231165	 212844	 149241	 146000	










Diário	 Gaucho,	 Expresso	 and	Metro	 São	 Paulo.	 Though	 these	 papers	 account	 for	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 total	




online	 news	 sites,	 but	 news	 consumption	 via	 social	media	 (especially	 Facebook	 and	WhatsApp)	
recently	saw	a	decline	after	years	of	growth	(Newman	et	al.	2017:107).	The	leading	newspapers	are	
also	leaders	on	the	online	market	for	news	(ibid.),	with	the	Folha-affiliated	UOL	platform	slightly	















early	1980s,	while	 the	older	Rede	Record	reappeared	as	a	contender	on	 the	scene	 in	 the	1990s	
(Matos	2012a,	Porto	2012:70).	Record’s	newscast	conquered	some	of	the	audience	in	the	evening	
news	 slot,	 going	 from	4	 percent	 of	 the	 audience	 in	 1996	 to	 17	 percent	 in	 2008,	 but	 the	 Jornal	
Nacional	 has	 remained	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 broadcast	market,	while	 SBT’s	 and	Records	 newscasts	
compete	for	the	second	place	(ibid.:72).	Today,	Jornal	Nacional	usually	captures	two	to	three	times	
the	 audience	 of	 Jornal	 da	 Record	 and	 about	 five	 times	 the	 audience	 of	 Jornal	 do	 SBT	 (Ribeiro	
2017:113),	and	the	newscast	was	usually	the	most	watched	or	the	second-most	watched	program	
in	2015-2016,	only	 surpassed	by	hit	 telenovelas	 and	 semi-global	 entertainment	 formats	 like	Big	
Brother.		
	








highest,	 with	 81	 percent	 using	 TV	 as	 source	 of	 news	 on	 a	 weekly	 basis	 –	 despite	 the	 self-
identification	of	the	majority	of	these	respondents	as	mainly	digital	(Newman	et	al.	2015:54).	For	
non-digital	users	and	for	vast	rural	areas,	reliance	on	TV	for	news	can	be	assumed	to	be	even	higher,	
given	 the	 limited	 print	 media	 circulation	 and	 internet	 coverage.	 Of	 the	 total	 advertisement	
expenditure	in	Brazil,	60	percent	was	located	in	television	in	2009	(Porto	2010:116),	and	for	these	
reasons,	researchers	such	as	Porto	have	previously	concluded	that	“broadcast	television	remains	
the	 dominant	medium”	 (ibid.:110)	 –	 although	 the	 advertising	market	 is	 shifting	 towards	 global	
internet	players	(Carro	2016:20).		
	
In	 sum,	 despite	 a	 diverse	 regional	 media	 market	 and	 increasing	 internet	 access,	 information	
concerning	the	national	political	arena	in	Brasília	is	still	filtered	initially	through	very	few	newsrooms	
–	a	triumvirate	of	broadcasters,	a	handful	of	quality	newspapers,	and	a	few	weekly	magazines	and	










daily	 news	 on	 politics	 flow	 primarily	 from	 newsrooms	 and	 agencies	 connected	 to	 the	 Globo	
conglomerate,	Folha	and	Estado	de	S.	Paulo	(Abramo	2007:99),	and	these	“quality”	newspapers	are	

















to	 cross	 several	 flows	of	 the	Brazilian	mediascape	and	 see	how	elite	media,	 tabloid	media,	 and	
newscasts	mutually	 constitute	and	manage	 the	narrative-based	accounts	of	 reality	presented	 to	
their	 audiences.	 The	more	or	 less	 independent	media	outlets	 that	 have	emerged	online	usually	
reflect	and	offer	counterpoints	to	the	coverage	of	scandals	provided	in	the	legacy	media	(Carvalho	
and	 Albuquerque	 2017,	 Becker	 and	Waltz	 2017:124-5).	With	 emphasis	 on	 the	 so-called	 quality	
papers	O	Globo,	Folha	and	Estado	de	S.	Paulo,	one	might	object	that	the	thesis	focus	on	material	
that	is	not	representative	of	all	Brazilian	media,	nor	of	the	average	Brazilian’s	news	consumption.	







gatekeeping	 power	 is	 potentially	 problematic,	 because	 biased	 coverage	 may	 rapidly	 propagate	
down	the	chain	of	vertically	 integrated	media;	 from	a	news	agency	to	media	platforms,	regional	
newspapers	and	 sites,	or	 from	a	national	broadcast	 to	a	 range	of	affiliated	 radio	and	broadcast	





The	 work	 of	 Hallin	 and	 Mancini	 builds	 partly	 on	 Seymour-Ure’s	 (1974)	 concept	 of	 parallelism	
between	 media	 organizations	 and	 political	 parties	 or	 movements.	 Party-press	 parallelism,	 or	







industry	 with	 a	 mass	 market	 sufficient	 to	 provide	 an	 independent	 economic	 base”	 (Hallin	 and	
Papathanassopoulos	2002:183).	Instead,	media	organizations	were	harnessed	by	local	oligarchs	and	
specific	 political	 interests,	 often	 in	 competition	 with	 other	 similar	 organizations.	 This	 model	 is	
termed	“polarized	pluralist”	by	Hallin	and	Mancini,	and	advocacy	journalism	and	political	control	of	









apply	 easily	 to	 the	 Brazilian	media,	 both	 because	 political	 parties	 do	 not	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	
presidential	countries	such	as	Brazil	and	because	the	leading	media	organizations	have	adopted	a	









party	 system.	 It	would	be	better,	 though,	 to	define	Brazilian	media	as	 a	manifest	 adherence	 to	 the	 liberal	
model,	 of	media	 neutrality	 and	 independence	 vis-à-vis	 political	 interests,	 although	 this	 is	 only	 imperfectly	
accomplished.	(Miguel,	Biroli	and	Mota	2012:138)	
	





2007,	 Nunes	 Leal	 1997,	 Motter	 1994).	 The	 finer	 points	 of	 the	 conceptual	 relation	 between	
instrumentalization	 of	 media	 and	 political	 parallelism	 notwithstanding	 (Albuquerque	 2013:748,	
Mancini	2012),	there	is	ample	evidence	of	a	“media	opening”	in	Brazil	at	the	national	level	after	the	
first	 free	 elections	 of	 1989	 (Porto	 2012).	 Like	 TV	Globo,	Folha	and	O	Globo	 strove	 to	 present	 a	
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ads	 newspapers	 in	metropolitan	 areas.	 To	 counter	 the	 economic	 pressures	 on	 this	 news	media	
market,	the	three	large	daily	papers	have	strengthened	their	political	profile	in	the	last	decade	or	
so,	bringing	about	what	 Lattman-Weltman	has	 termed	 repartidarização	 –	 the	 resurgence	of	 the	
party	press	(Lattman-Weltman	and	Chagas	2016).	With	a	stronger	focus	on	political	news,	Estado,	
Folha	and	O	Globo	have	tried	to	distinguish	themselves	from	popular	newspapers	with	more	focus	
on	 celebrity,	 sports	 and	 quotidian	 news.	 This	move	 has	 been	 to	 secure	 the	 share	 of	 the	 news	
consumers	actually	willing	to	pay	for	quality	news,	since	the	advertisement	is	moving	towards	other	
online	 channels	 (Carro	 2016:26),	 and	 the	 revenue	 of	 advertisement	 is	moving	 from	 the	 quality	
newspapers	to	new	mediating	companies	in	the	value	chain	of	the	advertisement	industry.		
	
















Because	 the	 mainstream	 outlets	 have	 increased	 their	 negative	 coverage	 of	 the	 PT,	 and	 since	
regional	media	and	radio	stations	are	allied	to	or	owned	by	exactly	these	media	organizations,	one	
might	 think	 that	 the	Brazilian	case	still	 fits	 the	polarized	pluralist	model.	However,	Albuquerque	
























polarized	 pluralist	model,	 but	 rather	 present	 a	mix	 of	 “objective”	 news	 in	 the	 North	 American	
















infrastructure	 of	 telecommunications	 (Matos	 2012a:50).	 Since	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy,	
Brazilian	governments	have	maintained	a	model	of	regulation,	subsidies,	and	allowed	the	vertical	
integration	of	media	groups	 to	continue,	 thus	concentrating	media	 in	a	 few	conglomerates.	The	
media	policy	that	resulted	in	concentration	of	media	ownership	mostly	had	the	aim	of	reinforcing	












which	 in	 the	 90s	 went	 to	 a	 few	 hundred	 outlets	 in	 only	 182	municipalities,	 were	 split	 up	 and	
		 62	
redistributed	 to	 thousands	 of	 smaller	 outlets	 across	 the	 country	 (Biroli	 and	 Miguel	 2013:89).	
Augmenting	 this	 shift,	 the	 government	 initiated	 a	 new	 phase	 of	 state-media	 relations	with	 the	
creation	of	 centralized,	 federal	public	 service	broadcasting:	The	Empresa	Brasil	de	Comunicação	
(EBC)	was	founded	in	2007	by	a	provisory	decree,	ratified	in	2008	in	order	to	fuse	the	Radiobrás	














non-state	 media	 organizations	 and	 actors	 (Kitzberger	 2014,	 2016).	 Admittedly,	 the	 PT	
administrations	acted	less	aggressively	through	policy	than	in	Venezuela	or	Argentina,	but	it	is	true	
for	 all	 three	 cases	 that	 “governments	have	 frequently	 clashed	with	dominant	media	 companies	
identified	with	conservative	economic	and	political	 interests.	Presidents	have	 regularly	 criticized	
leading	 media	 companies	 for	 representing	 anti-popular	 interests	 and	 conspiring	 to	 overthrow	
them”	(Waisbord	2013:134).	 Instead	of	paraphrasing	this	critique,	 I	will	now	unfold	some	of	the	

















TV	 Globo’s	 historical	 dominance	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 political	 project	 of	 the	 military	 governments	
(Guedes-Bailey	and	Jambeiro	2008:58,	Matos	2012b:867,	Lima	2004:51).	In	the	1980s,	the	charge	




restricted	election,	 taking	 the	mantle	before	 the	dying	president-elect	Tancredo	Neves	could	be	
sworn	in	(Skidmore	and	Smith	2001:174).	The	explosion	of	exposés	under	Sarney	was	attributable	
both	to	high	incidence	of	political	corruption	and	the	newfound	freedom	of	press.	The	problems	of	
political	 bias	 in	 political	 coverage	 (and,	 especially,	 in	 scandals),	 however,	 is	 normally	 located	by	
researchers	 after	 Sarney’s	 term.	 Even	 so,	 Porto	highlights	 the	 fact	 that	 Sarney	was	 friends	with	
Roberto	Marinho,	 leader	 of	 the	 Globo	 conglomerate	 (Porto	 2012:106).	 This,	 according	 to	 Lima	
(2004:53),	eventually	resulted	in	situations	going	far	beyond	bias	in	news	coverage,	when	Sarney	at	
the	 end	 of	 his	 term	 needed	Marinho’s	 blessing	 before	 appointing	ministers.	 Thus,	 the	 oligarch	
Marinho	exerted	a	 remarkable	but	opaque	 influence	on	national	politics	via	his	powerful	media	
organization,	 distorting	 the	 democratic	 potential	 of	 vertical	 accountability	 inherent	 in	 media	
(Smulovitz	and	Peruzzotti	2000).	
	
Bias	 in	news	can	be	more	or	 less	precisely	defined,	but	 for	each	 free	presidential	election	since	
Sarney’s	presidency,	the	kind	of	bias	emphasized	and	criticized	by	scholars	has	changed.	For	this	





















Other	 researchers	 have	 argued	 that	 investigative	 journalism	 in	 Brazil	 was	 really	 replaced	 by	
denuncismo	 (Abreu	 and	 Lattman-Weltman	 2000:3,	 Fernandes	 2011:197,	 Miguel	 and	 Coutinho	
2007),	which	 loosely	 translates	 into	exposés	based	on	unsubstantiated	allegations,	 fueled	by	 “a	
journalistic	 culture	 obsessed	 about	 the	 dealings	 of	 government	 and	 that	 consistently	 applies	
identical	patterns	to	unveil	wrongdoing”	(Waisbord	2000:88).	Waisbord	observed	that	“closeness	
between	 journalists	and	official	 sources	 is	also	 indispensable	 for	 the	media	 to	delve	 into	official	




The	 collusion	 between	 Brazilian	 journalists	 and	 their	 official	 sources	 gives	 rise	 to	 problems	 of	
counter-denunciations:	 “Journalists’	 dependence	 on	 officials	 also	 allows	 some	 sources	 to	 avoid	
denunciation,	while	at	 the	 same	 time	ensuring	 that	 the	media	will	 publicize	accusations	against	
rivals”	(Porto	2011a:111).	Institutional	actors,	such	as	the	public	prosecutors,	are	well	aware	of	the	
journalistic	interest	in	juicy	bits	from	investigations,	and	have	been	known	to	give	interviews	and	
disclose	 information	 to	media	 that	would	 benefit	 their	 court	 strategies	 (Arantes	 2002:157-162,	
Chaia	and	Teixeira	2000).	Since	 this	 thesis	 is	not	a	newsroom	study,	and	since	 I	have	elsewhere	
accounted	for	the	journalist-source	relationships	in	the	Lava-Jato	case	(Damgaard	2018b,	Chapter	
3),	 I	 will	 not	 expand	 on	 the	 problems	 of	 doing	 “politics	 by	 other	 means”	 through	 denuncismo	
(Peruzzotti	2006:256),	but	only	note	that	the	political	power	of	denunciations	and	scandals	in	the	













unemployment	 in	some	regions	were	also	allegedly	under-reported	 in	newscasts	 (Kucinski	1998,	


















media	 alleged	 that	 money	 had	 been	 pulled	 from	 slush	 funds	 of	 Lula’s	 PT	 and	 dealt	 out	 to	




























later,	on	 July	14,	Lula	 for	 the	 first	 time	responded	to	 the	case	 in	public,	 in	an	 interview	with	an	
independent	 journalist.	Here,	Lula	acknowledged	that	his	party	had	made	mistakes,	but	had	not	
done	 anything	 that	wasn’t	 usual	 in	 Brazilian	 politics	 (Monteiro	 2005).	 Lula’s	 alleged	 role	 in	 the	








President	 Lula	 appeared	 on	 national	 television,	 ostensibly	 to	 present	 a	 cabinet	 reshuffle	 in	
consequence	 of	 Dirceus's	 resignation.	 During	 the	 speech,	 Lula	 finally	 made	 a	 planned,	 public	








commissions	 that	 interviewed	various	 involved	 in	 the	 following	months.	 In	April	5,	2006,	a	 joint	
congressional	 committee	published	a	 report	about	 the	 case	 (Pereira,	Power	and	Raile	2011:34),	




The	media	 reveled	 in	 the	 investigations,	 committees,	and	denunciations.	The	Mensalão	exposés	
initiated	a	significant	general	rise	in	the	scandal	coverage	found	in	the	weekly	press,	so	that	“the	














28,	 the	 charges	 against	 the	 40	 politicians	 and	 businessmen	 were	 accepted,	 turning	 them	 into	
defendants	 and	 starting	 the	 trial	 called	 Ação	 Penal	 470.	 The	 court	 established	 a	 schedule	 for	
obtaining	witness	statements	for	the	defendants,	a	process	that	lasted	one	and	a	half	years.	In	the	


















narrative	 postulates	 a	 basic	 discontinuity	 effected	 by	 the	 mensalão	 trial.	 Operating	 within	 a	 progressive	
temporality,	the	Brazilian	nation	has	come	to	be	prosperous	but	pestered	by	corruption	and	other	forms	of	
dysfunctional	governing.	This	narrative,	 in	 turn,	 relies	on	several	other	narratives	and	conceptions,	each	of	
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those	 projecting	 certain	 ideals	 and	 beliefs	 about	 the	 actors	 and	 institutions	 involved	 in	 this	 “milestone”	
narrative.	The	journalists	and	editors	in	several	instances	use	the	case	to	emphasize	the	role	of	investigative	
media	 as	 the	 fourth	branch	of	 government,	monitoring	 the	quality	 of	 democracy	on	behalf	 of	 the	people.	
(ibid.:213)	
	



































a	 clear-cut	 story	 of	 conflict…	 Secondly,	 this	 narrative’s	mediatization	 of	 the	mensalão	 trial	 as	 a	 conflict	 of	







image	 of	 legitimate	 power,	 adding	 more	 skin	 hues	 to	 the	 palette,	 and	 framing	 the	 typical	 white	 elite	
parliamentarians	as	villains.		
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Finally,	 the	 increased	 focus	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 STF	 in	 Brazilian	 politics	 underscores	 the	 process	 of	
























Smaller	protests	against	bus	 fare	hikes	occurred	early	 in	2013:	200	people	united	 in	February	 in	
Porto	Alegre	protesting	augmented	public	 transportation	 fares,	 and	 similar	protests	occurred	 in	






banks	and	business	associations	are	based,	was	criticized	by	the	press	 for	disrupting	the	 flow	of	 traffic,	 for	




one	 commentator	 framing	 the	 protesters’	 motives	 as	 “politically	 ignorant	 stupidity	 mixed	 with	
rancor”	 (Alzamora	 and	 Arce	 2014:6).	Minor	 street	 protests	 ensued	 on	 June	 10,	 and	 11	 (Singer	
2013:24),	and	the	São	Paulo	protests	on	June	11	and	13	were	again	violently	repressed	by	the	police	
(ibid.).	 The	 violence	 galvanized	 Brazilians	 online,	 and	 was	 denounced	 on	 social	 media	 (and	 in	




























some	violent	 incidents	and	a	brief	occupation	of	 the	Congress	by	protesters	 in	Brasília	 (Avritzer	
2016a:72,	Singer	2013:26).	In	the	third	week	of	June,	the	slogans	for	change	and	protests	against	
transportation	fare	hikes	were	supplanted	by	political	topics	concerning	public	expenditure,	health	
and	 security	 (ibid.:78).	 The	 topic	of	 corruption	and	discontent	with	 the	Rousseff	 administration,	
around	June	20,	began	to	claim	the	spotlight	 in	the	Twittersphere	and	 in	the	mainstream	media	
coverage	of	the	same	period	(Avritzer	2016a:81,	92).	On	national	TV,	Rousseff	announced	the	need	






problems	 of	 corruption	 (Singer	 2013:36).	 Facebook	 groups	 such	 as	 Revoltados	 Online	 and	




























increasingly	 became	 polarized	 and	 politicized	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 (Lattman-Weltman	 and	 Chagas	
2016,	Feres	Júnior	and	Sassara	2016:210),	and	scandals	and	exposés	grew	to	be	the	main	material	
of	 the	 weeklies	 and	 the	 “quality”	 newspapers.	 The	 events	 highlighted	 in	 this	 chapter	 set	 the	
standard	for	the	coverage	of	the	Lava-Jato	case,	analyzed	in	the	next	chapter.	First,	the	election	of	
Lula	as	the	first	left-wing	president	since	the	return	to	democracy	shifted	media	attention	to	the	
increasingly	 established	 left-wing	 political	 elite,	 primarily	 organized	 around	 PT.	Whereas	media	
exposés	in	his	predecessor’s	government	had	been	less	effective,	the	first	scandal	involving	Lula’s	
ministers	quickly	led	to	resignations,	and	the	public	prosecutors	accumulated	independence	in	his	
presidential	 periods	 (Arantes	 2011),	 especially	 at	 the	 top-level,	 as	 became	 apparent	 during	 the	






elections,	 arguing	 that	 such	 negative	 coverage	 of	 well-known	 candidates	 should	 have	 negative	





Negative	 coverage	 does	 not	 translate	 uniformly	 nor	 directly	 into	 political	 preferences,	 in	 other	
words.	In	any	case,	the	media	conglomerates’	attention	to	scandals	made	Lula’s	successor	Rousseff	
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The	 hermeneutic	 endeavor	 of	 this	 chapter	 poses	 certain	 ethical	 choices	 concerning	 selection,	
























moments	of	emplotment	 shared	between	a	 range	of	news	 texts.	While	 I	 follow	 the	 intertextual	
trajectories	in	order	to	present	and	analyze	them,	while	not	supposing	them	to	be	the	“real”	or	the	
only	explanations	for	the	political	events	-	far	from	it.	Only	by	mapping	out	the	shared	plot	structures	





of	 analysis,	 I	 will	 present	 selected	 passages	 from	 the	 sampled	 weekly	 magazines	 and	 daily	
newspapers	that	deal	with	the	Petrobras	directors	and	businessmen	of	the	construction	sector	who	
were	 initially	 arrested	by	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations	 in	2014-2015.	 In	 some	 texts,	 the	 cartel	 of	
subcontractors	 appears	 as	 the	 obvious	 antagonist	 of	 the	 plot,	 but	 in	 several	 examples	 the	





















depth.	 I	 selected	 these	 two	 newscasts	 because	 they	 contain	 crucial	material	 that	 established	 a	














The	 fifth	 section	 of	 analysis	 unpacks	 examples	 sampled	 from	 the	 complex	 corpus	 of	 news	 on	
impeachment,	going	back	to	the	coverage	found	in	the	daily	newspapers	and	their	online	platforms	
in	early	2015,	skipping	 the	backstage	events	already	described	 in	 the	 third	section,	 instead	 fast-
















The	 operation	 that	 apprehended	 Youssef	 did	 not	 quite	 catch	 the	 eye	 of	 the	 national	 media,	
however.	While	the	case	was	covered	briefly	on	March	18,	it	was	not	linked	to	Petrobras	before	it	
became	 known	 that	 a	 former	 director	 of	 Petrobras,	 Paulo	 Roberto	 Costa,	 was	 in	 cahoots	 with	









media,	 a	 few	political	 pundits	 discussed	 the	 possible	 ramifications	 of	 the	 investigation,	 and	 the	



















































Like	 other	 news	 and	 columns	 in	 this	 early	 phase	 of	 the	 scandal,	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 corruption	 is	
















2014),	 the	 strategy	of	 snitching	 is	disapproved	by	Youssef’s	 lawyer,	Antonio	Augusto	Figueiredo	
Basto.	He	argued	 that	 Youssef	was	 really	 just	 a	 scapegoat	 in	 the	grander	 scheme	of	 things:	 “’O	
Alberto	é	mero	bode	expiatório	num	esquema	muito	maior,	sobre	o	qual	não	há	nenhum	interesse	
em	investigar.	Você	acha	que	ele	teria	 feito	tudo	de	que	é	acusado	sem	um	parlamentar?’”	The	
figure	of	a	scapegoat	 for	 the	political	elite	 is	 interesting,	as	 it	expands	the	scope	of	 the	scandal,	














Vaccarezza.	 This	 already	 impressive	 list	of	political	 actors	was	eclipsed	 completely	 the	 following	





da	 rede	 de	 corrupção	 remetem	 a	 2004,	 com	 a	 nomeação	 de	 Paulo	 Roberto	 Costa	 para	 a	 Diretoria	 de	





Leaked	details	 from	Youssef’s	testimony	were	also	published	 in	Veja.	 In	a	 lightning-strike	special	
issue	out	of	the	normal	publication	schedule,	the	Friday	before	the	second	round	of	election,	Veja‘s	
front-page	headline	read	“They	knew	it	all”	-	printed	on	top	of	the	faces	of	Rousseff	and	ex-president	









titled	 7th	 phase	 of	 Lava-Jato	 “Juízo	 Final”	 –	 the	 “Final	 Judgment.”	 27	 preventive	 and	 temporary	











front-pages	 the	 following	 years,	 signalling	 spin-offs	 from	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations.	 After	 six	
months’	worth	of	coverage,	weekly	magazines	and	daily	newspapers	alike	had	settled	on	the	same	












em	Curitiba,	 capital	 em	que	 correm	os	 processos	 da	 Lava-Jato,	 tem	 sido	 dura	 a	 rotina	 dos	 integrantes	 do	
chamado	 clube	 do	 bilhão,	 que	 até	 recentemente	 cruzavam	 os	 céus	 do	 país	 a	 bordo	 de	 jatos	 particulares.	
(V#2408)	
	









verdade.	 Como	Paulo	 Roberto	 Costa	 revelou	 com	 toda	 a	 clareza,	 tratava-se	 de	 um	esquema	de	 desvio	 de	
dinheiro	para	partidos	e	campanhas	políticas	organizado	[sic]	pelo	partido	no	poder,	o	PT.	(V#2408)	
	
Scapegoats	 are	 less	 to	 blame	 than	 the	 transgressors	 who	 designated	 the	 scapegoats;	 the	
characterization	thus	establishes	a	hierarchy.	The	hierarchy	of	transgression	is	also	marked	out	by	
the	qualifying	phrase	that	states	that	the	corruption	could	appear	to	be	“only	the	collusion	of	greedy	


































never	 build,	 Pinheiro	 had	 the	 beachside	 apartment	 built,	 allegedly	 at	 Lula’s	 request.	 In	 Veja’s	













share	 in	 the	 association	 and	 the	 rights	 to	 an	 apartment.	After	 the	bankruptcy	of	Bancoop,	OAS	
merely	executed	the	construction	of	some	of	the	buildings,	in	the	end	only	providing	apartments	to	









































their	 own	 enrichment.	 Some	 reports	 in	 the	 same	 period	 account	 for	 the	 exorbitant	 riches	 that	
businessmen	 and	 directors	 confess	 to	 having	 siphoned	 off;	 such	 confessions	 and	 the	 “hard”	
numerical	evidence	however	lacked	in	the	case	of	politicians.	Thus,	in	lieu	of	scathing	evidence	that	
attested	directly	to	the	benefits	gained,	the	alleged	close	relationships	to	imprisoned	businessmen	
connote	 corruption	 and	 transgression.	 Blame	 is	 assigned	by	 association,	 in	 short,	 or	 rather,	 the	




and	 Lula	 in	 particular;	 thereby	 the	 systemic	 dimensions	 of	 corruption	 in	 Brazil	 are	 denied	 as	 a	
relevant	 factor,	 and	 other	 political	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 Petrobras	 graft	 are	 backgrounded	 (a	
containment	strategy	common	to	many	of	the	coming	examples).	The	suspicion	clinging	to	personal	
relations	draws	upon	the	commonplace	discourse	that	describes	corruption	in	Brazilian	bureaucracy	
as	 related	primarily	 to	 influence	networks	 (Johnston	2007,	 Power	 and	Taylor	 2011).	 Finally,	 the	
emplotment	here	locates	specific	decision-making	power	(e.g.	the	power	to	direct	investments	in	





CEOs	 such	 as	 Nestor	 Cerveró	 or	 Renato	 Duque,	 nor	 expand	 on	 the	 shifts	 in	 coverage	 of	 Paulo	






Odebrecht	 resulted	 in	more	 front-pages	 in	 the	weeklies,	 headlines	 and	 news	 reports.	 Although	












































Moro.	 Bergamo’s	 short-form	 column	 focalizes	Marcelo	 and	 his	 reactions	 in	 two	 short	 narrative	





A	 pergunta	 recorrente	 ontem	entre	 advogados	 e	 políticos	 era:	 qual	 a	 chance	 de	Marcelo	Odebrecht	 fazer	
delação	premiada?	"Zero",	diz	um	dos	advogados	da	equipe	do	empreiteiro.	 [...]	Pouco	antes	de	ser	preso,	
Marcelo	Odebrecht	não	escondia	sua	contrariedade	com	Dilma	Rousseff.	Ele	afirmou	a	mais	de	um	interlocutor	


























E	 notas	 fiscais	 da	 Polis	 Digital,	 encontradas	 na	 contabilidade	 da	 Odebrecht,	 chamaram	 a	 atenção	 de	









Both	 texts	 anticipate	 future	 legal	 steps	 in	 a	 trial.	 Bergamo’s	 final	 paragraph,	 describing	 the	






a	 chain-of-command	starting	at	 the	presidential	palace	 in	Brasília	has	extended	 to	 the	 top-floor	











































a	maioria	 fica	 em	 Curitiba	 e	 de	 lá	 não	 sai.	Moro	 alia	 virtudes	 raríssimas	 para	 a	missão:	 preparo	 jurídico,	
pensamento	estratégico,	inflexibilidade	de	princípios,	coragem	moral	e	disciplina	de	trabalho.	Entra	cedo,	sai	
tarde	e	prossegue	na	lida	mesmo	de	casa.	Alguns	dos	procuradores	da	força-tarefa	compartilham,	em	maior	




































in	 a	 fight	 against	 corruption.	 Alone	 in	 the	 desert,	 the	 preacher	 or	 apocalyptic	 prophet	 calls	 for	
repentance	and	conversion.	As	 implied	 in	 the	Estado	quote	above,	 it	might	be	a	vain	hope	 that	











only	 businessmen,	 doleiros,	 and	 ex-politicians,	 it	 was	 perhaps	 surprising	 that	 he	 arose	 to	 the	
position	of	 a	national	 icon.	O	Globo	named	Moro	 the	person	of	 the	 year	 in	March	2015	 (Netto	
2016:169),	and	his	name	and	face	were	on	display	in	street	protests	against	corruption	and	against	
PT.	 The	 uncommon	 celerity	 of	 the	 trials	 in	 his	 Curitiba	 court,	 and	 the	 stiff	 sentences	 delivered	
certainly	set	his	processes	and	sentences	apart	from	many	trials	against	members	of	the	political	
elite.	 This	 was	 only	 possible,	 however,	 because	 a	 division	 of	 labour	 and	 jurisdiction	 emerged	
between	 Moro’s	 court	 and	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 Brasília.	 In	 the	 Brazilian	 system	 of	 political	
privileges	 and	 court	 prerogatives,	 every	 politician	 in	 office	 holds	 the	 so-called	 foro	 privilegiado,	
which	 can	be	 translated	as	 the	 right	 to	be	 judged	before	a	 court	of	 a	higher	 tier	 than	 common	
citizens.	Ex-parliamentarians	hold	no	such	privilege,	however,	and	so	with	the	authorization	judge	
Moro,	the	federal	police	could	apprehend	ex-Congressmen	–	or	ex-presidents.	The	foro	also	extends	
to	 the	 right	 of	 denunciation,	 so	 that	 duty	 of	 investigating	 and	 eventually	 indicting	 politicians	 in	







be	 used	 legally	 for	 investigations	 of	 government	 leaders	 and	 federal	 representatives	 if	 the	 PGR	
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chose	to	pursue	the	 inquiry,	and	only	 if	 the	Supreme	Court	 then	authorized	 investigations.	This,	
effectively,	delayed	investigations	of	politicians	in	public	office.	Even	so,	already	by	the	end	of	2014,	
rumors	floated	in	the	weekly	magazines	about	the	likelihood	of	such	investigations.	Many	names,	
supposedly	 involved	 in	 the	 Petrobras	 graft,	 leaked	 from	 Youssef	 and	 Costa’s	 testimonies,	 as	
described	above.	In	February	2015,	the	rumors	of	Brasília	had	it	that	the	PGR’s	office	was	close	to	













office	 of	 public	 prosecutors	 (the	 MPF).	 Janot,	 as	 Prosecutor-General,	 becomes	 a	 symbol	 that	
generated	“tension”	and	“fear”	in	Congress.	The	list	was	eventually	finalized	on	March	3,	2015,	and	
sent	to	the	Supreme	Court,	where	the	Supreme	Justice	Teori	Zavascki	authorized	and	publicized	the	






dealing	with	 senator	 Romero	 Jucá.	 The	 PGR	 also	 requested	 inquiries	 opened	 to	 investigate	 the	
governors	of	Rio	and	Acre,	Luiz	Fernando	Pezão	and	Tião	Viana,	but	these	requests	were	sent	to	the	










de	 apreensão	 em	 Brasília,	 principalmente	 entre	 os	 parlamentares	 e	 demais	 políticos	 citados	 na	 operação	
(E23/10	2015)	
	














there	 was	 a	 discernible	 pattern	 in	 the	 apparent	 chaos	 of	 party	 monikers,	 because	 a	 growing	



















that	PMDB	was	ever	 involved	 in	the	Petrobras	scandal,	 in	Folha	 (F29/12	2014)	as	well	as	 in	Veja	
(V#2400).	During	February,	Cunha’s	name,	however,	was	rumored	to	be	on	the	list	of	investigation	
requests	that	the	Prosecutor-General	Rodrigo	Janot	was	compiling.	The	rumors	were	eclipsed	in	the	






















or	 power	 projected	 in	 these	 titles	 are	 demonstrated	 early	 in	 the	 article:	 Cunha	 succeeded	 in	
removing	one	of	the	President’s	ministers,	Cid	Gomes,	because	Gomes	had	referred	to	Congress	as	










In	 spite	 of	 his	 past,	 “not	 a	 monument	 of	 ethics,”	 Cunha	 always	 “escaped	 the	 tsunami	 of	
investigations”	and	“none	of	the	accusations	made	 in	the	 judicial	arena	had	any	consequences.”	
Thus,	the	text	inserts	Cunha’s	power	not	only	in	courtrooms	and	in	politics	but	also	in	the	domain	



















doleiro	 Careca.	However,	 the	 report	 states	 that	Careca’s	 testimony	had	been	withdrawn	by	 the	
















O	 Globo’s	 headline	 the	 same	 day	 echoed	 Folha’s:	 “Eduardo	 Cunha’s	 testimony	 in	 the	 CPI	 of	






by	a	 statement	by	Sibá	Machado	of	PT	 -	 the	same	quote	 reported	 in	Estado.	 In	O	Globo,	 this	 is	
interpreted	 as	 an	 attempt	 “to	 clear	 out	 a	 tense	 ambience	 between	 Cunha	 and	 the	 Planalto.”	
Machado	is	furthermore	quoted	for	his	critique	of	the	use	of	plea	bargains.	The	reporters	interpret	












What	 is	 missing	 from	 each	 of	 these	 accounts,	 however,	 is	 Cunha’s	 statement	 concerning	 bank	
accounts.	The	accounts	are	obliquely	mentioned	in	the	broadcast	report	of	the	same	evening:	In	TV	
Globo’s	 Jornal	Nacional,	 a	news	 report	 starts	off	with	Cunha’s	defense,	which	 in	 the	 voice-over	
reporter	words	consisted	of	reading	out	each	mention	of	his	name	in	the	investigation	petition,	and	
pointing	out	the	contradictions	(JN12/3	2014).	However,	these	contradictions	are	not	detailed	then,	
as	 the	 reportage	 goes	 on	 to	 show	 the	 PGR	headquarters	 and,	 still	 in	 voice-over,	 describing	 the	
suspicions	of	the	prosecutors.	A	picture	of	the	doleiro	(and	supposed	PMDB	henchman)	Fernando	
“Baiano”	 Soares	 is	 shown,	while	 the	 voice-over	 finishes	 the	 allegations	 of	 Cunha’s	 and	 PMDB’s	




















declines	 to	 comment	 on	 Cunha’s	 accusations	 of	 politically	 motivated	 investigation.	 The	 exact	
moment	in	the	session	where	Cunha	denies	having	hidden	funds,	being	partner	in	corporations,	or	
having	bank	accounts	overseas,	was	not	picked	up	by	the	media	at	this	point.	This	response	came	
during	a	phase	of	questions	 from	 the	CPI	members.	 The	denial	would,	however,	 turn	out	 to	be	
crucial.	
	
In	 any	 case,	 minute	 differences	 between	 the	 framings	 in	 the	 texts	 and	 representations	 are	
discernible:	O	Globo’s	report	gives	more	emphasis	to	the	critical	questions	than	TV	Globo’s	evening	



































ally	Solange	Almeida	had	put	pressure	on	companies	 from	the	Petrobras	cartel	 in	 the	preceding	




























































Cunha	 acusou	 Camargo	 de	 ser	 mentiroso.	 O	 deputado	 alega	 que	 o	 lobista	 [Camargo]	 sofreu	 pressão	 do	
procurador-geral	da	República,	Rodrigo	Janot,	e	do	governo	para	emendar	sua	delação	premiada	e	citar	seu	
nome.	 Na	 sexta-feira	 passada,	 Cunha	 reagiu	 anunciando	 o	 rompimento	 com	 a	 presidente	 Dilma	 e	 a	 base	
governista:	"Tem	um	bando	de	aloprados	no	Planalto".	Ele	se	disse	agora	parte	da	oposição	e	informou	que	a	
Câmara	abrirá	CPIs	para	apurar	desmandos	no	BNDES	e	nos	 fundos	de	pensão.	Na	quinta-feira	de	manhã,	




































Even	 if	 the	media	 attention	was	 drawn	 to	 the	 impeachment	 petitions,	 to	 new	 committees,	 the	
government	crisis,	and	the	national	fiscal	situation,	Cunha	remained	under	scrutiny	in	the	Lava-Jato	
investigation.	 Júlio	Camargo’s	plea	bargain	became	 the	basis	of	 the	 first	 formal	denunciation	of	
Cunha.	On	August	20,	 the	PGR	 indicted	Cunha	and	Solange	Almeida	 for	extortion	and	graft	 in	a	







After	 the	 indictment,	 however,	 Cunha’s	 process	 stalled	 in	 the	 Supreme	Court,	 and	 it	 took	eight	
months	before	he	was	charged	before	the	Court	(in	a	session	on	March	3	the	following	year).	Before	
that	happened,	another	indictment	and	several	other	investigations	of	Cunha	had	been	initiated	by	




disciplinary	 commission	 of	 the	 Câmara,	 the	 Ethics	 Council,	 moved	 somewhat	 faster	 than	 the	
Supreme	Court,	but	the	resulting	disciplinary	process	was	restarted	multiple	times,	because	Cunha	














Through	 the	 delay	maneuvers,	 the	 elected	 speaker	 of	 the	 case,	 Fausto	 Pinato,	was	 hindered	 in	







truce,	 protecting	 him	 from	 disciplinary	 action	 and	 her	 from	 impeachment.	 However,	 the	 PT	
congressman	Zé	Geraldo	stated	outright	that	this	was	blackmail,	“a	knife	to	the	throat,”	and	that	he	
and	 his	 two	 colleagues	 in	 the	 Ethics	 Council	 were	 less	 than	 happy	 holding	 the	 trigger	 for	 the	
impeachment	 (de	 Almeida	 2016:105-106).	 According	 to	 several	 media,	 Rousseff’s	 ministers,	 or	
sometimes	even	Lula,	had	negotiated	a	ceasefire	with	Cunha:	
	





com	o	governo.	Com	os	 seguidores	que	 tem	na	Câmara,	está	 confiante	em	que	conseguirá	ver	o	processo	
contra	si	arquivado	no	Conselho	de	Ética.	(E#906)	
	






















não	 asseguraram	 votos	 para	 enterrar	 seu	 processo	 de	 cassação,	 o	 presidente	 da	 Câmara	 dos	 Deputados,	






petition	 was	 not	 founded	 in	 any	 legal	 base,	 and	 that	 it	 was	 not	 her	 having	 secret,	 Swiss	 bank	
accounts,	alluding	to	Cunha’s	case	(JN2/12	2015).			
	
The	 motif	 of	 Cunha’s	 revenge	 is	 a	 focalization	 of	 the	 Cunha-Rousseff	 (or	 Cunha-PT)	 conflict.	
Effectively,	 it	eclipses	agency	of	the	person	who	stood	to	gain	the	most	from	impeachment:	the	
vice-president.	As	the	media	had	already	uniformly	portrayed	the	political	negotiations	relating	to	
the	 disciplinary	 process	 as	 the	 cause	 of	 Cunha’s	 choice,	 the	 pressure	 from	 other	 actors	 within	
government	or	 in	 the	opposition	 is	not	considered	as	cause.	 Impeachment,	 in	 the	news	texts	of	
December	2015,	is	emplotted	as	the	resolution	and,	in	consequence,	the	escalation	of	the	conflict	








The	above	quote	 is	 from	 the	political	 commentary	 “Supremo	Em	Pauta,”	 co-written	by	 a	 group	
academics	led	by	Eloísa	Machado.	The	same	suspicion	of	vengeance	as	the	driving	force	appeared	
across	 the	 board	 of	 the	media	 studied	 here:	 PT	members	 denounced	 it	 as	 “explicit	 blackmail”	
(E3/12a	2015),	an	interpretation	repeated	by	the	Estado	pundit	Marco	Aurélio	Nogueira	(E3/12b	
2015)	and	the	political	analyst	Otávio	Amorim,	and	in	a	translated	Economist	editorial	on	December	
5	 reproduced	 in	 Estado	 (E5/12	 2015).	 However,	 the,	 Estado	 editors	 later	 explicitly	 denied	 the	
vengeance	motif:	
	
Como	 primeiro	 ponto	 a	 ser	 difundido	 pela	 militância,	 o	 governo	 federal	 tenta	 vincular	 o	 pedido	 de	

































Nos	 bastidores	 da	 Câmara,	 deputados	 creditam	 a	 decisão	 de	 Cunha	 de	 dar	 seguimento	 ao	 processo	 de	
impeachment	 de	Dilma	 Rousseff	 a	 rumores	 de	 que	 a	 Procuradoria-Geral	 da	 República	 (PGR)	 pode	 pedir	 o	
afastamento	dele	da	presidência	da	Câmara	a	qualquer	momento.	Desde	o	início	da	semana,	essa	possibilidade	
vem	 sendo	 ventilada	 pelos	 corredores	 da	 Casa.	 Representantes	 da	 base	 e	 da	 oposição	 ingressaram	 no	
Ministério	Público	pedindo	a	saída	de	Cunha	sob	o	argumento	de	que	ele	estaria	usando	a	estrutura	da	Câmara	




The	 intertextual	 shift	 demonstrated	 across	 these	 texts	 dislocated	 Cunha	 from	 the	 role	 of	 the	


































Rousseff.	 While	 the	 media	 as	 little	 as	 three	 months	 earlier	 had	 been	 keen	 on	 exposing	 the	
differences	and	disharmony	between	the	current	and	the	former	ex-president	(e.g.	G1-29/10	2015),	
this	pattern	changed	in	February	and	March	2016.	Crucially,	Lula’s	alleged	corruption	in	these	two	
real	 estate	 cases	 then	became	Rousseff’s	 problem,	 because	 a	 narrative	 developed	 around	 their	
close	 relationship	 and	 combined	 efforts	 to	 stop	 the	 Lava-Jato	 probe,	 or	 at	 least	 to	 obstruct	 it.	
Historically,	 the	metaphors	 of	 criador/criatura	 (creator	 and	 creation)	 or	mentor	 and	 pupil	were	
common-place	descriptions	of	the	relationship	between	Lula	and	Dilma.	This	metaphor-set	was	now	





locations	 frequented	by	Lula	after	his	period	as	president	was	 in	 fact	connected	to	the	cartel	of	
construction	 companies	 that	 grew	 enormously	 in	 his	 presidency	 (aligning	 with	 earlier	 exposés	
concerning	OAS	and	Odebrecht	in	2015,	e.g.	V#2423).	The	ties	between	Lula	and	the	construction	
company	OAS	 had	 been	 pursued	 by	 journalists	 of	 all	 the	main	media	 in	 January	 and	 February,	











that	went	 on	 to	 be	 exposed	 in	 the	 Panama	 Papers).	 Despite	 Conserino’s	 statement	 in	Veja,	 or	
perhaps	because	of	 it,	Lula’s	 lawyers	succeeded	 in	challenging	the	competency	of	the	São	Paulo	
prosecutors,	 starting	 a	 series	 of	 legal	 struggles	 in	 February	 about	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 case.	 The	













TV	 Globo’s	 evening	 newscast	 that	 night	 compressed	 the	 many	 elements	 of	 coverage	 that	 had	
unfolded	during	the	day’s	live	coverage	(on	GloboNews	and	the	competing	news	channels).	Rather	
















situations	 that	 are	 seen	 as	 nationally	 important	 and	 historically	 exceptional.	 By	 describing	 the	
overall	 structure	 of	 this	 particular	 newscast,	 I	will	 unpack	 the	 sequence,	 implicit	 hierarchy,	 and	
emplotment	and	integration	of	events.	
	
The	 Jornal	 Nacional	 newscast	 on	 March	 4	 starts	 off	 with	 a	 complex	 escalada	 (initial	 headline	
sequence,	 see	Montgomery	and	Feng	2016)	 that	outlines	 the	events	of	 the	day	and	 the	coming	











and	Lula’s	 response.	The	 first	 report	of	 the	newscast	consists	 in	 five	minutes	of	on-site	 footage,	























quotes	 the	 investigators,	 affirming	 that	 there	 are	 good	 reasons	 (“proofs	 and	 evidence”)	 for	
investigating	 the	 ex-president,	 and	 the	 following	 footage	 of	 the	 prosecutor	 Lima	 explicates	 the	







































could	 be	 critically	 interpreted	 as	 a	 characterization	 of	 relevance	 or	 truth	 value,	 or	 simply	 as	 a	
necessary	 sequence	 of	 representing	 an	 accusation	 and	 the	 consequent	 defense.	 However,	 by	
splitting	each	denunciatory	claim	from	the	counterclaim,	it	is	not	at	all	times	clear	how	these	relate,	
and	half	of	 the	 sequences	 from	Lula’s	press	 conference	are	preceded	by	an	 introduction	by	 the	
newscast	anchors	 that	disqualifies	or	 throws	 into	doubt	Lula’s	explanations.	Thus,	 in	 four	out	of	
seven	subsections	of	this	nine-minute	report	on	the	conference,	the	anchors	start	by	pointing	out	
the	flaws	and	omissions	of	the	argument	presented	by	the	ex-president.	 In	this	conference,	Lula	







Hierarchical	priority	 is	given	 to	 the	 investigation	rather	 than	 the	ex-president,	 locating	authority	
rather	strongly	with	the	Lava-Jato	task	force.	Aside	from	the	ex-president,	a	number	of	PT	members	
are	discredited,	and	the	violent	aggression	is	more	clearly	attributed	to	the	supporters	of	this	party	
























right	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 escalada,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 initial	 headline	 sequence	 that	 would	
normally	be	mostly	located	in	the	studio.	By	leaving	the	standard	pattern	of	the	introduction,	and	
by	making	a	cutaway	to	on-site	footage	immediately,	a	sense	of	urgency	is	established	at	the	formal	
level,	 matching	 the	 content.	 Similarly,	 several	 of	 the	 news	 reports	 are	 uncommonly	 long	 and	
repetitive,	lasting	between	six	and	nine	minutes	a	piece	with	few	shifts	in	the	material,	in	passages	
of	up	to	two	uninterrupted	minutes,	and	the	overall	elimination	of	all	other	news	items	is	significant	




Moving	on	 to	 the	 scripted	 text	 of	 the	newscast,	 the	 apparent	 arrest	 of	 Lula	 is	motivated	 a	 few	
seconds	after	the	first	headline,	indirectly	quoting	the	prosecutors	of	the	Lava-Jato	task	force,	who	
“affirmed	 that	 the	 institute	 and	 the	 company	 received	 payments	 and	 donations	 from	 the	 five	
Petrobras	contractors	most	involved	in	the	graft	(desvio)	of	money	from	Petrobras.”	This	is	the	first	
mention	 of	 wrong-doing,	 supplemented	 a	 little	 later	 (at	 0:58)	 by	 “pagamento	 de	 vantagem	
indevida,”	meaning	“payment	for	an	illicit	advantage,”	and	the	mention	of	the	company	OAS	having	
paid	for	storage	for	Lula's	“objects.”	The	objects	referred	to	are	gifts	of	public	office,	which	had	been	








to	 Lula,	 and	 that	 justice	 arrived,	 literally	 and	 figuratively,	 at	 the	 ex-president’s	 doorstep	 –	 as	
declared	 in	 the	 first	 sentence	 of	 the	 headline	 sequence:	 “A	 operação	 Lava	 Jato	 chega	 ao	 ex-
		 100	
presidente.”	The	transgression	is	initially	shown	even	more	clearly	than	it	is	labelled	or	described:	




The	 most	 visible	 actors	 in	 the	 newscast	 are	 the	 participants	 from	 the	 Lava-Jato	 task-force	
investigating	the	ex-president,	with	the	federal	prosecutor	Carlos	dos	Santos	Lima	as	the	principal	
face	 of	 the	 task-force.	 Three	 other	 investigators	 (Igor	 Romário	 de	 Paula,	 Roberto	 Leonel,	 and	
Eduardo	Mauat)	receive	much	less	on-screen	time.	Towards	the	end	of	the	newscast,	Lula	makes	
his	entry	in	a	long	news	report,	and	the	president	Rousseff	appears	briefly	at	the	very	end.	A	number	
of	 unnamed	 actors	 should	 also	 be	 mentioned,	 because	 several	 protesters	 in	 various	 stages	 of	




republican.	Already	 in	 the	escalada,	 in	 his	 first	 appearance,	 he	 exhorts	 the	 equal	 application	of	
justice.	The	operation	code-name	is	rendered	from	Greek	by	the	anchor	Bonner	as	“the	search	for	
the	truth.”	Lima	returns	as	truth-seeking	protagonist	at	several	points	in	the	newscast,	starting	with	





Lula	 (see	 below).	 In	 this	 way,	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 legitimate	 newsmakers	 is	 constructed	 and	 the	




A	 few	other	 sources	 are	 present	 directly	 in	 the	newscast.	 In	 the	 fifth	 news	 report,	 two	 citizens	




































“conducão	coercitiva,”	or	 “coercive	apprehension.”	The	agent	 states	 that	persons	 linked	 to	 Lula	
would	 try	 to	 hinder	 the	 interrogation,	 a	 claim	 that	 works	 as	 a	 premonition	 of	 the	 violent	 PT	
supporters	depicted	at	Congonhas	in	the	following	footage	sequence.	Thus,	the	necessity	and	claim	
to	legality	for	the	coercive	apprehension	hinges	upon	the	claim	of	violence;	or,	put	another	way,	










rates	and	serious	public	security	 issues,	 it	 is	peculiar	that	pushing	and	yelling	between	groups	of	
non-armed,	aging	protesters	would	merit	a	minute	of	prime-time	television.	However,	the	intention	
of	emphasizing	violence	 in	protests	can	be	 interpreted	as	a	way	of	 robbing	the	protests	of	 their	
democratic	merit.	But	the	violence	is	not	depicted	equally	among	both	“sides,”	and	one	“side”	is	
thus	 clearly	more	 discredited	 through	 this	 contrast:	While	 one	 protester,	 in	 a	 red	 shirt	 (visibly	
decoded	as	PT	supporter)	is	shown	as	violent,	attacking,	another	protester	clothed	in	the	national	
football	team	shirt	is	shown	as	wounded	–	it	could	probably	be	the	other	way	around,	but	it	is	hardly	












Just	after	 Lima's	 first	appearance	 in	 the	escalada,	 footage	of	 Lula's	 spontaneous	post-testimony	
press	conference	was	shown.	This	juxtaposition	underscored	the	opposition	of	actors.	Lula,	at	first	
indirectly	 quoted	 by	 both	 anchors	 in	 rapid	 succession,	 ”refutes	 the	 accusations,	 criticizes	 the	
coercive	apprehension,	 and	 says	 that	he	would	have	given	 clarifications	 if	 invited	 to	 testify”	 (at	
1:08).	Since	Lula	was	in	fact	not	accused	formally	then,	the	word	“accusation”	is	ascribed	to	Lula	
himself	via	an	indirect	quote.	Then,	the	voice-over	of	anchors	give	way	to	a	short	bit	of	Lula's	speech.	
In	 the	 footage,	 Lula	 looks	 disconcerted	 and	 indignant.	 The	 selected	 quotes	 continue	 Lula’s	




8:37	 and	 9:40,	 PGR	 Lima	 speaks	 at	 length,	 in	 two	 sections	 of	 footage,	 about	 the	 “criminal	
organization”	installed	in	the	federal	government,	orchestrated	through	a	“chain	of	command”	(at	
8:42)	that	had	previously	revealed	the	transgressions	of	ex-minister	José	Dirceu	(convicted	in	the	







































The	 anchor	 Bonner	 then	 points	 out	 that	 Lula	 avoided	 mentioning	 OAS	 and	 the	 suspicion	 of	
corruption	when	speaking	about	the	presidential	archive,	again	setting	up	the	following	footage	of	
Lula.	 Vasconcellos	 then	 introduces	 Lula’s	 explanations	 about	 the	 Atibaia	 site	 by	 establishing	 a	
conflict	between	the	Lava-Jato	task	force	and	the	ex-president:	“Lula	again	said	that	it	is	his	friends’	


















Right	after	 the	coverage	of	violence	 in	 the	protests,	another	PT	member,	 Luiz	Carlos	da	Silva,	 is	
linked	to	the	violent	protests	(by	proximity)	but	also,	explicitly,	to	the	Mensalão	scandal:	“Professor	
Luizinho,	founding	member	of	PT,	was	in	the	airport.	He	was	investigated	in	the	Mensalão	case	and	
was	 acquitted”	 (at	 5:53).	 Right	 after	 this	 intertextual	 link	 to	 the	 earlier	 mega-scandal,	 the	 ex-
politician	is	depicted	rambling	on	to	another	protester	(presented	not	as	such,	but	as	a	“passenger”	
in	the	airport),	while	brandishing,	for	no	apparent	reason,	male	undergarments.	The	reporter,	 in	
voice-over,	notes	 that	 “he	discussed	with	a	passenger;	demonstrated	a	pair	of	underpants;	 and	




a	 contrasting	 reference	 to	 a	 2005	 case	 where	 a	 PT	 congressman’s	 aide	 tried	 to	 hide	 that	 he	
transported	US	dollars	unto	an	airplane	in	his	underpants.	
	










answer,	 supposedly	 reproducing	 Lula’s	 non-answer,	 is	 that	 the	 ex-president	 “was	 indignant”	 in	
response	to	the	question.	PT	actors	and	Lula	supporters	are	not	covered	favorably,	in	sum:	They	are	




















































This	 pattern	 is	 characteristic	 of	 the	whole	 newscast:	 Causality,	 and	 thus	 culpability,	 is	 at	 times	
reported	 to	 be	 clear,	while,	 seconds	 later,	 reported	 to	 be	 only	 potential	 or	merely	 possible;	 in	
general,	denials	and	accusations	are	kept	distant	in	the	organization	of	material.	In	a	nutshell,	the	
editors	 are	 technically	 beyond	 reproach,	 because	 the	 doubtful	 or	 non-verifiable	 is	 hedged	









and	8)	 in	 the	PT	headqarters	 continues	 the	more	 “live”	part	 of	 the	newscast.	 Substantially,	 the	
primary	issue	at	stake	is	the	problem	of	establishing	the	legal	foundation	for	the	police	operation	
that	morning,	 and	 this	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 long	 sequences	 devoted	 to	 description	 of	 potentially	
criminal	 transgressions	 committed	 by	 Lula.	 The	 ex-president’s	 counterpoints	 to	 the	 various	
background	 sections	 that	 describe	 the	 evidence	 of	 these	 transgressions	 are	 presented	 by	 the	
anchors	with	various	degrees	of	distrust	 and	hedging,	while	no	other	 voices	are	 represented	 to	
comment	on	the	situation,	although	the	entire	situation	was	discussed	widely	and	intensely	across	











































Maria	 Priscilla	 Veiga	 Oliveira,	 of	 the	 4ª	 Vara	 Criminal	 da	 Capital,	 declined	 to	 authorize	 his	
imprisonment	and	decided	to	send	the	petition	to	be	analyzed	in	Curitiba…”	
		





















Again,	 the	 possible	 escape	 from	 Sérgio	Moro’s	 jurisdiction	 is	 interpreted	 as	 an	 “obstruction	 of	
Justice,”	 and	 public	 indignation	 is	 invoked	 in	 Avelino’s	 characterization	 of	 the	 nomination	 as	 a	
“mockery,	a	slap	in	the	population’s	face.”	
	










The	newscast	 that	aired	on	March	16	had	a	 rather	different	 structure	and	quality	 than	 the	one	
analyzed	above,	although	this	newscast	also	let	the	legal-political	issues	suppress	all	other	news.	I	






















toda	 a	 investigação	 sobre	 o	 ex-presidente	 e	 com	 isso	 tornaram-se	 públicas	 no	 fim	 da	 tarde	 conversas	
telefônicas	de	Lula.	(1:33)	
	




thus	 first	 appeared	 as	 legal,	 although	 recording	 a	 president	 should	 be	 within	 the	 exclusive	
jurisdiction	of	 the	Supreme	Court,	and	 then	only	 if	he	or	 she	were	officially	 investigated.	So,	by	















at	 18.46	mins).	 At	 first,	 the	 claim	 is	 related	 to	 the	 nomination	 of	 Lula	 for	 the	 cabinet,	without	
mentioning	 initially	 why	 a	 nomination	 in	 itself	 can	 constitute	 a	 crisis.	 It	 is,	 however,	 implicitly	
justified	by	the	third	sentence	of	the	escalada,	which	states	that	the	nomination	lets	Lula	escape	
the	reach	of	Sergio	Moro	(at	0:16)	and	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	–	an	interpretation	consonant	









Federal.	 O	 juiz	 Moro	 suspende	 o	 sigilo	 e	 a	 Justiça	 Federal	 torna	 públicos	 os	 grampos	 telefônicos	 do	 ex-
presidente,	um	deles	de	hoje	a	tarde.	Lula	recebeu	ligação	da	presidente	Dilma.	(0:05)		
	












opening	sentence	 is	predicated	on	the	nomination	having	 this	subversive	 intention,	dodging	 the	
expected	 arrest	 warrant.	 The	 transcript	 of	 this	 recording	 (and	 the	 same	 interpretation)	 also	





Two	actions	are	considered	 transgressions:	The	nomination	 (with	 its	 subversive	motivation)	and	
Lula’s	attempts	at	illegally	influencing	authorities.	The	second	transgression	is	covered	late	in	the	
newscast,	but	I	will	start	here.	As	 it	turned	out,	Lula	 in	fact	complains	that	Eugenio	Aragão,	sub-































Lula	wants	 both	Aragão	 and	Rosa	Weber,	 in	 the	 respective	 cases,	 to	 “act	 like	 a	man,”	 and	 this	
































Neither	 of	 the	 Congressmen	 refer	 to	 phone	 taps	 or	 the	 suspicion	 that	 sending	 the	 official	
appointment	in	“case	of	necessity”	was	a	way	of	shielding	Lula	from	arrest	ordered	by	Sérgio	Moro.	




ultimate	 aim	 of	 shielding	 Lula	 from	 impending	 arrest,	 which	 would	 constitute	 an	 ethical	
transgression.	 However,	 Neves	 and	 Avelino	 are	 in	 fact	 simply	 repeating	 the	 strategy	 of	 the	
opposition	parties	to	legally	challenge	the	appointment	of	Lula;	a	strategy	that	was	already	prepared	






Like	 in	 the	 newscast	 of	March	 4,	 a	 counterpoint	 is	 only	 presented	 very	 late	 (at	 31:00),	 totally	




















That	news	report	 is	 followed	directly	by	a	report	 from	the	STF,	summarizing	the	decision	not	 to	
interfere	 in	 the	 impeachment	process.	 Lula	does	not	 comment	 the	 situation	at	any	point	 in	 the	











and	 began	 to	 assemble	 already	 before	 news	 reached	 the	 public	 about	 Rousseff’s	 possible	


























specifically	 as	 the	 central	 antagonist	 in	 the	 plot	 unravelled	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	
investigations.	 For	 the	 Rousseff	 administration,	 this	 spelt	 trouble:	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Lula’s	
cabinet	nomination	was	botched	because	numerous	federal	judges	revoked	it	in	the	following	days,	







The	 impeachment	 petition,	 submitted	 in	 October	 2015,	 that	 eventually	 led	 to	 the	 ousting	 of	
President	Rousseff	 in	August	2016,	was	based	on	 several	 charges,	many	of	 them	 related	 to	 the	
corruption	of	Petrobras	(Bicudo,	Reale	Júnior,	and	Paschoal	2015:3-9).	However,	according	to	the	
law	defining	 impeachment	proceedings	 (law	1079	of	1950),	acts	anterior	 to	 the	mandate	of	 the	
incumbent	 cannot	 legally	 ground	 an	 impeachment	 process.	 That	 clause	 meant	 that	 even	 if	
conclusive	 evidence	 of	 Rousseff’s	 active	 or	 passive	 acceptance	 of	 corruption	 in	 Petrobras	 had	
surfaced,	as	long	as	the	crime	had	happened	before	her	presidential	period	starting	in	2015,	she	
would	have	been	shielded	from	such	charges	(although	the	allegations	or	evidence	could	still	be	




acusatório	 (Wink	 2017).	 In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 firmer	 ground	 for	 initiating	 the	 process	 of	
impeachment,	the	opposition	could	not	rely	only	on	the	allegations	concerning	Rousseff’s	culpability	







During	 2014,	 the	 Finance	Ministry	 had	 expanded	 an	 existing	 and	 common	 practice	 of	 delaying	
transfers	of	funds	between	the	State	Treasury	and	public	banks.	Three	public	financial	institutions	
(the	 Caixa	 Federal,	 the	 Banco	 do	 Brasil,	 and	 the	 FGTS)	 transferred	money	 to	 citizens	 in	 several	














Veja	may	 serve	 as	 an	 illustration	 of	 how	 quickly	 the	 idea	 of	 impeachment	 became	 a	 topic	 and	
discussed	as	a	plausible	possibility	–	yet	without	the	argument	that	could	bring	down	the	Rousseff	
presidency.	 In	 defending	 the	 admissibility	 of	 an	 impeachment	 process,	 the	 juridical	 issues	 and	






































The	 editorial	 conditions	 the	 government’s	 survival	 on	 Congress,	 “even	 if	 protests	 of	 the	 streets	







































the	 debate	 of	 early	 2015	 in	 general	 lacked	 the	 legally	 valid	 argument.	 Bad	 governance	 of	 the	
economy	was	gradually	brought	up	as	a	sufficient	cause	for	impeachment	(instead	of	the	Petrobras	
investigations,	which,	as	Cunha	had	declared	 in	the	February	 interview,	could	not	 legally	 lead	to	
impeachment).		
	
A	solution	to	 the	 lack	of	a	 transgression	on	which	an	 impeachment	process	could	be	based	was	
eventually	 constructed:	 the	 infringement	 of	 the	 fiscal	 compliance	 law	 (Lei	 de	 Responsabilidade	






































(TCU)	 –	 quanto	 os	 atrasos	 nos	 repasses	 de	 recursos	 pelo	 Tesouro	Nacional	 para	 bancos	 públicos,	 como	 o	
BNDES,	 feitos	 neste	 ano.	 A	 repetição	 das	 manobras	 contábeis	 em	 2015	 foi	 apontada	 em	 relatório	 do	
procurador	do	Ministério	Público	junto	ao	TCU,	Júlio	Marcelo	de	Oliveira.	(E19/10	2015)	
	





Suspeito	 de	 esconder	 contas	 bancárias	 na	 Suíça	 e	 acusado	de	 envolvimento	no	 esquema	de	 corrupção	da	
Petrobras,	o	presidente	da	Câmara,	Eduardo	Cunha	(PMDB-RJ),	recebeu	na	manhã	desta	quarta-feira	(21)	o	
novo	 pedido	 de	 impeachment	 contra	 Dilma	 Rousseff.	 Assinada	 pelo	 ex-petista	 Hélio	 Bicudo	 e	 pelo	 jurista	
Miguel	Reale	 Jr.,	 a	peça	é	 chancelada	pela	oposição	e	 tem	entre	os	argumentos	 justamente	os	desvios	na	
estatal.	Como	informou	o	Painel,	o	novo	pedido	de	impeachment	contempla	também	decretos	assinados	pelo	
governo	 em	 2015	 que	 aumentaram	 em	 R$	 800	 milhões	 as	 despesas	 do	 Executivo	 sem	 autorização	 do	
Congresso.	Os	novos	argumentos	são	uma	forma	de	tentar	provar	que	Dilma	continuou	a	cometer	neste	ano	



















with	 the	 corruption	 attributed	 to	 PT	 and	 eventually	 be	 able	 to	 launch	 their	 own	 presidential	
candidates,	hopefully	capturing	the	left-wing	voters	then.	So,	PT	was	at	the	mercy	of	PMDB,	in	a	














the	 impeachment	 in	 the	media	 representations	 of	 the	 process.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 provide	 some	
examples	of	the	narrative	transfer	occurring	between	the	two	sets	of	events.	
	


























messages	 from	OAS	president	 Leo	Pinheiro,	and	 rumors	had	 it	 that	 the	 incarcerated	PT	 senator	
Delcídio	do	Amaral	was	about	to	negotiate	a	plea	bargain.	The	two	situations	had	forced	Wagner	
away	from	public	spotlight,	though	he	occupied	the	ministerial	position	usually	assigned	to	the	first	


































da	 Silva	 de	 2002,	 sem	 que	 os	 recursos	 fossem	 contabilizados.	 Lula	 balançou,	mas	 ainda	 com	 reservas	 de	
popularidade	e	num	momento	de	economia	em	 início	de	 recuperação,	 segurou-se	no	 cargo.	Duda	acabou	
absolvido	pelo	STF.	Para	Dilma	Rousseff,	a	investida	sobre	João	Santana	é	potencialmente	mais	desastrosa.	O	
contexto	econômico	é	ruinoso,	e	ela	tem	apenas	fiapos	de	aceitação	popular.	O	eventual	comprometimento	
















also	 named	 “Petrolão,”	 underscoring	 the	 similarities	 of	 the	 scandals	 (see	 section	 2.2).	 Such	
comparisons	between	the	two	scandals	and	news	reports	identifying	causal	links	between	the	two	

















November	 25,	 2015,	 in	 a	 phase	 of	 Lava-Jato	 investigations	 called	 “Passe	 Livre”).	 At	 that	 point,	































































morphed	and	acquired	a	new	 focus,	 because	 the	possibility	of	 an	ousting	of	 President	Rousseff	
afforded	a	new	angle	for	comparisons	to	Brazil’s	history	of	democratic	breakdowns,	 likening	the	
impeachment	 to	a	coup	d’état.	President	Rousseff’s	argument	was,	primarily,	 the	 lack	of	a	 legal	
ground	for	impeaching	her:		
	












































Renúncia	 é	 desistência	 e	 isso	 não	 bate	 com	o	 ideário	 esquerdista.	 Renunciar	 como	 estratégia	 política	 não	















to	present	the	 impeachment	as	a	 fait	accompli	 (Miranda	2016).	Both	Estado	and	Folha	 featured	
festive	front-page	designs	on	April	18	(see	appendix	A,	figure	A.17	and	A.18),	arguably	marking	the	










Delcídio	 do	 Amaral’s	 testimony),	 b)	 various	 commentary	 and	 op-ed	 pieces	 on	 the	 legality	 of	
petitions,	pedaladas	 and	 the	 rejection	of	 the	state	accounts	by	 the	TCU,	and	c)	 comparisons	 (in	
background	articles)	to	the	impeachment	of	Collor	in	1992.	These	three	themes	related	to	legal	or	
quasi-legal	matters,	 while	 a	 range	 of	 items	 treated	 d)	 the	 crumbling	 government	 coalition	 and	
especially	 e)	 the	 struggle	 for	 control	 of	 the	 PMDB	 group	 in	 the	 Câmara	 (again	 with	 Cunha	 as	
antagonist)	and	the	expulsion	of	PMDB	dissident	ministers	Katia	Abreu	and	Celso	Pansera,	plus	the	
f)	 last-minute	 efforts	 to	 secure	 PP	 and	 PR	 support	 for	 the	 Dilma	 government	 and	 g)	 derived	
discussions	of	the	legality	of	such	negotiations.	In	a	few	instances,	reports	were	published	on	h)	the	
negotiations	about	the	politicians	who	were	expected	to	eventually	form	a	new	cabinet.	Another	





A	subset	of	 these	reports	dealt	with	 l)	 the	reactions	of	parliamentarians	and	civic	society	 to	 Jair	
Bolsonaro’s	laudation	during	his	vote	in	favor	of	impeachment.	Bolsonaro	dedicated	his	vote	to	the	
colonel	 Ustra,	 who	 commanded	 interrogations	 and	 torture	 of	 left-wing	 activists	 during	 the	
dictatorship,	including	that	of	Rousseff.	Some	coverage	dealt	with	m)	a	range	of	equally	extreme	
and	unexpected	expressions	of	discontent	 related	 to	 the	 impeachment,	 including	death	 threats.	
Finally,	a	number	of	news	reports	accounted	for	n)	Rousseff’s	activities	as	her	mandate	hung	by	a	
thread	embroiled	in	the	impeachment,	including	a	trip	to	the	UN	assembly	in	New	York,	a	cancelled	
trip	 to	 Greece,	 and	 the	 always-newsworthy	 reports	 on	 presidential	 bicycling	 around	 Brasília’s	
Planalto	area.	
	
The	 total	number	of	 texts	published	 in	Estado	 and	Folha	 that	 in	one	way	or	 the	other	 tied	 into	
impeachment,	often	through	one	(or	several)	of	the	themes	mentioned	below,	reached	more	than	




front-pages	 of	 April	 and	May	 tended	 to	 ignore	 crucial	 questions	 concerning	 the	 political	 actors	
coming	into	power	when	(rather	than	if)	Rousseff	would	be	ousted.	A	parallel	argument	to	this	is	
developed	in	the	next	chapter.	Rousseff	was	temporarily	removed,	at	first,	on	May	12,	after	the	
Senate	 ratified	 the	 vote	of	 the	Câmara.	 In	 the	 following	months,	 the	 special	 commission	of	 the	
Senate	and	the	plenary	repeated	the	decision	of	the	Câmara,	and	like	the	lower	house	of	Congress,	
interpreted	 fiscal	 delays	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 the	 president’s	 fiscal	 responsibility.	 Rousseff	 was	
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investigation	 unraveled	 the	 role	 of	 PMDB	 (and	 several	 other	 parties	 coming	 into	 power)	 in	
corruption	schemes	tied	to	the	cartel	of	construction	companies,	most	prominently	the	Odebrecht	

























Tavares	 quickly	 decided	 to	 negotiate	 a	 plea	 bargain,	 which	 allegedly	 stirred	 frantic	 meetings	







this	 time	 targeting	 the	 headquarters	 of	 the	 company.	 The	 phase	 name	was	 a	 reverse-wordplay	
implying	that	the	investigations	reached	the	apex	of	the	organization.	The	”Xepa”	phase	revealed	
the	extent	of	a	secret	department	within	the	Odebrecht	company	solely	tasked	with	moving	bribes	











discussed	 in	 all	 the	 daily	 papers	 the	 following	 day.	 However,	 arguing	 that	 one	 could	 not	 know	




later	 (G25/3	 2016).	 The	 cautiousness	 of	 the	 Globo	 editors	 starkly	 contrasted	 the	 rapid	
dissemination,	one	week	earlier,	of	secret	recordings	of	Lula	and	Rousseff.	
	





The	 following	 day,	 the	 Folha	 columnist	 Clovis	 Rossi	 pointed	 out,	 in	 an	 op-ed	 piece	 entitled	 “A	










nor	 initialized,	but	which	materialized	 later	 in	2016.	The	moniker	became	the	established	short-
hand	term	for	the	plea	bargain,	as	seen	on	the	Veja	front-page	in	November.	The	End-of-the-World	
Testimony	worked,	like	all	harbingers	of	apocalypse,	as	herald	of	the	end	times;	in	other	words,	a	





The	agents	of	 this	narrative	are	positioned	 like	dominos,	one	triggering	 the	 fall	of	 the	next:	The	






































Dilma	Rousseff	 and	Michel	 Temer	half-consumed	by	 the	 fire	 (see	 appendix	A,	 figure	A.24).	 This	
parallel	expression	of	an	impending	negative	verdict	made	sense	in	the	context	of	the	court	trial	
against	both	in	the	TSE.	Whether	in	the	STF	or	TSE,	“the	political	class”	was	thus	facing	“its	crucial	








2018	 general	 elections	 were	 wide	 open	 and	 “more	 unpredictable	 than	 any	 other	 presidential	
election	since	 the	 transition	 to	democracy”	 (F6/4	2018).8	Notice	how	the	unpredictability	of	 the	
2018	elections	yields	an	open-ended	narrative	structure:	Unlike	the	impeachment	stories	discussed	
below,	 it	was	difficult	 to	 formulate	any	 coherent	 stories	about	 the	political	world	after	October	
		 126	









Personified	 in	 the	 “serene	 and	 tranquil”	 PGR	 Janot,	 “guardian	 of	 the	 most	 recondite	 secrets	
capacious	of	shaking	the	Republic”	in	tandem	with	the	institutional,	de-personified	protagonist	of	












evidence	 to	 be	 found	 truthful.	 Indeed,	we	 are	 given	 to	 understand	 that	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
Odebrecht	plea	bargain	is	due	to	its	truthfulness.	This,	finally,	brings	with	it	the	assumption	that	the	
reader	knows	that	the	“final	judgment”	would	be	possible	only	because	of	the	scope	and	level	of	





The	 notion	 of	 future	 grave	 ramifications	 of	 Odebrecht’s	 inside	 knowledge	 was	 already	
























leak	 revealed	 similar	 plans	being	hatched	by	PMDB	 shortly	 thereafter:	Folha,	 on	May	23,	 2016,	
published	 recordings	 (taped	 before	 the	 impeachment	 became	 a	 reality)	 which	 featured	 a	 key	
















than	a	 year	had	viewed	Machado	as	 “the	perfect	way	 to	get	 to	 the	big	 sharks	of	 the	Petrobras	
corruption	scheme,	especially	the	PMDB	leadership,”	which	would	explode	as	a	result	of	the	taps:	
	







“national	 pact,	with	 the	 Supreme	 court,	with	 everybody”	 in	 the	 leaked	 recording	 (F23/5	 2016),	
which	could	limit	the	reach	of	the	investigations.	Jucá	stepped	down	after	the	leak,	as	did	another	
recorded	 cabinet	 member,	 but	 the	 sense	 that	 “deep	 state”	 actors	 of	 the	 old	 elite	 were	 doing	
everything	in	their	power	to	stop	the	Lava-Jato	trials	lingered.		
	






event	of	a	plea	bargain:	“’Se	a	 JBS	delatar,	 será	o	 fim	da	República’,	diz	Eduardo	Cunha”	 (E17/5	
2017),	read	one	Estado	headline.	However,	Temer	weathered	the	storm,	explaining	away	the	arrest	
of	his	aide	who	carried	R$	500,000	 in	cash,	and	also	 ignoring	the	 leaks	of	 the	conversation	with	
Joesley	Batista	in	which	he	consented	to	maintain	payments	to	pay	for	Cunha’s	silence.	Counting	on	
the	immobility	of	the	institutional	checks	and	balances	and	the	legislative	shield	of	Congress	(Pérez-
Liñán	 2014)	 to	 stop	 corruption	 probes	 against	 him,	 Temer	 simply	 absorbed	 the	 scandal	 and	
continued	to	govern.	A	majority	 in	the	Câmara	voted	not	to	 let	a	trial	against	Temer	commence	
(with	251	votes	against	233).	Moreover,	other	 leaks	 from	 the	Batista	 case	hinted	 that	 Supreme	
judges	could	be	bought,	and	the	office	of	the	PGR	was	later	scandalized	as	it	turned	out	that	one	of	









before.	 In	 particular,	 the	 lingering	 suspicions	 about	 Lula	 and	 PT	 leaders	 left	 from	 the	 previous	
scandals	 (the	Mensalão	 and	 the	Celso	Daniel	 case)	were	pursued	by	 the	 Lava-Jato	probe	and	 it	
seemed	to	unwind	the	plot	that	had	successfully	kept	PT	in	power	and	grafted	millions	and	millions	
from	the	coffers	of	Petrobras	and	other	state	companies.	However,	other	plots	were	also	unmasked,	
giving	 rise	 to	 new	 contradictions,	most	 importantly	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 impeachment	 process,	
which	could	either	be	interpreted	as	a	parliamentary	coup	d’état	which	would	shield	investigated	
politicians,	or	as	a	shortcut	to	re-establishing	economically	sound	governance	model	of	the	public	





















the	PGR	and	 the	STF	did	not	 come	off	 as	particularly	efficient	 in	pressing	 charges	against	other	

































successive	 revelations,	 exposés	 and	 leaks	 had	 spread	 like	 rings	 in	 the	 water,	 bringing	 Brazilian	











The	 previous	 chapter	 deliberately	 delayed	 a	 concluding	 summary	 of	 contrasting	 or	 consonant	
emplotments	of	the	disclosure,	leaks	and	scandals	in	Brazil’s	political	sphere	2014-2018	–	and	yet,	
a	reader	with	a	knack	for	narrative	may	have	gleaned	the	contours	of	several	plots	already.	The	goal	










Journalism	 constitutes	 a	 series	 of	 interrelated	 practices	 for	 the	 social	 construction	 of	 time.	 It	 arrests	 the	
ordinary	 and	 the	 unusual	 in	 various	 forms	 of	 texts	 that	 create	 feelings	 of	 simultaneity,	 help	 to	 define	 the	
contemporary,	 outline	 possible	 futures,	 and	 shape	 our	 understanding	 and	memories	 of	 the	 past.	 (Bødker	
2016:55,	emphases	mine)	
	


















news;	 in	 fact,	 serialization	 is	as	old	as	 the	penny	press.	Serialization	of	 real	events	was	 found	 in	
famous	 historical	 scandals	 such	 as	 the	 Dreyfus	 affair,	 while	 fictional	 serials	 were	 popular	 and	
common	content	in	newspapers,	with	Conan	Doyle’s	“penny	dreadfuls”	as	one	of	many	examples.	
Mussell	has	argued	that	it	was	a	defining	genre	characteristic	of	the	developing	news	press:	“It	was	
through	 formal	 properties	 –	 from	 their	 materiality	 to	 their	 seriality	 –	 that	 newspapers	 and	




stabilize	 the	 slowly	 mutating	 format	 across	 editions	 (ibid.:42-54).	 “Repetition	 is	 a	 vital	 and	













this	moniker,	 thus	 playing	 on	 an	 already	 existing	 everyday-language	 shorthand.	 The	 volume	 of	
content	on	the	scandal	gathered	in	these	subsections	frequently	surpassed	the	“regular”	political	










Janot	 e	 sua	 equipe	 prepararam	a	 lista	 com	uma	estratégia	 cautelosa.	 Para	 evitar	 ataques	 de	 advogados	 e	
desarmar	alguns	dos	ministros	mais	conservadores,	os	procuradores	optaram	por	não	usar	nenhuma	prova	
colhida	no	decorrer	de	um	ano	de	 investigação	da	Lava	Jato.	Centraram-se	somente	nas	delações	de	Paulo	








In	 this	 example,	 the	 text	 presents	 the	 situation	 as	 a	 legal	 trench-style	warfare	with	 “dangerous	
flanks”	that	poses	“legal	risks”	to	the	whole	investigation.	The	strategy	and	hopes	of	the	prosecutors	
for	the	upcoming	stages	of	the	pre-trial	phase	are	described,	and	the	choice	of	strategy	is	based	on	









of	 only	 basing	 the	 petition	 for	 investigation	 in	material	 from	 plea	 bargains,	 and	 an	 alternative	
strategy	is	presented	as	too	dangerous;	thus,	two	immediate	futures	are	spelled	out	here,	plus	a	
more	long-term	future	with	a	possible	extended	phase	of	gathering	more	evidence,	depending	on	

























































This	 text,	 like	 the	previous	one,	exists	 in	a	 serial	 relationship	 to	other	 texts:	 The	 latter	example	
























40,	 entre	 25	 e	 30	 votos	 devem	 ser	 pelo	 impeachment	 no	 próximo	 domingo,	 dia	 17	 de	 abril,	 quando	 está	
prevista	a	votação	no	plenário.	"Não	só	tenho	absoluta	certeza	de	que	houve	o	crime	de	responsabilidade,	
como,	do	ponto	de	vista	político,	achamos	que	o	governo	da	presidente	Dilma	não	tem	a	menor	condição	de	











The	 temporal	 concepts	 of	 anticipation	 and	 expectation,	 discussed	 in	 section	 2.4,	 may	 help	

















Maior	 empreiteira	 do	 País,	 no	 dia	 em	 que	 foi	 alvo	 de	 mais	 uma	 fase	 das	 investigações	 de	 corrupção	 na	
Petrobrás	 admitiu	 em	 nota	 oficial	 acordo	 de	 'colaboração	 definitiva'	 de	 seus	 executivos	 com	 o	Ministério	
Público	Federal…	Mais	influente	empreiteira	do	País,	a	Odebrecht	mantém	sólidos	contatos	com	o	universo	da	
política	brasileira.	Por	isso,	o	anúncio	agitou	os	gabinetes	de	Brasília	no	início	da	noite	de	ontem.	A	expectativa	












agents	 in	handcuffs	–	was	 considered	 to	be	even	more	 symbolic.	 That	moment	did	not	actually	
manifest	itself	 in	2016,	but	the	expectation	of	it	was	no	doubt	present.	A	number	of	news	items	























the	 event	 is	 located	 as	 part	 of	 a	 pattern,	 as	 one	 in	 a	 rhythmic	 series	 of	 “crisis	moments.”	One	
paragraph	later,	the	same	pundit	considers	the	coming	end	of	the	Rousseff	government	and	the	














forth	 the	pattern	before	 the	events	have	even	manifested	 themselves.	The	events	 linked	 in	 the	





















are	articulated.	 I	 introduced	the	concept	of	narrative	desire	 in	Chapter	2	with	 these	words:	The	





of	 several	 media	 texts	 that	 may	 serve	 as	 illustrations	 of	 modes	 of	 temporality	 that	 generate	
narrative	desire	 through	anticipation;	 specifically,	 the	desire	 for	ousting	Rousseff,	 the	desire	 for	
Cunha’s	fall	and	for	corruption	trials	against	other	corrupted	Congressmen,	and	the	desire	to	see	
Lula	in	handcuffs	at	Sérgio	Moro’s	bidding.	In	this	section,	I	will	develop	the	argument	that	these	





made	by	various	Brazilian	 scholars	of	media	and	politics	 (e.g.	 van	Dijk	2017,	Albuquerque	2017,	
Chaia	2016:52,	Souza	2016),	my	claim	is	more	limited.	With	the	examples	above,	I	simply	hope	to	
show	that	events	in	scandals	are	covered	because	they	are	deemed	newsworthy	on	the	grounds	of	
their	 likely	 consequences.	 Those	 consequences	are	defined	 institutionally,	 and	 the	projection	of	
futures	found	in	the	news	are	basically	accounts	of	likely	scenarios	within	the	relevant	institutional	
frameworks.	 As	 such,	 the	 journalists	 merely	 reproduce	 the	 “webs	 of	 facticity”	 and	 the	
commonplace,	 institutionally	 sanctioned	 interpretations	 of	 events.	 What	 emerges	 both	 in	 and	






















(which	 in	 turn	 is	 linked	 to	 Lula,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	previous	 chapter).	 The	protesters,	 or	 rather	
“people”	 in	 general	 (“as	 pessoas”),	 know	 that	 “something	 must	 be	 done,”	 urgently,	 in	 the	
“unanimous”	 fight	 against	 corruption,	 even	 “without	 a	 clear	 notion”	 of	 what	 that	 “something”	
should	be.	Their	protests	will	however	demonstrate	the	political	support	 for	 impeachment,	 thus	
precipitating	Rousseff’s	 fall	 and	strengthening	 the	virtuous	cycle	beginning	 in	 the	“volatile	 stock	
markets.”	This	projection	of	the	future	connects	the	text	to	one	emergent	fabula	–	a	fabula	of	the	
cleaning	 of	 Brazilian	 politics,	 starting	 with	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations.	 The	 desired	 narrative	
resolution	 (popular	 protests)	 to	 the	 supposed	 or	 perceived	main	 problem	 (political	 leaders	 like	









testimony	 of	 Lula	 generates	 the	 expectation	 of	 a	 trial,	 and	 the	 eventual	 trial	 will	 generate	 the	
expectation	of	a	sentence	(rendering	Lula	ineligible	in	the	2018	elections),	and	this	should	ultimately	
be	 followed	by	 incarceration.	The	smaller	events	of	day-to-day	politics	and	 trials	are	 thus	made	














news	 and	 the	 institutional	 circumstances	 of	 scandals	 together	 engender	 this	 specific	 temporal	
orientation	and	narrative	desire	 for	resolution	 in	the	texts.	 If	 the	texts	 failed	to	explain	the	root	
causes	 or	 ultimate	 consequences,	 they	 could	 hardly	 be	 recognized	 as	 newsworthy,	 nor	 as	 truly	
reporting	on	the	series	to	which	they	belong,	and	so	they	would	likely	be	discarded	by	editors.		
	
Journalists	are	 sometimes	prompted	by	 their	 sources	 to	 look	 for	 symbolic	 significance	 that	may	
emerge	as	emplotment	in	the	text.	In	the	previous	chapter,	we	saw	how	Cunha	and	Lula	defined	the	
investigations	as	political	persecution;	such	definitions	may	carry	over	into	the	media	texts	(and	into	













police	 operations	 christened	 “Final	 Judgement”,	 “Xepa”,	 “Aletheia”,	 to	 name	 the	 most	 salient.	
Almost	every	operative	phase,	that	is,	every	sequence	of	the	Lava-Jato	investigations	that	involved	




the	 operation	 “Resta	 Um”	 targeted	 the	 Petrobras	 sub-contractor	 that	 had	 avoided	 being	
investigated	until	that	day.	The	name	of	the	“Xepa”	phase	(the	word	“apex”	backwards)	signified	
that	the	task-force	reached	the	top	of	the	corruption	scheme	–	the	Odebrecht	group.	In	appendix	
B,	 I	have	compiled	a	 list	of	phase	names	 (and	 their	 timeline	and	 targets).	 The	mythological	 and	











In	 the	section	above,	we	saw	pseudo-seriality	at	work	 linking	the	Lava-Jato	 investigations	to	the	





























mandate.	 The	 temporality	 here	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 internal	 analepsis	 (Genette	 1980:49),	 a	
second-order	narrative	interfering	with	the	structure	and	causal	links	of	the	surface	story.		
	
A	 second	example	of	 such	a	complex	 temporality	 is	 the	combination	of	 Lula’s	 interrogation	and	
Rousseff’s	 increasingly	 close	 relation	 to	 Lula	 in	March	2016.	 Since	 Lula	had	been	an	outsider	 to	
Rousseff’s	government	for	several	years,	and	frequently	critical	(in	2015)	of	the	perceived	orthodox	
economic	team	led	by	Joaquim	Levy,	the	increasing	narrative	intertwinement	of	their	fates	was	in	a	
way	 surprising.	 With	 the	 interrogation	 of	 Lula,	 the	 suspicions	 that	 clung	 to	 him	 apparently	


















organization	 of	 news	 discourse	 have	 not	 linked	 such	 organizing	 structures	 to	 political	 action	 –	
precisely	because	analyses	of	news	items	tend	to	balk	at	going	on	to	the	analysis	of	intertextually	
emergent	 temporal	 structures	 of	 discourse.	 This	 is	 the	 topic	 of	 the	 following	 sections,	 treated	
through	a	presentation	of	 six	 fabulas	 that	 I	 have	abstracted	 from	 the	material	presented	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	followed	by	a	discussion	of	how	the	fabulas	cropped	up	as	the	purported	grounds	
		 140	
and	 discursive	 backdrop	 of	 a	 range	 of	 political	 events	 and	 judicial	 interventions	 (all	 the	 while	












the	 desire	 for	 punishment	 and	political	 change.	 In	 particular,	many	 texts	 focus	 on	 the	 eventual	
ousting	of	Rousseff,	while	fewer	texts	have	a	scope	of	desire	that	encompasses	all	of	Congress	and	
consider	the	political	elite	en	bloc	to	be	the	problem	that	needs	to	be	treated.	Some	texts	present	








previous	chapter	 into	 three	groups.	The	 first	 two	 fabulas	 tell	 the	 stories	of	a	 successful	 crusade	
against	 corruption	 and	 Impeachment	 of	 a	 President,	 while	 the	 next	 two	 stories	 invert	 the	
interpretation,	seeing	the	same	events	as	political	persecution	and	a	coup	d’état.	Finally,	two	more	





















The	 graft	 in	 Petrobras	 via	 overpriced	 construction	 contracts	 was	 installed	 by	 PT	 governments,	
































the	 Supreme	Court	 President	 Lewandowski.	 Thus,	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 proceedings	was	 observed	



































This	 fabula	 explains	 two	problems	 for	 Rousseff:	 the	 corruption	 allegations	 and	 the	 low	 support	
during	 her	 second	 term.	 The	 Rousseff	 administration	 was	 never	 a	 corrupt	 government,	 and	
removing	 her	 only	 succeeded	 through	 a	 thoroughly	 anti-democratic	 and	 legally	 fraught	
impeachment	 proceeding,	 executed	 against	 the	will	 of	 the	 people	 by	 a	 small	 group	within	 the	
political	elite.	The	low	approval	ratings	of	the	Rousseff	government	were	an	artifact	of	the	media	
barrage,	and	the	unpopularity	of	Rousseff	was	eventually	exceeded	by	Temer.	The	fabula	explains	






force	 (called	 the	 “República	 da	 Curitiba,”	 see	 Castro	 2016	 and	 footnote	 9)	 executed	 a	 media	
campaign	to	tarnish	Lula’s	image	and	keep	him	from	being	a	viable	presidential	candidate	in	2018.	
Swan	 boats,	 public	 talks,	 and	 diplomatic	 missions	 to	 secure	 overseas	 contracts	 for	 Brazilian	
companies;	any	item	or	activity	could	be	linked	to	Lula’s	alleged	friends	in	the	business	world	and	
could	be	construed	as	a	kickback	paying	for	political	influence	in	Petrobras,	BNDES,	and	Congress.	





The	 fabula	 ends	 in	 tragedy,	 with	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 deciding	 not	 to	 interfere	 in	 the	 political	
persecution	directed	from	Curitiba.	Even	as	Lula	continued	to	appear	in	the	polls	as	the	eventual	










The	 corruption	 of	 Brazilian	 politics	 runs	 far	 and	 deep,	 through	 the	 current	 political	 elite	 to	 the	
coroneis	of	yorn.	Fortunately,	the	Lava-Jato	task-force,	the	federal	police,	the	Prosecutor-General(s),	
and	several	valiant	and	indomitable	judges	managed	to	change	the	tide	by	taking	the	old	elite	to	
































After	 various	 political	 backstage	 deals	 and	 the	 excessive	 judicial	 interventions	 into	 politics,	 the	
Brazilian	democracy	and	its	institutional	structures	are	precariously	close	to	collapsing.	With	two	
Constitutional	crises	between	the	Legislative	and	the	Judiciary	Branches,	with	street	protests	that	







but	 it	 also	made	 the	 2018	 elections	 the	most	 unpredictable	 and	 potentially	 groundbreaking	 in	
decades.	The	PSDB-PT	axis	of	political	orientation	was	shattered,	along	with	the	veto-player	model	
of	 peemedebismo	 (Nobre	 2013b),	 and	 together	 with	 these	 two	 cornerstones	 of	 congressional	





































news	 and	 fabulas	 about	 the	 impeachment,	 the	 scope	 of	 foresight	 is	 cut	 short	 at	 the	 expected	
moment	of	the	ousting.	Thus,	compared	to	the	torrent	of	news	pieces	about	special	commissions	






idea	 that	 time	 is	 accelerated	and	 compressed	by	news	 (Hassan	2012,	Bødker	2016,	Bødker	 and	











and	 argue	 that	 a	 particular	 time	 scope	 of	 the	 crisis	 (or	 crises)	 was	 established	 through	 the	
storytelling	 found	 in	 the	 news	 on	 corruption	 and	 scandals.	 Because	 of	 this	 particular	 temporal	
scope,	 and	 because	 the	 electoral	 cycle	 and	 the	 Constitution	 remained	 the	 framework	 of	 these	
fabulas,	the	legitimacy	of	the	entire	system	of	democracy	in	Brazil	was	virtually	beyond	critique.	Put	
simply,	 the	 struggle	 to	 preserve	 the	 Constitution	 and	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 the	 impeachment	
process	 were	 two	 major	 concerns	 (van	 Dijk	 2017);	 no	 solutions	 to	 either	 crisis	 or	 impending	
democratic	catastrophe	coming	from	outside	of	the	Constitution	or	the	ballot-boxes	could	ever	be	

































also	 covered	 intensely	 by	 newspapers	 through	 constantly	 updated	 feeds	 that	 interpreted	 the	
political	events.	On	top	of	the	media	conglomerates’	scrutiny,	the	official	broadcasting	service	of	
















In	 general,	 extraordinary	 events	 such	 as	 these	may	 gain	 a	 second-life	 outside	of	 the	newsroom	
frenzy,	 further	 adding	 to	 the	 sense	 of	 compressed	 time	 of	 crisis,	with	 updates	 appearing	 every	
minute.	 The	 unfolding	 stages	 of	 these	 events	 are	 “breaking	 on	 Twitter,	 discussed	 on	 blogs	 and	







































emerged	 in	 this	 multitude	 of	 political	 discontent.	 Nonetheless,	 a	 major	 outcome	 of	 the	 large	




here,	 and	 the	massive	 turnout	 was	 interpreted	 as	 reactions	 to	 Rousseff’s	 government	 and	 the	
scandals	proliferating	around	 it.	Perhaps	counterintuitively,	 the	dynamic	spill-over	effects	of	 the	
protests	 in	Congress	 resulted	 in	 four	major	 coalition	parties	 leaving	 the	government	only	 to	 re-
constitute	themselves	as	coalition	parties	two	months	later.	Thus,	 if	anybody	had	a	vain	hope	of	
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cleaning	 up	 politics	 through	 such	 protests,	 that	 hope	 could	 only	 be	 sustained	 by	 ignoring	 the	
continuity	of	centre-right	parties	in	government.	In	short	order,	PMDB	and	the	centre-right	parties	
in	the	governing	coalition	PTB,	PRB,	PR	and	PP	declared	full	or	partial	support	for	impeachment	in	






Delcídio	do	Amaral	 the	week	before).	 The	party	also	announced	 that	 its	minister	of	 Sports,	George	Hilton,	
would	 leave	 the	 position.	 In	 response,	 Hilton	 left	 PRB,	 announced	 his	 affiliation	 with	 Pros,	 and	 remained	
minister	of	Sports	until	 the	 impeachment	of	Rousseff.	The	 then-president	of	PTB,	Cristiane	Brasil,	 likewise,	
announced	 that	 she	would	 vote	 for	 the	 impeachment	 of	 Rousseff,	 on	March	 18,	 although	 the	 party	 only	
officially	recommended	impeachment	on	April	13.		
	
PMDB	had	been	deliberating	 internally	when	 to	 leave	 ever	 since	Cunha	urged	 the	party	 to	 leave	 the	 year	
before.	During	 the	parliamentary	 recess	and	 the	 internal	elections	 for	party	president,	 the	discussions	had	
demonstrated	increasing	hostility	toward	Rousseff,	and	a	party	convention	was	called	shortly	after	the	2016	
carnival.	The	agenda	was	simple:	A	vote	whether	or	not	to	leave	the	government.	Henrique	Eduardo	Alves	left	









rest	of	 the	coalition	parties,	and	 the	exit	of	PMDB	 therefore	 started	a	wave	of	defections:	On	April	12,	PP	
announced	 their	 decision	 to	 abandon	 government,	 support	 impeachment,	 and	 Occhi	 left	 the	 Ministry	 of	
National	Integration	the	following	day.	The	same	day,	April	13,	the	PSD	group	leader	in	the	Congress,	Rogerio	
Rosso,	declared	that	there	was	a	broad	consensus	about	supporting	impeachment,	and	that	the	minister	of	the	






This	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	 decisive	 vote	 in	 the	 highly	 mediatized	 format	 on	 April	 17,	 as	 the	
















out.	 When	 the	 testimony	 of	 Sergio	 Machado,	 director	 of	 the	 state	 company	 Transpetro,	 was	













subsections	 of	 Folha	 and	 Estado	 on	 politics	 neither	 maintained	 attention	 nor	 unearthed	 new	
material	in	the	cases	of	corruption	where	Temer	was	mentioned.	However,	a	lot	of	attention	was	
paid	to	the	fact	that	Temer	had	acted	as	Head	of	State	when	signing	decrees	for	extra	expenses,	
hypothetically	 putting	 him	 in	 the	 same	 predicament	 vis-à-vis	 the	 law	 of	 fiscal	 responsibility	 as	
Rousseff.	This	theme,	spurred	by	the	general	interest	in	impeachment,	got	much	more	traction	in	
early	April	than	all	the	previously	mentioned	cases	combined	(see	the	appendix	C,	figure	C.2).	 In	
sum,	 suspicions	 that	 Temer	was	 involved	 in	 corruption	 only	 spurred	 brief	 interest,	 and	without	
follow-up	coverage,	those	cases	were	simply	buried	–	at	least	until	Temer	took	office	as	President.		
	
The	 testimony	 of	 Sergio	 Machado	 exposed	 not	 just	 Temer,	 but	 two	 newly	 appointed	 PMDB-
affiliated	ministers	in	the	new	cabinet	at	the	end	of	May	2016,	ten	days	after	the	ousting	of	Rousseff.	
On	May	22,	Folha	published	recorded	conversations	between	a	number	of	PMDB	bosses	and	Sérgio	




government	 and	 ending	 the	 PGR’s	 and	 the	 Lava-Jato	 task-force’s	 project	 of	 cleaning	 Brazilian	
politics.	 A	 number	 of	 PMDB	 bosses,	 including	 ex-President	 José	 Sarney,	 argued	 likewise	 in	 the	
conversations	 that	were	 recorded.	 Jucá	 and	 the	Minister	 of	 Transparency,	 Fabiano	 Silveira,	 left	
office,	while	Jucá,	upon	stepping	down,	returned	to	his	seat	in	the	Senate,	and	participated	in	the	

































Ultimately,	what	 is	more	 disconcerting	 than	 the	 hypothetical	 delay	 of	 the	 leak	 by	 either	 of	 the	










Similarly,	 the	media	 texts	 in	 April	 and	May	 2016	 at	 no	 point	mentioned	 the	 possibility	 of	 two	

















support	 fell	 away	 quickly.	 Folha’s	 editors	 even	 deliberately	misread	 a	 survey	 conducted	 by	 the	
associated	poll	service	DataFolha	in	order	to	present	a	coherent	positive	picture	of	the	economy	











institutional	 crises	 (ibid.:115-8),	 and	 the	 tendency	 of	 judicialization	 (Tate	 and	 Vallinder	 1995,	
Werneck	Vianna	et	al.	1999,	Werneck	Vianna,	Burgos	and	Salles	2007)	continued	with	increasing	
intensity,	based	on	the	string	of	crises.	With	the	disclosure	of	the	corruption	in	the	Lava-Jato	cases,	







basis	 of	 the	 public	 demand	 and	 outrage	 provoked	 since	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations	 became	





parliamentary	 prerogative	 called	 foro	 privilegiado,	 on	 May	 3,	 2018,	 was	 restricted	 to	 trials	 of	
criminal	actions	committed	as	acts	of	office.	A	fourth	change	of	jurisprudence,	effected	by	the	STF	
on	June	14,	2018,	deemed	coercive	testimonies	unconstitutional	(such	as	Lula’s	testimony	described	
in	 the	 previous	 chapter).	 Each	 of	 the	 judicial	 reviews	 was	 debated	 intensely	 in	 the	 climate	 of	
increasing	political	crisis	of	legitimacy	which	gradually	also	became	a	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	the	STF.	
On	 top	 of	 the	 STF’s	 internal	 problem	 of	 case	 overload	 (Falcão,	 Arguelhes	 and	 Recondo	 2016),	
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exacerbated	 by	 the	 Lava-Jato	 investigations,	 idiosyncratic	 decisions	 made	 by	 Supreme	 judges	
(especially	 Gilmar	Mendes	 and	Dias	 Toffoli)	 sparked	 public	 controversy.	 For	 reasons	 of	 space,	 I	
cannot	show	the	trajectory	of	the	court	decisions	nor	the	public	debates	on	these	issues,	but	the	







4.4.3,	 and	 three	 other	 ministerial	 nominations	 were	 also	 legally	 contested,	 namely	 those	 of	
Wellington	Cesar	Lima	and	Eugenio	Aragão	(both	in	2016	for	the	Ministry	of	Justice),	and,	in	2018,	
Cristiane	Brasil	(of	PTB).	Brasil	was	hindered	in	taking	office	as	Minister	of	Labour,	and	her	substitute	




























in	 the	 Congressional	 committee	 preparing	 the	 process	 prior	 to	 the	 bills	 going	 to	 the	 floor	 of	
Congress,	however.	Third,	several	bills	aimed	at	increased	punishment	for	judges	overstepping	the	










instruments	 that	may	 be	 changed	 at	whim.	 The	 reduction	 of	 the	 parliamentary	 protection	 (see	
above	and	section	4.2)	seems	to	hold,	for	now.	The	publicity	of	investigation	into	political	corruption	
is	still	a	local	decision	–	although	the	arguments	fielded	by	Sérgio	Moro	for	the	utmost	degree	of	


















































of	 Brazil).	 Similar	 epochal	 interpretation	 of	 political	 events	 and	 similar	 conceptions	 of	 historical	
significance	 surfaced	 when	 Lula	 was	 incarcerated	 in	 April	 2018	 (Feres	 Júnior	 2018).	 These	 two	
moments	were	presented	as	momentous	or	laden	with	symbolic	significance	of	another	temporal	





varies	 according	 to	 the	 strata	 or	 type	 of	 news;	 but	 it	 is	 remarkable	 that	 the	moments	 of	 crisis	




In	 some	 media	 texts	 presented	 in	 this	 and	 previous	 chapters,	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case	 and	 the	
impeachment	 became	 treatments	 for	 an	 ailing	 Nation	 beleaguered	 by	 crises:	 The	 first	 Lula	
administration	had	a	crisis	of	governability,	leading	to	a	moral	crisis	(and	a	corruption,	via	Dirceu	if	
not	 Lula,	 of	 the	model	 of	 creating	 Congressional	majorities).	 The	 Rousseff	 administration	 then,	
taking	over	the	reins	of	government,	also	inherited	a	party	and	its	electoral	base	in	crisis	because	of	
the	moral	crisis	(or	rather,	because	of	the	Mensalão	scandal).	With	less	PT	representatives,	Rousseff	
had	to	manage	a	more	 ideologically	distant	 (and	more	rebellious)	support	base	 in	Congress	as	a	
result	 of	 the	 electoral	 and	 moral	 crisis,	 and	 her	 government	 then	 faced	 an	 even	 more	 severe	
governability	crisis,	with	PMDB	leaders	forcing	fiscal	strain	upon	the	state	budget	through	legislative	
measures	unchecked	by	the	executive	branch,	thus	deepening	the	economic	crisis	that	began	to	








embedded	 in	 news	 texts	 and	 political	 utterances	 in	 scandals.	 But,	 because	 certain	 fabulas	 exist	
ready	 to	 hand,	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 closure	 (as	 well	 as	 narrative	 risk),	 a	 limited	 range	 of	 potential	
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consequences	is	drawn	upon	by	journalists	and	pundits.	In	the	case	of	the	Lava-Jato	scandals	and	
impeachment,	 this	 also	 created	 a	 situation	 where	 several	 fabulas	 reciprocally	 permeated	 each	
other,	 as	 the	 emplotment	 of	 events	 in	 one	 fabula	 could	 introduce	 risk	 and	 change	 the	 odds	 of	
particular	outcomes	in	the	others.	Within	this	constructionist	view	of	news	and	political	history,	I	
have	attempted	to	account	for	the	ways	in	which	the	moments	of	crisis	in	news	produced	certain	













temporality,	 structured	 through	 premonitions	 and	 narrative	 desire	 for	 certain	 outcomes,	 are	


































or	 unarticulated	 fragments	 of	 value	 systems	 in	 tension	 and	 contradiction	 with	 one	 another.	









presented	 express	 conflicting	 value	 systems.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 will	 return	 to	 the	 theoretical	 line	 of	
Chapter	2,	considering	how	Greimasian	actant-subjects	desire	and	transfer	values	as	the	fabulas	of	
the	Lava-Jato	progress.	On	the	basis	of	this	analysis,	it	will	then	be	possible	to	characterize	the	inner	
limits	 of	 the	 value	 systems	 and	 consider	 what	 lies	 outside	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 Political	
Unconscious	in	the	Lava-Jato	scandal.		
	
Preliminarily,	 I	will	 assign	 the	notion	of	 “value”	 to	 dichotomous	 concept-pairs	 such	 as	 the	ones	
discussed	 by	 Lévi-Strauss	 and	 Greimas	 (Greimas	 1987:84),	 and	 let	 “ideology”	 designate	 more	
complex	sets	of	political	preferences	and	worldviews.	The	two	concepts	may	gradually	shade	into	
















































maps	 the	 limits	of	 a	 specific	 ideological	 consciousness	and	marks	 the	 conceptual	points	beyond	








for	 our	 experience	 of	 the	 real.	 When	 Greimas'	 system	 is	 used	 in	 this	 fashion…	 it	 furnishes	 the	 graphic	
embodiment	of	 ideological	closure	as	such,	and	allows	us	to	map	out	the	 inner	 limits	of	a	given	 ideological	
formation	and	to	construct	the	basic	terms	of	this	particular	libidinal	apparatus	or	"desiring	machine"	(ibid.:48)	
	
Following	 this,	 I	 take	 it	 that	 fabulas	 articulate	 various	 values	 that	 can	 be	 expressed	 in	 a	 logical	
structure,	and	the	desires	for	certain	values	expressed	by	the	subject-actants	form	a	good	starting	
point	 for	 exploring	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 value	 system.	 One	 obvious	 desire	 articulated	 in	 the	
disclosure	of	corruption	is	the	desire	for	truth,	as	Lull	and	Hinerman	note	in	their	introduction	to	
the	seminal	volume	Media	Scandals:	“Truth	is	always	at	issue”	(1997:1).	In	the	fabulas	presented	in	






the	very	 reality	of	 the	scandalous	disclosure.	Truth	 is	 furthermore	 tempered	by	uncertainty	and	
delays.	 The	 latter	 was	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 but	 the	 former	 merits	 further	
consideration.	Uncertainty	and	doubt	are	obstacles	to	be	overcome	during	the	pursuit	of	truth,	and	
the	operation	that	transfer	value	is	thus	all	about	shifting	actants	from	liminal	and	uncertain	spaces	






Truth	 	 	 	 Falsehood				 	 (axis	of	knowledge)	
	 	 	 X	
Not	proven	false		 	 Not	proven	true	 (axis	of	the	contradictories	(Greimas	1987:51))	
	
In	fabula	1	and	1a,	the	PT	ex-presidents	and	the	party	try	to	deny	or	hide	their	responsibility	for	the	
broken	economy	of	Petrobras	and	Brazil	 in	general.	 The	protagonists	of	 this	 fabula	 set	 strive	 to	
reveal	 the	 truth,	 dispel	 the	doubt,	 and	 to	 repair	 the	 lack	of	 knowledge	 through	disclosure.	 This	
operation	will	move	the	respective	antagonists	to	the	position	of	proven	falsehood	in	the	schema.	
The	 contradiction	 that	 is	 solved	 in	 either	 set	 of	 fabulas	 is	 precisely	 the	 problem	 of	 doubt	 and	
contradiction	which	lies	at	the	heart	of	scandals:	History	needs	revision,	the	web	of	facticity	is	torn,	
















not	with	 truth	claims	and	 the	unmasking	of	 falsehood	but	with	 the	status	of	guilt	and	sanction,	








Innocent	 	 Guilty	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 X	
Not	guilty	 	 Not	innocent	
Punished	 	 Punished	 	
	
The	above	semiotic	schema	of	value	lays	two	sets	of	axes	on	top	of	each	other,	that	of	sanction	and	
that	of	 guilt.	 This	 generates	 two	positions	 that	 are	problematic	or	 contradictory	 and	 in	need	of	
resolution:	 The	 position	 of	 impunity	 and	 the	 position	 of	 a	miscarriage	 of	 justice	 containing	 the	
innocent-but-punished.	 By	 understanding	 texts	 and	 fabulas	 about	 investigations	 and	 trials	 as	

















Fabula	1/1a	 	 	 	 	 	 Fabula	2/2a	
	 	 	 Impunity	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Impunity	
Judiciary	 	 (empty)	 	 	 (empty)	 	 	 PSDB,	Temer	 	
	 	 X	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 X	
(empty)	 	 Lula	/PT	 	 	 Lula/Rousseff/PT	 	 (Cunha)	













	 	 	 Impunity	







claim	 the	 presidency	 through	 illegitimate	 and	 excessive	 judicial	 interventions.	 In	 fabula	 3,	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 attaining	 power	 lies	 precisely	 in	 the	 top-left	 position;	 even	 the	 association	 with	
politicians	from	the	right-hand	side	contaminates	a	candidacy.	In	fabula	3a,	legitimate	rule	cannot	





of	 judicial	 measures.	 The	 suspicion	 that	 the	 political	 elite	 wants	 to	 be	 rid	 of	 the	 Lava-Jato	
investigation	 escalates	 the	 conflict,	 and	 by	 investing	 such	 sinister	 motives	 in	 all	 of	 actants	 of	
Congress	and	government,	normal	measures	are	deemed	insufficient.	The	extraordinary	measures	





Normal	 	 	 Abnormal	
legitimate	 	 	 illegitimate	
	 	 	 X	
Exceptional	 	 	 Exceptional	
but	excessive	 	 	 but	necessary,	thus	also	legitimate	
	
The	legitimacy	of	judiciary	and	judicial	decisions	was	of	course	also	a	theme	in	the	other	fabulas.	As	














Theme	 Fabula:	 1,	1a,	3	 2,	2a,	3a	
Legitimation	of	power	(Rousseff)	 	 Illegitimate	presidency	 Legitimate	presidency	
Legitimation	of	power	(Temer)	 	 Legitimate	presidency*	 Illegitimate	presidency	
Legitimation	of	public	opinion	 	 Legitimate	protests	 Overwhelming	media	bias	
Resistance		 	 PT	Capture	of	State	Power	 Excess	of	Judiciary	and	Moro	
Power	balance	 	 Functioning	institutions	 State	of	Exception	
Temporality	 	 	 	






judged	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 enacting	 necessary	 policy	 changes.	 However,	 because	 the	 Temer	
administration	 seemed	 to	 deliver	 some	 of	 the	 desired	 political	 reforms,	 the	 illegitimacy	 of	 the	
presidency	 itself	was	downplayed	 in	editorials	of	 the	mainstream	outlets.	Perhaps	 for	 the	 same	
reasons,	 the	 crises	 relating	 to	 the	 Temer	 presidency	were	 never	 presented	 as	 symbolically	 and	
historically	important	as	the	crisis	pertaining	to	Lula	and	Rousseff.		
	

































consistent	 act	 in	 a	 consistent	 manner	 (Power	 and	 Zucco	 Júnior	 2011),	 there	 is	 increasing	
fragmentation	 of	 Congress	 (with	 28	 parties	 represented	 in	 the	 2015-2018	 period),	 confusingly	
similar	abbreviations,	and	the	trajectories	of	many	important	politicians	easily	span	three	or	four	
ideologically	 heterogeneous	 parties	within	 two	 decades	 of	 public	 life	 (Pereira,	 Power	 and	 Raile	
2011:36).	The	media	system	responds	to	this	with	a	presidential	focus	(Albuquerque	2011:91)	and	













the	 Lava-Jato	 case,	 certain	 features	 made	 the	 scandal	 intensely	 aligned	 with	 party	 lines	 and	
ideological	 preferences;	 and	 in	 theory,	 the	 absence	 of	 political	 preferences	 and	 ideologically	
motivated	 actions	 relating	 to	 political	 transgressions	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 feature	 of	 a	 scandal.	
Furthermore,	 comparative	 research	 has	 yielded	 interesting	 insights	 into	 the	 backstage	 level	 of	
scandals,	where	relative	party	strength	may	be	the	parameter	most	accurately	predicts	occurrence	
of	scandals.	In	other	Latin	American	cases,	there	is	a	clear	pattern	of	scandals	having	much	to	do	

















present	 in	 fabula	 2	 and	 2a,	 had	 been	 common	 in	 left-wing	 politics	 since	 the	 Mensalão	 case	
(Damgaard	2015a,	Biroli	and	Mantovani	2014:209).	This	theme	was	 increasingly	present	 in	news	
meta-reports	in	CartaCapital	and	JornalGGN,	for	instance,	in	the	build-up	to	the	impeachment	of	








and	backstage	politics	 at	 its	worst,	 but	 as	 an	 ideological	 struggle	barely	masked	 as	 scandal	 and	
economic	 crisis.	 This	 ideological	 interpretation,	 commonly	 found	 in	 in	 left-wing	 entrepreneurial	
online	media	such	as	JornalGGN	or	Mídia	NINJA	or	print/web	outlets	such	as	CartaCapital,	expands	





	 	 	 	 (guilty	but	counting	on	impunity	in	the	courts)	
	 Metropolitan	elite	 	
(empty)	 	 	 Conservatives		
Oppressors	
	 	 	 PSDB,	Temer	 	
	 	 	 Mainstream	media	
	 	 X	 	 	 	 	
Grassroots	and	PT	
Lula/Rousseff	 	 	













Because	 of	 the	 (frequently	 articulated)	 claim	 that	 the	 prosecutors	 acted	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	



















Innocent	 	 	 	 Guilty	 	
(Judiciary	actors)	 	 	
Liberal	political	actors	
Evangelical		 	 	 	 (empty)	
Nuclear	family	values	
	 	 	 	 X	
	 	 	 	 	 PT	
(empty)	 	 	 	 Communist	
	 	 	 	 	 Secular	
	 	 	 	 	 Gay		
	 	 	 	 	 Punished	
	
This	 set	of	 ideological	values	opposed	 in	 this	version	 is	not	dissimilar	 to	 the	 liberal/conservative	
values	and	metaphor	categories	discussed	by	Lakoff	(2002),	as	the	right-wing	schema	projects	an	
image	of	PT	according	to	a	“demonology”	(ibid.:171),	in	caricature	of	left-wing	discourse	informed	





Importantly,	 when	 either	 set	 of	 fabulas	 is	 extended	 to	 include	 ideology	 (or	 demonology,	 the	




state	 that	 was	 previously	 ruled	 democratically.	 Although	 the	 timing	 is	 different,	 the	 narrative	






another	way	of	 looking	at	 ideology.	 Thinking	about	 ideology	 in	 this	way,	 as	 a	 contrast	between	
corrupt	elite	politics	and	the	citizenry,	provides	a	third	option	for	interpreting	the	ideological	value	
of	 the	 Lava-Jato	 case,	 which	 is	 even	 consonant	 with	 the	 fabulas	 3	 and	 3a.	 I	 consider	 this	
interpretation	to	be	a	populist	 reading	of	 the	whole	scandal	and	political	crisis.	 In	 this	view,	the	
“cleaning	of	Congress”	is	essentially	anti-elitist,	and	the	movement	will	pave	the	way	for	populist-
style	 presidential	 candidates,	 Jair	 Bolsonaro	most	 (in)famously,	 but	 with	 various	 other	 possible	
candidates	appearing	and	disappearing	from	time	to	time	(Luciano	Huck	and	Joaquim	Barbosa	as	
the	most	salient	candidates	highlighted	as	“newcomers”).	Even	if	such	candidates	were	aligned	with	
political	 parties,	 their	 main	 claim	 as	 candidates	 was	 their	 status	 as	 outsiders,	 fresh	 faces	 not	


















	 	 	 Guilty	of	corruption	
	 	 	 State	(legislative	and	executive	branch)		
	 	 	 Punished	
	
Now,	 if	 we	 remember	 that	 the	 basic	 axes	 of	 this	 scheme	 is	 guilty/punished	 and	 innocent/not	
punished,	the	so-far	empty	slot	in	the	top-right	suggestively	demands	to	be	filled	in.	In	this	corner,	
















	 	 	 Guilty	of	corruption	
	 	 	 State		













Innocence	 	 	 Impunity	(not	innocent,	not-punished)	
Judiciary		 	 	 Politics	
Rule	of	law	 	 	 Private	interests	(corrupted)	
	 	 	 X	
Suffering	subject	 	 Guilty	of	corruption	











realized	 (in	 fabulas	 1	 and	 1a),	 or	 be	manipulated	 for	 political	 (fabula	 2	 and	 2a)	 or	 indeed	 anti-

















the	 next	 is	 no	 guarantee	 for	 a	 radical	 renewal	 of	 politics.	 The	 population	 at	 large	 also	 remains	





1/1a:	Judiciary	 >	(punishes)	Politics		 >	(for	corrupting)	the	State		 >	(thus	saving)	the	Citizens	 	
2/2a:	Politics	 >	(corrupts)	Judiciary	 >	(that	punishes)	the	State		 >	(which	manipulates)	the	Citizens	





not	 interfere	 in	 the	 judiciary,	 hoping	 against	 hope	 that	 the	 judiciary	 would	 let	 justice	 prevail.	
Ultimately,	 she	 invoked	 the	 metaphor	 that	 history	 would	 judge	 the	 current	 political	 situation.	
Likewise,	Lula	appealed,	literally,	to	the	supposedly	greater	and	less	corrupted	judicial	instance	of	





































three	obvious	 examples	 of	 the	use	of	 national	 symbols.	 These	 symbols,	 beyond	 contrasting	 the	
symbolic	 red	 color	 of	 traditional	 socialist	 banners	 to	 the	 national	 flag’s	 green	 and	 yellow,	 also	
opposed	the	Brazilian	nation	(inhabited	by	citizens)	to	the	Brazilian	state	(colonized	by	politics).	In	
other	words,	precisely	 in	 the	moment	when	 the	unity	of	 the	nation	 is	 invoked	 through	national	





























at	 work	 in	 mainstream	 media	 works	 just	 like	 the	 counter-narratives	 of	 the	 left-wing,	 as	 they	
transpose	or	displace	the	multiple	identities	of	the	citizens	and	instead	propose	a	single	community:		
	
Counter-narratives	 of	 the	 nation	 that	 continually	 evoke	 and	 erase	 its	 totalizing	 boundaries…	disturb	 those	
ideological	 manoeuvres	 through	 which	 ‘imagined	 communities’	 are	 given	 essentialist	 identities.	 For	 the	






rupture,	 violence,	 revolution.	 Here,	 news	 work	 like	 the	 national	 discourses	 of	 the	 nineteenth	









































the	questions	of	 guilt	 and	 responsibility	 are	 settled,	 and	where	 terabytes	of	 data	 and	 scores	of	
testimonies	can	ultimately	be	evaluated.	Because	the	crises	following	the	corruption	disclosure	are	
imagined	to	be	solvable	only	in	the	judicial	domain,	the	Constitution,	governed	in	the	final	instance	
by	 the	 STF,	 frames	 and	 closes	 off	 the	 fabulas.	 This	 is	 of	 course	 paradoxical,	 because	 the	most	
fundamental	problem	of	Brazilian	political	corruption	is	the	morose	pace	of	higher	courts	in	both	




considered	 an	 ideologeme	 –	 an	 intertextual	 function	 materialized	 at	 different	 structural	 levels	















in	 which	 the	 state	 is	 ever	 in	 danger	 of	 being	 “taken	 over”	 by	 politics	 through	 the	 transition	
mechanism	 at	 every	 election	 and	 its	 accompanying	 political	 appointment	 system	 in	 state	
companies.	 It	 was	 symbolically	 very	 fitting	 that	 the	 gargantuan	 state	 oil	 company	 Petrobras	
provided	fuel	for	fabulas	of	the	conflagration	of	the	Republic.	But	despite	the	apocalyptic	tenor,	the	
inclination	towards	judicial	solutions	within	the	framework	of	the	1988	Constitution	anchors	this	
ideologeme	 to	 the	 currently	malfunctioning	 institutional	 checks	 and	 balances,	with	 inconsistent	







from	 dispelling	 the	 optimistic	 predictions	 that	 emerged	 with	 the	 commodities	 boom	 and	 the	
discovery	 of	 Brazil’s	 rich	 deep-sea	 oil	 deposits,	 and	 apart	 from	 shattering	 the	 notion	 of	 an	
increasingly	well-consolidated	and	accountable	democratic	system,	what	was	the	point	and	morale	
of	 this	 particular	 story?	 In	 the	 telling	 of	 the	 fabulas	 about	 the	 Lava-Jato	 scandal	 and	 the	
impeachment	of	Rousseff,	a	story	subject	coalesced:	A	nation	at	the	end	of	an	epoch,	caught	in	a	










governs	 for	 personal	 gains,	 while	 only	 13	 percent	 of	 citizens	 are	 satisfied	 with	 democracy	
(Latinobarómetro	2017:9-10).	The	disapproval	of	Congress	is	now	at	60	percent,	higher	than	ever	in	





The	Lava-Jato	case	at	 first	appeared	as	a	 solution	 to	Brazilian	democracy’s	historical	problem	of	
impunity	 in	political	 corruption	 cases.	 If	 the	disclosure	of	 the	Petrobras	 graft	 could	not	prevent	











Two	fabulas	emerged	to	counter	 these	by	 inversing	the	actantial	 roles.	The	main	strip	of	events	
narrated	 in	 the	Golpe	 fabula	 cast	 the	 impeachment	 as	 a	 variation	 of	 a	 coup	 d´état,	 while	 the	
counternarrative	emplotting	a	political	persecution	of	Lula	drew	upon	Brazil’s	history	of	suppressing	
left-wing	ideology	(and	left-wing	presidents).	These	variations	of	counternarratives	did	not	escape	
the	boundaries	of	 the	previous	emplotments	of	corruption	 fabulas,	as	 they	simply	displaced	the	
		 172	
mark	of	corruption	unto	a	different	part	of	the	political	elite.	They	did,	however,	solve	the	problem	
of	 explaining	 why	 the	 popular	 PT	 leaders	 suddenly	 found	 themselves	 under	 siege	 in	 trials,	 in	
























Lula’s	 and	 Cunha’s	 incarcerations	 notwithstanding.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	 limits	 and	
operations	 of	 the	 political	 unconscious,	 which	 splits	 ideology	 down	 a	 stereotyped	 divide	 and	
projects	the	political	stereotypes	unto	a	simplistic	conceptual	semiotic	diagram	reflecting	the	basic	







would	 be	 the	 material	 for	 another	 research	 project,	 directed	 at	 newsrooms,	 editorial	 and	
journalistic	principles	and	practices.	However,	I	have	here	theoretically	made	the	case	that	the	news	
should	 not	 be	 considered	 “objective”	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 not-invented;	 indeed,	 news	 never	was	 an	
objective	 representation	 of	 encountered	 facts	 and	 events.	 In	 the	 journalistic,	 editorial	 and	
interpretive	 practices	 of	 newsworkers	 in	 the	 political	 beat,	 all	 the	 elements	 -	 headlines,	 leads,	
quotes	from	sources,	ascriptions	and	predictions	–	are	crafted	in	order	to	cohere	and	to	answer	not	





the	 textual	 tether	 that	constitutes	 the	“why.”	Therefore,	 I	have	argued	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 in	 the	
specific	case	of	scandals,	researchers	must	pay	heed	to	shared	but	distributed	narrative	structures	
that	 organize	 actants	 and	 events	 along	 story	 arcs.	 Such	narrative	 structures	 provide	 the	 “why,”	
supply	criteria	for	selecting	and	construing	events	as	newsworthy,	and	condition	the	possible	frames	
and	metaphors.	Unfolding	within	a	fluid	mediascape	through	a	set	of	literary	forms	and	conventions	
















and	 terabytes	 of	 data	 disclosed	 in	 the	 court	 processes,	 the	 scandal	 prompted	 a	 plethora	 of	
perplexing	questions	and	paradoxes	concerning	the	staying	power	of	the	coalitional	presidentialist	









are	 fighting	 it	out,	 alternatingly	 annulling	and	 reinstalling	prison	 sentences	 for	 Lula,	Dirceu,	 and	
arrested	 PMDB	 leaders	 such	 as	Henrique	Alves	 and	Geddel	 Vieira	 Lima.	 Future	 research	 should	
explore	 how	 the	 fabulas	 analyzed	 here	 leaves	 an	 imprint	 on	 public	 opinion	 and	 electoral	
preferences,	identifying	the	links	between	the	discourse	of	media	and	policy	initiatives,	social	and	
political	mobilization.	Many	 questions	 remain	 in	 this	 area:	What	 is	 the	 relation	 between	 these	
















believe,	 will	 become	 not	 just	 the	 backgrounded	 blueprints	 of	 future	 news	 texts	 and	 political	
commentary,	but	also	inform	the	proto-narratives	underlying	scientific	arguments	and,	ultimately,	
underlying	Brazilian	history.	I	have	argued,	with	Jameson,	Koselleck,	MacIntyre,	and	others,	that	this	
is	 because	 History	 can	 only	 be	 imagined	 and	 represented	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 narrative	 forms	 and	































3.	 The	 various	 discourse	 types	 or	 genres	 expressing	 these	 subjective	 models,	 for	 instance	 in	 everyday	
conversational	stories,	in	news	reports,	editorials,	columns,	background	articles,	opinion	articles,	letters	to	the	


















































Federal	Air	Force,	 situated	at	Galeão	 in	Rio	de	 Janeiro.	The	 investigation	 rapidly	advanced	 towards	 the	presidential	
palace	 by	 blaming	 the	 president’s	 brother	 for	 ordering	 the	 manslaughter.	 The	 independence	 of	 the	 Air	 Force	
investigation	 made	 Galeão	 seem	 a	 Republic	 apart	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 Brazil,	 earning	 the	 air	 force	 commanders	 the	






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Date		 	 Code	-	Media	Outlet		 Subject	1		 Subject	2		 	 Author(s)	
4/4	2014	 F4/4	2014	 Folha	 Petrobras	 Paulo	Roberto	Costa	 Eliane	Cantanhêde		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/159669-tudo-embolado.shtml	
13/4	2014	 F13/4	2014	 Folha	 Petrobras	 Dilma	Rousseff	 Eliane	Cantanhêde		
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/elianecantanhede/2014/04/1439915-oposicao-mostra-a-cara.shtml	
10/06	2014	 F10/6	2014	 Folha		 Petrobras	 Paulo	Roberto	Costa	 Mateus	Leitão	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/06/1467860-petrobras-nao-era-balcao-de-negocios-diz-ex-diretor-que-esteve-preso.shtml	
21/5	2014	 F21/5	2014		 Folha		 Petrobras		 Jurisdictional	competence	 Editorial	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/opiniao/166889-competencia-e-pressa.shtml	
10/8	2014	 F10/8	2014	 Folha		 Alberto	Youssef	 Plea	bargain	 Mario	Cesar	Carvalho	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/08/1498307-preso-desde-marco-doleiro-alberto-youssef-quer-colaborar-com-a-justica.shtml	
5/9	2014	 V#2390		 Veja	 Petrobras	 Paulo	Roberto	Costa	 Rodrigo	Rangel	
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/exclusivo-paulo-roberto-costa-comeca-a-revelar-nomes-dos-beneficiarios-do-esquema-de-corrupcao-da-petrobras/	
10/10	2014	 I#2342	 IstoÉ	 Petrobras	 Paulo	Roberto	Costa	 Josie	Jerônimo	
https://istoe.com.br/387126_DELATOR+DA+PETROBRAS+DIZ+QUE+A+CAMPANHA+DE+DILMA+EM+2010+FOI+BENEFICIADA+POR+DINHEIRO+DESV
IADO/	
14/11	2014	 E#859	 Época	 Petrobras		 Cartel	 Murilo	Ramos,	Marcelo	Rocha,	et	al.	
https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2014/11/bescandalo-da-petrobrasb-partidos-e-empreiteiras-no-juizo-final.html	
15/11	2014	 G15/11	2014	 O	Globo	 Petrobras		 Cartel	 (O	Globo	front	page	editor)	
http://www.estemundopossivel.com.br/upfiles/fckeditor/image/CAPA%20O%20GLOBO%20LAVA-JATO.jpg	
17/11	2014	 V#2400	 Veja	 Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Reinaldo	Azevedo	
https://veja.abril.com.br/blog/reinaldo/cunha-candidato-a-presidencia-da-camara-diz-que-reforma-politica-ele-quer-feita-pelo-congresso-com-
financiamento-privado-voto-majoritario-e-sem-reeleicao/	
7/12	2014	 G7/12	2014	 O	Globo	 Lula	 OAS	 Germano	Oliveira	
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/cooperativa-entrega-triplex-de-lula-mas-tres-mil-ainda-esperam-imovel-14761809		







7/1	2015	 F7/1	2015	 Folha	 Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Severino	Motta,	Gabriel	Mascarenhas		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/01/1571474-lider-do-pmdb-sera-alvo-da-procuradoria-na-lava-jato.shtml	
12/1	2015	 V#2408	 Veja	 Petrobras		 Ricardo	Pessoa	 Rodrigo	Rangel	
http://www.manancialvox.com/diario/VEJA-14-01-2015.txt	
4/2	2015	 V#2411	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 R.	Rangel,	R.	Bonin,	B.	Megale	
No	link	available	
11/2	2015	 V#2412	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 (no	author	of	interview)	
No	link	available	
25/2	2015	 V#2414	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 Mailson	Nobrega	
No	link	available	





Date		 	 Code	-	Media	Outlet		 Subject	1		 Subject	2		 	 Author(s)	
12/3	2015	 G12/3	2015	 O	Globo	 CPI	de	Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Chico	de	Gois,	Eduardo	Bresciani	
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/depoimento-de-eduardo-cunha-cpi-da-petrobras-vira-ato-de-desagravo-15574079	
12/3	2015	 E12/3	2015	 Estado	 CPI	de	Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 D.	Carvalho,	D.	Cardoso,	P.	Venceslau	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,sob-suspeita-cunha-vai-a-cpi-e-e-alvo-de-elogios-dos-colegas,1649829	




Nacional	 CPI	de	Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 JN	newsroom	
https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4031161/	
14/3	2015	 V#2417	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 Gabriel	Castro	
https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/entenda-como-funciona-um-processo-de-impeachment/	
14/3	2015	 V#2417	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	 M.	Barros,	Daniel	Pereira,	Pieter	Zalis	
No	link	available	
21/3	2015	 V#2418	 Veja	 Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Adriano	Ceolin	
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/o-poderoso-cunha/	
22/4	2015	 V#2422	 Veja	 Impeachment	 Dilma	Rousseff	
No	link	available	
29/4	2015	 V#2423	 Veja	 Lula		 Leo	Pinheiro	 Kalleo	Coura,	Hugo	Marques		
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/os-favores-do-empreiteiro/	
18/6	2015	 F18/6	2015	 Folha	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Solange	Almeida	 Rubens	Valente	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/06/1644488-aliada-de-cunha-fez-requerimento-a-pedido-de-corretor-ligado-ao-deputado.shtml	
18/6	2015	 G18/6	2015	 O	Globo	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Solange	Almeida	 Chico	Otavio	
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/aliada-de-cunha-pressionou-executivos-da-schahin-envolvida-na-lava-jato-16478499	




Nacional	 Odebrecht		 Arrests	 Jornal	Nacional	newsroom	
https://globoplay.globo.com/v/4267836/		
20/6	2016	 F20/6	2015	 Folha	 Odebrecht		 Arrests	 Mônica	Bergamo	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/ilustrada/223240-monica-bergamo.shtml	
22/6	2015	 E#889	 Época	 Petrobras		 Marcelo	Odebrecht	 F.	Coutinho,	T.	Bronzatto,	D.	Escosteguy	
https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/06/marcelo-odebrecht-ameaca-derrubar-republica.html	
6/7	2015	 E#891	 Época	 Petrobras		 Sérgio	Moro	 T.	Bronzatto,	L.	Loyola,	D.	Escosteguy	
No	link	available	
15/7	2015	 G15/7	2015	 O	Globo	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Julio	Camargo	 Renato	Onofre,	Thais	Skodowski	
https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/delator-da-lava-jato-diz-que-cunha-pediu-propina-de-us-5-milhoes-16790059	
17/7	2015	 E17/7	2015	 Estado	 Petrobras		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Daniel	Carvalho,	Victor	Martins	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,cunha-cira-cpi-do-bndes-apos-romper-com-governo,1727327	
19/7	2015	 E19/7	2015	 Estado	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Julio	Camargo	 Alberto	Bombig	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,reves-de-cunha-muda-rumo-da-oposicao,1727909	
20/7	2015	 E#893	 Época	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Julio	Camargo	 F.	Tavares,	A.	Ribeiro,	P.	M.	de	Moura	
https://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2015/07/acoes-da-policia-terao-consequencias-politicas.html	
22/7	2015	 V#2435	 Veja	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Julio	Camargo	 Daniel	Pereira	
http://en.calameo.com/read/001238206a72704b8f69e	
22/7	2015	 V#2435	 Veja	 Lula		 Leo	Pinheiro	 Rodrigo	Rangel,	Robson	Bonin	
http://en.calameo.com/read/001238206a72704b8f69e	
3/8	2015	 E3/8	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Pedaladas	 Pedro	Venceslau		
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,parecer-sera-nossa-bala-de-prata--diz-lider-do-psdb-na-camara,1736834	





Date		 	 Code	-	Media	Outlet		 Subject	1		 Subject	2		 	 Author(s)	
19/10	2015		 E19/10	2015		 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Igor	Gadelha	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lamento-que-seja-com-um-governo-brasileiro-o-maior-escandalo-de-corrupcao-do-mundo--diz-cunha,1782426	
21/10	2015	 F21/10	2015	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Débora	Alvares,	Ranier	Bragon	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/10/1696548-suspeito-de-corrupcao-cunha-recebe-pedido-de-impeachment-de-dilma.shtml	












(Globo)	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Ethics	Committee	 Fernanda	Calgaro	
http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/11/eduardo-cunha-diz-que-provara-ao-conselho-de-etica-que-falou-verdade.html	
20/11	2015	 E20/11	2015	 Estado	 Eduardo	Cunha	 Ethics	Committee	 D.	Carvalho,	D.	Cardoso,	Igor	Gadelha	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,aliados-de-cunha-impedem-leitura-de-relatorio-que-pede-processo-contra-ele,10000002520	
24/11	2015	 F24/11	2015	 Folha	 Sergio	Moro	 anti-corruption	 (front	page	editor)	
24/11	2015	 G24/11	2015	 O	Globo	 Sergio	Moro	 anti-corruption	 (front	page	editor)	













2/12	2015	 F2/12a	2015	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Ranier	Braigon,	Gustavo	Uribe	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/12/1713918-bancada-petista-decide-votar-contra-cunha-no-conselho-de-etica-da-camara.shtml	










Nacional	 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 Jornal	Nacional	newsroom	
http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/12/dilma-diz-que-recebeu-com-indignacao-abertura-de-impeachment.html	
3/12	2015	 E3/12a	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Beatriz	Bulla	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,pt-desiste-de-recurso-no-stf-apos-gilmar-se-tornar-relator,10000003791	
3/12	2015	 E3/12b	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Marco	Aurélio	Nogueira	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/marco-aurelio-nogueira/impeachment-e-um-risco-mas-pode-trazer-ganhos-para-o-debate-democratico/	
3/12	2015	 E3/12c	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 E.	Machado,	D.	Dimoulis,	R.	Dias	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/supremo-em-pauta/impeachment-supremo-tera-papel-decisivo-para-preservar-legalidade/	
5/12	2015	 E5/12	2015	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Economist	editorial	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,o-roto-e-a-esfarrapada-se-estranham--imp-,1807179	





18/1	2016	 E18/1	2016	 Estado	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Editorial	
http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,a-verdade-do-impeachment,10000007338	
19/1	2016		 E19/1	2016	 Estadão	 Sergio	Moro	 Manifesto	against	LJ	 Fausto	Macedo,	Julia	Affonso	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/promotores-paulistas-repudiam-manifesto-dos-advogados-contra-a-lava-jato/	
22/1	2016	 V#2462	 Veja	 Lula	 OAS	 Veja	newsroom	
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/ministerio-publico-vai-denunciar-lula-por-ocultacao-de-propriedade/	
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29/1	2016	 F29/1	2016	 Folha			 Lula	 Odebrecht	 Flávio	Ferreira	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/01/1734827-odebrecht-fez-obra-em-sitio-ligado-a-lula-diz-fornecedora.shtml	




(Globo)	 Mensalão	 Petrobras	 Hélio	Gurovitz	
http://g1.globo.com/mundo/blog/helio-gurovitz/post/quadrilha-do-petrolao-e-uma-so.html	
22/2	2016	 F22/2	2016	 Folha			 Impeachment		 João	Santana	 Fabio	Zanini	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1741820-apos-dez-anos-publicitario-estrela-volta-a-ameacar-governo-petista.shtml	
23/2	2016	 F23/2	2016	 Folha			 Impeachment		 João	Santana	 Ranier	Bragon	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1742320-oposicao-decide-ir-ao-stf-pedir-que-impeachment-seja-destravado.shtml	
26/2	2016	 F26/2	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 João	Santana	 Daniele	Lima	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/02/1743480-pmdb-volta-a-considerar-impeachment-apos-prisao-de-santana.shtml	




Nacional	 Lula	 OAS	 JN	newsroom	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4IdpIBPW8Bs	
8/3	2016	 F8/3	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Maria	Lúcia	Tavares	 Graciliano	Rocha,	Bela	Megale	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1747462-responsavel-por-planilha-da-odebrecht-negocia-delacao.shtml	
9/3	2016	 E9/3	2016	 Estado	 Lula	 Sérgio	Moro	 Eliane	Cantanhêde		
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,sob-vara,10000020255	
10/3	2016	 E10/3	2016	 Estado	 Lula	 Obstruction	of	Justice	 Dora	Kramer	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nomeacao-so-pode-ser-ideia-de-inimigo,10000020477	
10/3	2016	 F10/3	2016	 Folha	 Lula	 Obstruction	of	Justice	 Mônica	Bergamo	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2016/03/1748472-planalto-teme-acao-no-stf-se-lula-virar-ministro-da-casa-civil.shtml	
11/3	2016	 E11/3	2016	 Estado	 Lula	 Presidential	candidate	 Fernando	Gabeira	
http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,de-paz-e-amor-a-jararaca,10000020610	
14/3	2016	 V#2469	 Veja	 Marcelo	Odebrecht	 Petrobras	 Ulisses	Campbell	
No	link	available	
14/3	2016	 F14/3	2016	 Folha	 Lula	 Obstruction	of	Justice	 Mônica	Bergamo	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2016/03/1749879-lula-deve-aceitar-convite-de-dilma-para-ser-ministro.shtml	
15/3	2016	 F15/3	2016	 Folha	 Lula	 Obstruction	of	Justice	 D.	Álvares,	R.	Bragon,	P.	Reverbel		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1750090-oposicao-vai-acionar-justica-se-lula-assumir-ministerio-de-dilma.shtml	












22/3	2016	 F22/3a	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Plea	bargain	 Mario	Cesar	Carvalho		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1752993-executivos-da-odebrecht-decidem-fazer-acordo-de-delacao.shtml	
22/3	2016	 F22/3b	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Planilha	 Graciliano	Rocha		
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1752707-odebrecht-tinha-departamento-de-propina-no-pais-diz-lava-jato.shtml	
23/3	2016	 F23/3	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Planilha	 Clovis	Rossi	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1753135-a-delacao-do-fim-do-mundo.shtml	





Date		 	 Code	-	Media	Outlet		 Subject	1		 Subject	2		 	 Author(s)	
	
25/3	2016	 F25/3	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Planilha	 Editorial	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2016/03/1753954-lista-explosiva.shtml	
11/4	2016	 F11/4	2016	 Folha	 Partido	da	República	 Government	rupture	 Débora	Álvares	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1759860-favoravel-ao-impeachment-lider-do-pr-na-camara-entrega-cargo.shtml	
14/4	2016	 F14/4	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 Jose	Henrique	Mariante	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/josehenriquemariante/2016/04/1760726-revisao-inconsequente.shtml	
27/4	2016	 F27/4a	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Eduardo	Cunha	 Marina	Dias	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1765414-dilma-acusa-cunha-de-ser-pecado-original-do-impeachment.shtml	
27/4	2016	 F27/4b	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 Marina	Dias,	Gustavo	Uribe,	Valdo	Cruz	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/04/1765178-dilma-admite-que-afastamento-da-presidencia-se-tornou-inevitavel.shtml	
3/5	2016	 E3/5	2016	 Estado		 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 Victor	Martins,	Carla	Araújo	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,e-confortavel-para-os-golpistas-que-a-vitima-desapareca--diz-dilma-sobre-pressao-para-
renuncia,10000048880		
5/5	2016	 F5/5	2016	 Folha	 Impeachment		 Dilma	Rousseff	 L.	Colon,	M.	Haubert,	D.	Álvares	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/05/1768027-afastamento-de-cunha-confirma-tese-para-anular-impeachment-diz-cardozo.shtml	
23/5	2016	 F23/5	2016	 Folha	 Sergio	Machado	 Romero	Jucá	 Rubens	Valente	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/05/1774018-em-dialogos-gravados-juca-fala-em-pacto-para-deter-avanco-da-lava-jato.shtml	
26/5	2016	 F26/5	2016	 Folha	 Sergio	Machado	 Romero	Jucá	 Bernardo	Mello	Franco	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/bernardomellofranco/2016/05/1775184-o-novo-homem-bomba.shtml	
8/6	2016	 V#2481	 Veja	 Sergio	Machado	 Rodrigo	Rangel	
No	link	available	
6/8	2016	 F6/8	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 Michel	Temer	 Folha	Newsroom	São	Paulo	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/08/1799749-odebrecht-delatara-pedido-de-apoio-financeiro-de-temer-
afirma-revista.shtml	
7/8	2016	 F7/8	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 José	Serra	 Bela	Megale	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/08/1799887-jose-serra-recebeu-r-23-mi-via-caixa-2-afirma-
odebrecht.shtml	
8/8	2016	 V#2490	 Veja	 Odebrecht	 Michel	Temer	 Daniel	Pereira	
https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/odebrecht-cita-temer-em-negociacao-de-delacao-premiada/	
8/10	2016	 E8/10	2016	 Estado		 Odebrecht	 Plea	bargain	 Beatriz	Bulla	
http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,hotel-de-brasilia-vira-qg-de-delacao-da-odebrecht,10000081003	
28/10	2016	 F28/10	2016	 Folha	 Odebrecht	 José	Serra	 Bela	Megale	
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/10/1827058-odebrecht-diz-que-caixa-2-a-serra-foi-pago-em-conta-
suica.shtml	





17/5	2017	 E17/5	2017	 Estado	 JBS	 Michel	Temer	 Alexandre	Hisayasu,	Fausto	Macedo	
https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/se-a-jbs-delatar-sera-o-fim-da-republica-diz-eduardo-cunha/	
28/5	2018	 F28/5	2018	 Folha	 Jair	Bolsonaro	 Elections	 Celso	Rocha	de	Barros	
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/celso-rocha-de-barros/2018/05/bolsonaro-te-acha-otario.shtml	
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2016-03-16 Temer	é	citado	no	caso	Petrobras Senador	implica	também	Temer,	Renan	e	Esteves Janot	vai	pedir	investigação	de	Lula,	Temer,	Mercadante	e	Aécio
2016-03-11 Ex-diretor	preso	foi	indicado	por	Temer,	afirma	Delcídio	
2016-03-01 Emenda	de	Cunha	à	Lei	dos	Portos	ajuda	doador	de	Temer
2016-02-12 Ao	TSE,	Temer	acusa	oposição	de	'demonizar'	doação	eleitoral
2016-01-12 Lava	Jato	faz	Temer	se	unir	a	Dilma	em		defesa	no	TSE
2015-12-19 Em	mensagem,	empreteira	cita	repasse	a	Temer	de	R$5	milhões
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Appendix	D	
Transcript	of	news	broadcasts	
	
Jornal	Nacional,	broadcast	on	TV	Globo,	20:30	on	March	4,	2016	–	see	section	4.4.1	
Retrieved	from	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4IdpIBPW8Bs	
	
[WB	=	William	Bonner;	RV	=	Renata	Vasconcellos]	
	
[music,	zoom	in	on	anchors	in	Globo	studio]	
WB:	Boa	noite	
RV:	Boa	noite	
WB:	A	operação	Lava	Jato	chega	ao	ex-presidente		
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Policiais	federais	obrigam		
[footage	from	Lula’s	house,	agents	leading	Lula	out	of	the	garage	and	into	black	car]	
Lula	prestar	depoimento	numa	sala	no	aeroporto	de	Congonhas	
[studio,	head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	A	ação	policial	atrai	manifestantes	pro	e	contra	ao	ex-presidente	
[footage	of	police	and	protesters	in	half	melee	in	front	of	Lula’s	house]	
e	as	provocações	de	lado	a	lado	terminam	em	violência	
[studio,	head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	procuradores	investigam	contas	de	instituto	Lula	e	a	empresa	de	palestras	dele	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
e	afirmam	que	o	instituto	e	a	empresa	receberam	pagamentos	e	doações	das	cinco	empreiteiras	
mais	envolvidas	no	desvio	de	dinheiro	da	Petrobras	
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	os	investigadores	querem	saber	porque	empresas	dos	filhos	do	ex-presidente	receberam	
dinheiro	do	instituto	Lula	e	da	empresa	de	palestras	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Agentes	também	fizeram	buscas	na	casa	de	Lula	em	São	Bernardo	do	Campo		
[footage	of	beach	side	apartment	and	ranch]	
e	no	tríplex	em	Guarujá	e	no	sitio	em	Atibaia	
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	A	força-tarefa	da	Lava	Jato	investiga	se	a	OAS	bancou	armazenamento	de	objetos	de	Lula	
depois	que	ele	deixou	a	Presidência	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	isios	e	reformas	no	sitio	e	no	apartamento	foram	pagamento	de	vantagem	indevida	ao	ex-
presidente	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	este	é	o	momento	de	sermos	republicanos		
Não	há	ninguém	isento	de	investigação	no	pais	
[studio,	head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	O	ex-presidente	repudia	as	acusações	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	critica	a	condução	coercitiva		
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[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	diz	que	teria	prestar	do	esclarecimento	se	tivesse	sido	convidado	a	depor	
[footage	of	Lula	at	press	conference]	
Lula:	então	era	só	ter	comunicar	[not	intelligible]	diremos	lá	
Lamentavelmente,	eles	preferiram	a	utilizar	a	prepotência.		
A	arrogância.		
Num	show	e	num	espetáculo	e	pirotécnica		
[studio,	head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	A	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	manifesta	
[footage	of	Dilma	at	press	conference]	
WB:	solidariedade	ao	ex-presidente	Lula	
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	rebate	afirmações	do	acordo	de	delação	premiada	do	senador	Delcídio	do	Amaral	
[head	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	nossos	repórteres	mostram	a	repercussão	da	24o	fase	da	Lava	Jato	no	Congresso	e	no	
mercado	financeiro	
[head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	a	nova	denúncia	de	Procuradoria-Geral	da	República	contra	o	deputado	Eduardo	Cunha	
[full	studio	shot	from	above]	
WB:	o	Jornal	Nacional	está	começando		
[graphic	with	logotype;	music]		
[2:00	-	full	studio	shot,	zooming	in]	
WB:	Policiais	federais	levaram	o	ex-presidente	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	para	depor	a	investigadores	
da	operação	Lava	Jato	hoje	da	manha	numa	sala	do	aeroporto	de	Congonhas	em	São	Paulo.	Ele	foi	
o	alvo	central	da	24o	fase	da	operação,	que	recebeu	o	nome	de	“Aletheia”.		
[shot	from	left,	zooming	in	again	on	WB]	
WB:	Em	grego,	essa...	palavra	significa	“a	busca	da	verdade”.	
[footage	from	helicopter,	above	São	Bernardo	do	Campo	and	Lula’s	apartment]	
Reporter	VO	[José	Roberto	Burnier]:	Eram	6	da	manha	quando	policia	federal	bateu	a	porta	do	
apartamento	do	ex-presidente	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	em	São	Bernardo	do	Campo	onde	ele	mora	
De	acordo	com	os	procuradores	da	operação	Lava	Jato,	Lula	recebeu	os	policiais	com	
tranquilidade.	Para	não	chamar	atenção,	Lula	saiu	num	carro	sem	o	logotipo	da	PF,	por	volta	da	7	
de	manha.	
Mas	ele	não	foi	para	a	sede	da	policia	federal	na	zona	oeste	de	São	Paulo,	
para	onde	os	intimados	costumam	ser	levados.	
Ele	percorreu	cerca	de	25	quilómetros,	entre	São	Bernardo	do	Campo	e	a	zona	sul	de	São	Paulo	
onde	fica	o	aeroporto	de	Congonhas.	
[repórter	on-site,	half-shot]	
Burnier:	Por	questões	de	segurança	o	ex-presidente	Lula	foi	trazido	aqui	para	ala	de	autoridades	
de	aeroporto	de	Congonhas.	
É	uma	área	militar;	mais	protegida.	Durante	mais	de	três	horas,	Lula	prestou	depoimento	numa	
sala	que	normalmente	é	usada	pela	Presidência	da	República		
[head-shot	of	police	delegate	Igor	Romário	de	Paula]	
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Romário	de	Paula:	o	acompanhamento	nas	ultimas	semana	detetou	a	movimentação	de	pessoas	
ligadas	de	uma	forma	ao	ex-presidente	e	sua	família,	no	sentido	de	mobilizar	pessoas	para	tentar	
prejudicar	a	diligência	de	hoje.	
Então	a	por	isso	o	local	do	depoimento	dele	foi	mudado,	por	isso	as	equipes	hoje	são	
acompanhados	das	equipes	estáticas	para	isolar	áreas	necessário,	e	feito	no	forma	mais	ágil	
possível,	no,	foi	uma	mudança	de	procedimento	por	ser	o	ex-presidente	da	República			
Foi	uma	questão	só	de	segurança	mesmo	
[footage	from	press	conference,	in	Curitiba	presumably,	with	judge	Sergio	Moro]	
Reporter	VO:	No	total,	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	expediu	11	mandados		
[footage	from	the	front	of	Lula’s	house]	
de	condução	coercitiva,	que	é	quando	o	suspeito	ou	investigado	tem	que	ser	apresentar	a	uma	
autoridade	policial,	ainda	que	fique	calado.	
[footage	of	Congonhas	from	helicopter,	shots	of	police	cars	coming	down	a	street]	
Moro	também	expediu	33	mandados	de	busca	e	apreensão,	cumpridos	nos	estados	de	São	Paulo,	
Rio	e	Bahia.	
[footage	from	the	front	of	Lula’s	house]	
200	policiais	e	30	auditores	da	Receita	Federal	
[footage	of	Tax	Authority	car	opening	door]	
participaram	na	operação.	
[Animated	graphic	of	“propinoduto”	–	showing	tubes,	supposedly	at	a	Petrobras	refinery,	dripping	
bundles	of	money.	A	document	hovers	in	from	left,	depicting	the	court	order	quoted	below]	
As	buscas	foram	autorizadas	dia	24	de	fevereiro.	A	justificativa	do	Ministério	Público	para	a	
condução	coercitiva	do	ex-presidente	é	que		
[quote,	graphic	highlights	of	that	text	section]	
a	medida	é	necessária	para	evitar	tumultos	políticos,	como	ocorrido	no	Fórum	criminal	da	Barra	
Funda	em	fevereiro,	quando	pessoas	ficaram	feridas.	
[footage	from	the	front	of	Lula’s	house]	
Assim	que	a	notícia	foi	divulgada,	manifestantes	começaram	a	se	aglomerar	em	frente	ao	
apartamento	de	Lula.	
[footage	shows	2	seconds	of	protesters	singing	“Olé,	olé	oh	la,	Lula,	Lula”]	
Não	demorou	muito	e	começou	uma	confusão.	Policia	militar	tentou	manter	os	grupos	a	favor	e	
contra	em	lados	separados.		
[footage	of	in-fighting	between	protesters]	
Teve	socos,	chutes,	gente	machucada,	e	muita	briga	
[footage	of	more	fighting	at	airport,	by	busses	and	behind	barriers]	
A	cena	se	repetiu	em	frente	ao	aeroporto	de	Congonhas.	Manifestantes	a	favor	e	contra	o	ex-
presidente	entraram	em	confronto.	
Sobrou	provocação	para	todo	lado;	
[footage	of	people	protesting	inside	Congonhas	terminal]	
E	em	frente	a	sala	onde	Lula	estava	depondo.	
No	saguão,	muita	gente,	e	mais	discussão	
Teve	protestos	contrários	
[people	chanting	“a	nossa	bandeira	jamais	será	vermelha”]	
e	favoráveis	ao	ex-presidente	Lula	
[people	chanting	“não	vai	ter	golpe”]	
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[close-up	of	Luiz	Carlos	da	Silva	in	front	of	the	airport	office	of	the	federal	police]	
Professor	Luizinho,	um	dos	fundadores	do	Partido	dos	Trabalhadores,	estava	no	aeroporto.	
Ele	chegou	a	ser	investigado	no	esquema	de	Mensalão	e	foi	absolvido.	Ele	discutiu	com	uma	
passageira;	mostrou	uma	cueca,	e	fez	com	a	mão	a	letra	“l”,	de	Lula.	
[footage	of	airport	front	road,	on	the	ground	and	from	helicopter]	
Do	lado	de	fora,	um	pequeno	grupo	de	manifestantes	soltou	fogos	no	canteiro	central	de	avenida	
que	fica	em	frente	ao	aeroporto.	O	trânsito	parou	nos	dois	sentidos.	
[footage	of	Paulo	Teixeira	in	front	of	airport]	
O	deputado	federal	do	PT	Paulo	Teixeira	que	acompanhou	o	depoimento	do	ex-presidente	diz:	
[footage	of	Atibaia	ranch	from	helicopter,	while	quoting	Teixeira]	
“Lula	afirmou	que	os	donos	do	sítio	em	Atibaia	são	Jonas	Suassuna	e	Fernando	Bittar.”	
[footage	of	beach	side	apartment	complex]	
O	ex-presidente	explicou	que	teve	uma	quota	do	triplex	na	Guarujá,	mas	que	não	exerceu	a	opção	
de	compra	de	apartamento.	Lula	confirmou	que	visitou	o	imóvel	
[footage	of	Atibaia	ranch	from	helicopter]	
já	de	acordo	com	o	deputado,	Lula	se	irritou	quando	foi	perguntado	sobre	os	pedalinhos	com	os	
nomes	dos	netos	e	que	estão	no	sítio	de	Atibaia	
[footage	of	Paulo	Teixeira	in	front	of	airport]	
Paulo	Teixeira:	Ele	ficou	indignado	e	falou	que	acha	essa	pergunta	na	tal	altura	nem	é	da	policia	
federal	e	nem	do	Ministério	Público	Federal	e	não	dar	...	a	minha	altura		
[low-resolution	photo	of	Lula	on	the	phone	at	the	airport	hall,	zooming	out	and	revealing	the	
propinoduto	graphic	again,	substituted	for	another	photo	of	Lula	in	the	hall]	
Reporter	VO:	Depois	de	responder	às	perguntas	dos	delegados	da	Polícia	Federal,	o	ex-presidente	
saiu	pouco	
[footage	of	garage	entrance	of	the	Congonhas	presidential	hall	section,	circled	by	a	yellow	ring]	
depois	do	meio	dia	por	trás	do	aeroporto.		
[studio,	torso-and-desk	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Os	investigadores	disseram	que	as	suspeitas	contra	o	ex-presidente	Lula	são	baseadas	em	
provas	e	depoimentos.	
O	Ministério	Público	e	a	Polícia	Federal	investigam	o	papel	dele	no	esquema	criminoso	[RV	nods]	
da	Petrobras	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Há	motivos	para	investigar	o,	o	senhor	Luiz	Inácio.	Neste	momento,	o	motivo	é	verificar	se	
esses	pagamentos,	feitos	a	ele,	são	um,	um	“quid	pro	quo”,	como	diz	os	americanos,	do,	do,	dos	
benefícios	alcançados	pro	favores	no	governo.	
[torso-and-desh	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Agora	Você	vai	conhecer	os	detalhes	dos	motivos	dessa	condução	de	Lula,	apresentados	
pelos	investigadores.	
Esses	motivos	foram	divulgados	numa	entrevista	junto	com	um	documento,	e	o	repórter	Marcelo	
Rocha	mostra	na	reportagem:	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[Reading	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	Estão	
sendo	cumpridos	
[in	this	case	and	the	following,	the	graphic	shows	quotes	from	document,	with	lines	of	text	
swooping	closer	to	the	spectator]	
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nesta	data,	mandados	de	busca	e	apreensão	e	de	condução	coercitiva	para	aprofundar	a	
investigação	de	possíveis	crimes	de	corrupção	e	lavagem	de	dinheiro	oriundo	de	desvios	da	
Petrobras,	praticados	por	meio	de	pagamentos	dissimulados	por	José	Carlos	Bumlai	e	pelas	
construtoras	OAS	e	Odebrecht	ao	ex-presidente	da	República,	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva,	e	pessoas	
associadas.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Nesse	caso	estamos	falando	de	uma...	organização	criminosa	infiltrada	dentro	do	governo	
federal	que	se	utilizava	da	Petrobras	e	das	outras	empresas	para	o	financiamento	político	e	
também	para	apropriação	pessoal.	Essa	organização	criminosa	certamente	possui	uma,	um	
comando.	Foi	verificado,	e	nós	aí	fizemos	a	acusação,	que	o	ex-ministro	Zé	Dirceu	fazia	parte	deste	
comando	junto	com	ex-tesoureiro	José	Vaccari	entre	outros.		
[break	in	footage	to	other	part	of	conference,	still	Lima	talking]	
Nós	precisamos,	e	fazemos	uma	investigação,	da	continuidade	dessa	cadeira	de	comando.	Hoje,	
nós	estamos	analisando	evidências	de	que...	o	ex-presidente	e	sua	família	receberam	vantagens	
para	...	eventualmente	...	a	...	consecução	de	atos	dentro	do	governo	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
Esse	grande	esquema	era	coordenado	a	partir	das	cúpulas	e	lideranças	dos	partidos	políticos	que	
compunham	a	base	do	governo	federal,	especialmente	o	Partido	dos	Trabalhadores,	o	Partido	
Progressista	e	o	Partido	do	Movimento	Democrático	Brasileiro.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Esse	é	um	esquema	de	compra	de	apoio	político	partidário,	entretanto:		
[10:00]	Se	ele	conhecia	as	vantagens	indevidas	pagas,	e	se	ele	recebeu	vantagens	indevidas,	nós	
estamos	ainda	em	investigação.	
[footage	from	other	angle,	showing	more	desk	and	still	focus	on	Lima]	
As	investigações	são	exatamente	
[footage	from	first	angle,	head-on	–	possible	hiding	a	break	in	the	footage]	
no	sentido	de	comprovar	–	ou	não	–	a	participação	do	ex-presidente	nas	decisões	de	
beneficiamento	dos	partidos	políticos	da	base	aliada.	Nesse	aspecto,	as	investigações	já	vêm	
acumulando	evidências	do	principal,	eeh,	beneficiário	disso,	era	o	governo	do	PT;			
que	foi...	cujo	titular	foi	o	ex-presidente.	Então,	fica	claro	que	o	benefício	político	recebido	foi	
basicamente	do	ex-presidente	Lula,	e	atualmente	da	atual	presidente.	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
O	ex-presidente	Lula,	além	de	líder	partidário,	era	o	responsável	final	pela	decisão	de	quem	seriam	
[11:00]	os	diretores	da	Petrobras	e	foi	um	dos	principais	beneficiários	dos	delitos.	De	fato,	
surgiram	evidências	de	que	os	crimes	o	enriqueceram	e	financiaram	campanhas	eleitorais	e	o	
caixa	de	sua	agremiação	política.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Está	sob	analise	todo	os	atos	de	nomeação	de	diretórias	da	empresa	Petrobras	-	e	de	outros	
casos	envolvendo	outras	empresas	ou	órgãos	estatais	-	e	verificando	se	este	aparelhamento	da	
Petrobras	e	deu-se	por	orientação	do	governo.	Nós	sabemos	que	José	Dirceu	estava	realmente	
aparelhando	a	Petrobras	para	desvio	de	recursos.	Nós	vamos	verificar	agora	se	esses	desvios	de	
recursos	eram	de	reconhecimento	do	ex-presidente.	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
A	suspeita,	aqui	novamente,	é	que	os	valores	com	que	o	ex--presidente	foi	agraciado	constituem	
propinas	pagas	a	título	de	contraprestação	pelos	favores	ilícitos	obtidos	no	esquema	Petrobrás.	
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[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	A	vantagem	não	precisa	ser	dinheiro,	não	preciso	estar	diretamente	ligada	ao	ato;	nós	
podemos	verificar	que	mesmo	após...	o	exercício	da	Presidência	pode	estar	sendo	pagos	ainda	
vantagens	ao	ex-presidente	
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
Todos	esses	fatos	estão	sendo	investigados	no	âmbito	da	Lava	Jato	porque	eles	se	relacionam	com	
o	destino	de	verbas	desviadas	da	Petrobras	por	empresas	e	pessoas	participantes	do	mega-
esquema	criminoso.	Os	fatos	são	de	competência	federal	não	só	por	se	relacionarem	com	crimes	
financeiros	e	de	lavagem	de	dinheiro	transnacional,	mas	também	por	haver	fatos	praticados	
quando	o	ex-presidente	estava	no	exercício	de	mandato	no	âmbito	da	União	Federal,	onde	
possivelmente	sua	influência	foi	usada,	antes	e	depois	do	mandato	–	o	que	é	objeto	de	
investigação	–	para	que	o	esquema	existisse	e	se	perpetuasse.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	head-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima,	this	
time	in	the	midst	of	scores	of	reporters	holding	microphones]	
Lima:	Certamente	o	governo	dele	foi	um		
[credit	texts	appear	in	the	bottom	of	the	screen]	
dos	grandes	beneficiários	da	compra	desse	apoio	político	partidário,	eeh,	nós	estamos	
investigando	se	houve	algum	vantagem	ao	senhor	Luiz	Inácio.		
Reporter	VO,	Marcelo	Rocha	[quoting	again	from	document	presented	in	graphic	of	a	desk]:	
A	investigação	sobre	o	ex-Presidente	não	constitui	juízo	de	valor	sobre	quem	ele	é	ou	sobre	o	
significado	histórico	dessa	personalidade,	mas	sim	um	juízo	de	investigação	sobre	fatos	e	atos	
determinados,	que	estão	sob	suspeita.	Dentro	de	uma	república,	mesmo	pessoas	ilustres	e	
poderosas	devem	estar	sujeitas	ao	escrutínio	judicial	quando	houver	fundada	suspeita	de	
atividade	criminosa.	
[repeating	the	footage	of	the	escalada	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	
Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Este	é	um	momento	de	sermos	republicanos;	
Não	há	ninguém	isento	de	investigação	no	pais.	
[repórter	on-site	in	Curitiba,	outside	of	the	PF	offices]	
Marcelo	Rocha:	Foram	estes	os	argumentos	apresentados	pelos	procuradores	ao	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	
para	pedir	a	condução	coercitiva	do	ex-presidente	Lula.	O	juiz	concordou	que	não	dava	para	
marcar	uma	data,	já	que	isso	pode	causar	tumultos	como	o	que	ocorreu	em	São	Paulo	no	mês	
passado	quando	Lula	seria	ouvido	numa	investigação	conduzidas	por	promotores	paulistas.	O	juiz	
destacou	que	a	condução	coercitiva	do	ex-presidente	não	significa	antecipação	de	
responsabilidade	criminal,	e	nem	tem	por	objetivo	cessar	os	direitos	de	Lula	ou	colocá-lo	em	
situação	vexatória.	
Sérgio	Moro	estabeleceu	como	condição	para	o	cumprimento	do	mandado	que	os	policiais	não	
utilizassem	algemas	e	em	hipótese	alguma	permitissem	a	filmagem	do	deslocamento	e	
interrogatória	do	ex-presidente.	
[studio,	head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Os	partidos	citados,	PP	e	PMDB,	negam	(RV	shakes	her	head)	qualquer	envolvimento	em	
irregularidade.	O	Ministério	Público	Federal	também	tinha	pedido	a	condução	coercitiva	da	ex-
primeira-dama,	Marisa	Letícia,	mas	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	indeferiu	o	pedido.	O	juiz	alegou	que	no	
caso	de	Marisa	Letícia	é	possível	agendar	um	depoimento	sem	que	se	implique	um	maior	risco	à	
ordem	pública.		
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[torso-and-desk-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Uns	dos	principais	focos	dessa	fase	da	operação	Lava	Jato	são	os	pagamentos	ao	Instituto	
Lula	e	ao	LILS,	a	empresa	de	palestras	do	ex-presidente.	
RV:	As...	[interrupted	by	WB]	
[close-up	head-shot	of	WB,	angled	from	the	left	of	the	desk]	
WB:	As	investigações	mostram	que	empreiteiras	que	mais	desviaram	dinheiro	da	Petrobras	são	as	
maiores	financiadores	das	duas	instituições.	
[footage	from	older	interview	with	Lula]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:		Assim	que	deixou	a	Presidência	em	2011,	Lula	criou	a	LILS,	empresa	
que	promove	principalmente	palestras	do	ex-presidente.		
[helicopter	footage	of	Instituto	Lula]	
No	mesmo	ano,	ele	também	criou	o	Instituto	Lula,	que	funciona	sem	fins	lucrativos	
[propinoduto	graphic	again,	this	time	from	another	angle,	with	the	BR	logo	prominent	(the	well-
known	gas	station,	a	sub-company	of	Petrobras)	–	again	ending	in	money	bundles	and	a	document	
swooping	in	from	the	left,	this	time	illustrating	Institute	Lula’s	web	page]	
De	acordo	com	seu	site	na	Internet,	o	instituto	tem	com	missão	principal	a	cooperação	do	Brasil	
com	a	África	e	a	América	Latina	
[helicopter	footage	of	Instituto	Lula]	
A	LILS	e	o	Instituto	Lula	estão	na	mira	da	Polícia	Federal	e	do	Ministério	Público	Federal	
[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors;	credit	subtitle	at	the	
bottom	of	the	picture]	
Os	investigadores	da	Lava	Jato	querem	saber	se	há	relação	entre	dinheiro	desviado	da	Petrobras	
pelas	empreiteiras	e	os	pagamentos	e	doações	feitas	a	LILS	e	ao	Instituto.	
[footage	of	tax	auditor	Leonel	at	press	conference,	torso,	and	the	Paraná	police	department’s	flag,	
the	state’s	flag,	and	other	banners	in	the	background]	
Roberto	Leonel:	Nós	seremos	aí	a	verificação	de	que	–	que	a	coincidência	há	-	que	as	cinco	
maiores	empresas	que	pagaram	palestras	para	a	LILS	Palestras	de	2011	a	2014	–	são	as	mesmas	
empresas	que	doaram	os	maiores	valores	para	o	Instituto	Lula.	
[break	in	footage,	resuming	instantly	in	same	shot]	
Esse	é	umas	das	considerações	em	relação	às	origens	dos	recursos.	
[propinoduto	graphic	again	–	again	with	the	BR	logo]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:		os	procuradores	já	identificaram	que	entre	2011	e	2014,	o	Instituto	
Lula	recebeu	mais	de	20	milhões	de	reais	em	doações	-	perto	de	60%	da	receita	-	dinheiro	das	
construtoras	Camargo	Correa,	Odebrecht,	Queiroz	Galvão,	OAS	e	Andrade	Gutierrez.	
No	mesmo	período,	essas	empreiteiras	e	mais	a	UTC	fizeram	pagamentos	a	LILS	para	palestras	do	
ex-presidente	Lula,	no	total	de	quase	10	milhões	reais,	47%	do	faturamento	da	empresa.	
[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors	seen	from	right]	
Todas	essas	empreiteiras	que	fizessem	os	pagamentos	e	doações	são	investigados	na	Lava	Jato	e	
parte	delas	já	teve	executivos	condenados.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Caracterizavam	núcleo	duro	do	cartel	que	delapidou	património	da	Petrobras	
[break	in	footage,	resumed	instantly]	
Isto	é	um	valor	significativo.	É	claro	que	doações	pode	serem	realizados	por	diversos	motivos,	mas	
nós	precisamos	analisar	claramente	se	isso	tem	alguma	vinculação	com	as	obras	...	eeh...	
fraudadas,	e	com	a	Petrobras	e	outras	órgãos.		
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[new	propinoduto	graphic	–	zooming	in	on	a	sombre	landscape	with	a	lone	refinery]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:	No	despacho	que	autorizou	a	operação	de	hoje,	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	
afirmou	que		
[half-quoting	text]	
não	se	pode	concluir	pela	ilicitude	das	transferências	às	empresas	do	ex-presidente,	mas	é	forçoso	
reconhecer	que	tratam-se	de	valores	altos	para	doações	e	palestras,	o	que	no	contexto	do	
esquema	criminoso	da	Petrobras	gera	dúvidas	sobre	a	generosidade	das	empresas.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:		Os	procuradores	também	querem	investigar	se	as	palestras	feitas	
[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors]	
pelo	ex-presidente	Lula	e	pagas	pelas	empreiteiras	foram	realmente	realizadas	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	head-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima,	this	
time	in	the	midst	of	scores	of	reporters	holding	microphones]	
Lima:	Nós	queremos	verificar-se	circunstancias	em	que	as	ocorreram,	os	locais	em	que	as	
ocorreram,	e	se	houve	um	ato	do	governo	que	possa	ser	vinculados	a	essas	empreiteiras	que	
pagaram	essas	palestras	e	aos	governos	que	onde	essas	palestras	ocorreram	
[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors]	
	Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:	Outro	ponto	da	investigação	é	saber	se	houve	favorecimento	das	
empresas	ligadas	a	filhos	do	ex-presidente	através	de	pagamentos	
[helicopter	footage	of	Instituto	Lula]	
do	instituto	Lula	e	da	LILS	Palestras.	
[propinoduto	graphic	of	a	sombre	landscape	with	a	lone	refinery	again;	again,	document	swoops	
in	from	left	]	
O	Instituto	Lula	pagou	G4	Entretenimento	e	Tecnologia	Digital,	que	tem	como	sócios	Fabio	Luiz,	
filho	de	Lula,	e	Fernando	Bittar,	e	Kalil	Bittar.	Entre	2012	e	2014,	a	empresa	recebeu	mais	de	1,3	
milhão	reais.	Fernando	Bittar	é	um	dos	donos	oficiais	do	sítio	de	Atibaia.		
O	Instituto	também	pagou	a	FlexBR	tecnologia	que	tem	sede	no	mesmo	endereço	da	G4	e	tem	
como	sócios	os	filhos	de	Lula,	Marcos	Claudio	e	Sandro	Luís,	além	de	Marlene	Araújo	Lula	da	Silva,	
nora	do	ex-presidente.	A	Flex	recebeu	114.000	reais	em	2014.	
A	LILS	também	pagou	a	FlexBR	mais	de	72	mil	reais	entre	2013	e	2014	e	fez	pagamentos	ainda	a	
outro	filho	de	Lula	–	Luís	Claudio	–	mais	de	227	mil	reais	entre	2011	e	2013.		
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	Como	nós	não	vemos	nenhuma	motivação	econômica	na	contratação	por	parte	do	Instituto	
Lula	de	empresas	dos	familiares	do	ex-presidente,	eeh,	nós	estamos	investigando	se	esses	valores	
correspondem	aos	serviços	prestados	ou	não.	Se	não	corresponderem,	certamente	há	um	
beneficio	aos	familiares	
[break	in	footage,	instantly	continuing]	
Como	Instituto	Lula	recebe	das	cinco	maiores	empreiteiras,	nós	estamos	verificando	se	isso	não	é	
apenas	uma	triangulação	de	um	beneficio	final	da	família	do	senhor	Luiz	Inácio	
[repórter	on-site,	night-time]	
Malu	Mazza:	A	Receita	apontou	outra	possível	irregularidade:	Por	não	ter	fins	lucrativos	e	ser	
isentos	de	impostos,	os	recursos	que	entram	no	Instituto	Lula	só	podem	ser	usados	dentro	da	
função	principal	da	entidade.	Já	a	LILS	Palestras	é	uma	empresa	comum	com	fins	lucrativos,	mas	
na	prática	a	Receita	Federal	e	os	investigadores	afirmaram	que	o	Instituto	e	a	LILS	têm	os	mesmos	
funcionários.	A	coincidência,	segundo	eles,	se	repete	com	doadores	e	clientes.	
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[footage	of	the	press	conference,	desk	with	four	delegates/prosecutors]	
Reporter,	Malu	Mazza,	VO:	Para	os	investigadores,	isso	leva	a	uma	mistura	na	movimentação	
financeira	do	Instituto	e	da	LILS.	Essa	confusão	precisa	ser	investigada.	
[Torso	shot	of	tax	authority	auditor]	
Roberto	Leonel:	A	empresa	LILS	não	possui	nenhum	empregado;	exceção	é	que,	há	alguns	anos,	
tinha	um	só	empregado	que	era	um	dos	filhos,	eeh,	e	toda,	e	a	sede	dela	na	sss...	na	casa,	na	
residência	do	ex-presidente.	Tá.	Então	toda	atividade	de	contatos,	eeh,	eeh,	eeh,	com	empresas	
que	vão	contratar	para	fazer	as	palestras,	as	questões	financeiras,	as	questões	de	análise	de	
documentos,	et	cetera,	tudo	é	feito	no	instituto,	que	não	tem	esse	objetivo.		
[studio,	head	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	A	24o	fase	da	Lava	Jato	teve	operação	de	busca	e	apreensão	no	sítio	de	Atibaia	que	a	família	
do	ex-presidente	Lula	costuma	a	frequentar	no	interior	de	São	Paulo,	
[shot	of	studio	from	the	right	of	RV	zooming	in]	
e	surgiram	novas	informações	sobre	esse	imóvel.		
[footage	from	helicopter	of	Atibaia	ranch]	
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Os	investigadores	da	força-tarefa	da	Lava	Jato	não	têm	dúvidas:	O	
ex-presidente	Lula	é	o	verdadeiro	dono	do	sítio	em	Atibaia.	
[graphics	of	table	with	documents]			
Eles	chegaram	a	essa	conclusão	depois	de	constatar	que	parte	considerável	dos	itens	pessoais	do	
ex-presidente	foi	transportada	de	Brasília	para	o	sítio	quando	Lula	deixou	o	Planalto	no	fim	de	
2010.	
[footage	from	police	press	conference,	half-shot	of	PGR	Carlos	Fernando	dos	Santos	Lima]	
Lima:	As	despesas	de	armazenamento	nós	temos	comprovação	que	foram	pagos	pela	empresa	
OAS.		
[graphics	of	table	with	documents,	voice-over	quoting	document]			
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Segundo	investigação,	os	pertencias	do	ex-presidente	foram	
transportados	por	duas	empresas:	Mudanças	5	Estrelas	Limitada	e	Três	Poderes	Mudanças	e	
Transporte	Limitada,	a	Granero	–	as	duas	contratadas	pela	União.	Coube	a	Granero	a	realização	do	
transporte	das	roupas	que	foram	para	apartamento	de	São	Bernardo	de	Campo	e	parte	da	adega	
que	foi	entrega	no	sítio	de	Atibaia.	Segundo	documento,	o	acervo	audiovisual	do	ex-presidente	se	
encontra	atualmente	armazenado	na	Granero.		
[still	photos	of	archive	and	items	on	shelves]	
É	o	que	mostram	essas	fotos	feitas	pela	Polícia	Federal	no	campão	da	transportadora.	Duas	delas	
mostra	uma	caixa	e	um	pacote	em	que	está	inscrito:	caixa	madeira	sítio.	A	5	Estrelas	também	
transportou	parte	dos	bens	para	o	sítio	de	Atibaia	e	para	o	depósito	de	Granero	com	custos	pagos	
pela	OAS,	segundo	a	Receita	Federal.	Em	dezembro	de	2010,	o	presidente	do	Instituto	Lula,	Paulo	
Okamotto,	autorizou	a	Granero	a	prestar	esses	serviços.	Já	de	acordo	com	o	documento,	três	dias	
depois,	a	construtora	OAS	assinou	um	contrato	de	armazenagem	com	a	Granero	no	valor	de	
21.536	reais	e	84	centavos	-	em	beneficio	do	ex-presidente	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva.	
Segundo	a	investigação,	a	OAS	indicou	que	o	contrato	tinha	pro	objetivo	armazenagem	de	
materiais	de	escritório	e	mobiliário	corporativa	de	propriedade	da	OAS.	O	serviço	foi	prestado	
entre	janeiro	de	2011	e	janeiro	deste	ano,	no	valor	total	de	quase	um	milhão	e	300	mil	reais.		
O	relatório	conclui	que	há	evidências	de	que	o	ex-presidente	Lula	recebeu	vantagens	indevidas	da	
OAS	nesse	valor	com	adoção	de	práticas	de	lavagem	de	dinheiro,	com	ocultação	e	dissimulação	de	
origem,	natureza	e	propriedade	de	bens	e	recursos.		
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[footage	of	police	car	in	Atibaia	woods,	credit	text	at	the	bottom	of	the	picture]	
A	polícia	federal	esteve	hoje	no	sítio	para	cumprir	mandado	de	busca	e	apreensão.	
[helicopter	footage	of	the	ranch	área]	
Em	2010	o	local	passou	por	uma	grande	reforma	e	a	suspeita	é	de	que	as	obras		
[graphic,	Google	Earth-style,	of	the	ranch	area,	overlayed	with	two	logos	and	the	Picture	of	
Bumlai]	
têm	sido	bancadas	pelas	empreiteiras	OAS	e	Odebrecht,	investigadas	pela	Lava	Jato,	e	também	
pela	pecuarista	José	Carlos	Bumlai,	preso	em	Curitiba	e	réu	no	esquema	de	corrupção	da	
Petrobras.		
[helicopter	footage	of	the	ranch	área]	
Lula	nega	ser	o	verdadeiro	proprietário	e	diz	que	apenas	frequentava	o	local	em	dias	de	descanso.		
[graphic,	Google	Earth-style,	of	the	ranch	area,	overlayed	with	pictures	of	documents,	Jonas	
Suassuna,	Fabio	Lula	da	Silva,	and	a	emblem	of	a	man	substituting	for	a	Picture	of	Bittar]	
A	propriedade	está	registrada	nos	nomes	do	Fernando	Bittar	e	Jonas	Suassuna,	sócios	de	um	dos	
filhos	do	ex-presidente.	
[new	overlays,	this	time	of	three	checks,	showing	numbers	R$	1	milhão,	R$	400	mil	and	R$100	mil]	
O	Jornal	Nacional	teve	acesso	a	copias	dos	cheques	usados	na	compra	do	sítio	que	foram	entregas	
pela	defesa	do	Lula	ao	Ministério	Público.	
Todos	os	cheques	são	assinados	por	Jonas	Suassuna	no	total	de	1	milhão	e	meio	de	reais.	
[graphics	of	table	with	documents]			
Numa	petição	em	que	pedia	ao	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	a	suspensão	das	investigações	sobre	o	
sítio,	a	defesa	do	ex-presidente	afirmou	que	foi	Jacó	Bittar,	pai	de	Fernando	Bittar	e	amigo	de	Lula,	
que	procurou	o	sítio	para	que	as	famílias	pudessem	conviver.	
[Reporter,	on-site	at	the	ranch	gates]		
Bruno	Tavares:	Os	procuradores	da	Lava	Jato	receberam	mais	uma	prova	de	que	pessoas	muito	
próximas	do	ex-presidente	cuidaram	pessoalmente	da	reforma	aqui	no	sítio.	O	empreiteiro	é	o	
que	forneceu	a	mão-de-obra,	e	os	equipamentos	por	a	obra	diz	que	quem	pagou	a	obra	foi	um	ex-
assessor	especial	de	Lula.	
[new	graphics	of	table	with	documents,	blue	and	yellow	hues]	
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Na	defesa	que	apresentou	ontem	na	Lava	Jato,	o	empreiteiro	Carlos	
Rodrigues	do	Prato	disse	que	o	pagamento	era	feito	semanalmente	e	em	espécie,	por	Rogério	
Aurélio	Pimentel,	totalizando	167.500	reais.		
[graphic,	Google	Earth-style,	of	the	ranch	area,	overlayed	with	photo	of	Rogerio	and	Lula]	
Rogerio	Aurélio	Pimentel	foi	assessor	especial	de	Lula.	
[photo	substituted	by	mug-shot	style	photo	of	Rogerio]	
Ele	deixou	o	governo	quando	Dilma	assumiu	a	Presidência.	
O	nome	do	Aurélio	já	tinha	aparecido	no	escândalo	dos	Aloprados	em	2006.	
[footage	of	Aurélio	in	car	prior	to	his	interrogation	the	same	morning	in	São	Paulo]	
Aurélio	foi	levado	para	prestar	depoimento	hoje	cedo	na	sede	da	Polícia	Federal	em	São	Paulo.		
[footage	of	interview	on	a	road,	repórter	showing	an	iPad	to	interviewee,	interviewee	looking	
down	and	camera	angle	over	her	shoulder	and	cheek]	
Mostramos	a	foto	dele	para	Patrícia	Nunes	que	era	dona	de	um	depósito	em	Atibaia	e	vende	
materiais	de	construção	para	obra	no	sítio.	
Nunes,	almost	off-screen:	Já	passou	cinco	anos,	né...	a	descrição	dele	seria	essa:	vaibam,	branca,	
cabelo	branco,	meio	gordinho,	que	algo	que	me	lembrava	dele.	
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[break	in	footage]	
É	muito	parecido	com	o	que	me	lembro...	mas	não	consigo	de	certeza,	viu?	
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Em	depoimento	a	Lava	Jato,	o	engenheiro	da	Odebrecht,	Frederico	
Barbosa,	disse	que	em	dezembro	de	2010,	o	diretor	da	construtora	Emyr	Costa	Junior,	solicitou	
que	fosse	analisado	uma	obra	de	um	sitio	em	Atibaia.	
Ele	foi,	na	ocasião,	disse	que	foi	recebido	por	uma	pessoa	de	nome	Aurélio.	O	engenheiro	
informou	ainda	que	Aurélio	era	responsável	por	lhe	passar	decisões	sobre	o	acabamento	da	obra;	
e	que	os	trabalhadores	foram	pagos	pela	Odebrecht,	mas	não	era	uma	obra	de	Odebrecht.	
[helicopter	footage	of	police	agents	and	cars	on	parking	lot]	
Depois	que	ficarem	mais	de	sete	horas	no	sítio,	policiais	federais	foram	até	uma	propriedade	perto	
da	ali.	
[footage	of	cellular	antena	site,	zoom	out	and	move	towards	repórter	on-site]	
Bruno	Tavares:	essa	antena	de	telefonia	celular	também	é	alvo	dos	investigadores	da	operação	
Lava	Jato	
Eles	querem	entender	porque	que	essa	antena	foi	colocada	ao	menos	de	100	metros	do	sítio	
Santa	Barbara.	
[footage	of	the	top	of	the	antenna]	
Ela	foi	instalada	pela	operadora	Oi.	
[interview,	police	delegate	sitting	in	car	and	pointing	up]	
Eduardo	Mauat:	O	que	nos	achamos	interessante	é	o	seguinte:	geralmente	antena	se	põem	na	
cima	do	morro...	na,	se	tá	em	baixo.	Então	se	as	pessoas	saem	dessa	racha	não	[...]	antena	
Female	interviewer,	off-screen:	Seria	para	quem	mora	que	bem	por	no	s..	sofrido	sinal		
Eduardo	Mauat:	Exatamente.	
[more	footage	of	the	antenna,	credit	text	at	the	bottom]	
Reporter,	Bruno	Tavares	VO:	Os	investigadores	apuram	se	a	instalação	da	antena	teria	sido	mais	
um	beneficio	concedido	irregularmente	pro	uma	empresa	ao	ex-presidente.	
[studio,	torso-and-desk	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	O	Instituto	Lula	declarou	que	é	absolutamente	falsa	a	afirmação	de	que	a	mudança	do	ex-
presidente	de	Brasília	pra	São	Paulo	tem	há	sido	pago	por	uma	empresa.	
WB:	O	Instituto	afirmou	que	a	mudança,	como	ocorre	com	todos	os	ex-presidentes,	foi	
providenciada	pela	Presidência	da	República.	Segundo	instituto,	parte	dos	objetos	foi	levada	para	
apartamento	em	São	Bernardo,	e	parte	para	o	sítio	Santa	Barbara,	com	o	conhecimento	dos	
proprietários.		
RV:	O	instituto	afirmou	ainda	que	no	fim	do	governo	Lula,	a	Presidência	da	República	providenciou	
triagem	e	entrega	do	acervo	documental	privado	do	ex-presidente	da	mesma	forma	como	
procedeu	com	os	anteced	–	com	os	antecessores.	
WB:	A	Granero	declarou	que	fez	parte	da	mudança	do	ex-presidente	Lula	de	Brasília	para	São	
Paul,o	e	que	o	acervo	audiovisual	continua	armazenado,	e	que	o	acervo	museológico	foi	retirado	
por	outra	transportadora	contratado	por	Paulo	Okamotta.	
RV:	A	defesa	de	Fernando	Bittar	e	Jonas	Suassuna	afirmou	que	o	sítio	em	Atibaia	pertence	a	eles.	
A	defesa	de	Suassuna	diz	ainda	que	todas	as	despesas	de	sítio	foram	pagas	por	ele.	
	
[end	of	transcript	at	28.55]	
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[WB	=	William	Bonner;	RV	=	Renata	Vasconcellos]	
	
[music,	zoom	in	on	anchors	in	Globo	studio]	
WB:	Boa	noite	
RV:	Boa	noite	
WB:	A	crise	do	governo	Dilma	Rousseff	atinge	o	ponto	mais	alto.	
[graphic	of	document	on	desk]	
RV	VO:	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	é	nomeado	Ministro-Chefe	da	Casa	Civil	
[torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Ele	sai	do	alcance	de		
[footage	of	Sergio	Moro	speaking	publicly]	
Sérgio	Moro,	o	juiz	federal	do	Paraná	responsável	pela	Lava	Jato,	
[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	passa	a	ter	o	chamado	foro	privilegiado	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.	
[torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	O	juiz	Moro	suspende	o	sigilo	
[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	a	Justiça	Federal	torna	publicos	os	grampos	telefónicos	do	ex-presidente,	
[torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	um	deles	de	hoje	a	tarde.	
[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Lula	recebeu	ligação	da	presidente	Dilma	
[graphic	of	a	futuristic	sound-scanner	instrument,	dividing	the	screen	in	two,	with	a	picture	of	
Dilma	and	a	picture	of	Lula	–	the	sound	of	their	recorded	dialogue	is	accompanied	by	text	in	the	
middle	of	each	instrument	section]	
-	Dilma:	Alô	
-	Lula:	Alô	
-	Dilma:	Lula,	deixa	eu	te	falar	uma	coisa.	
-	Lula:	Fala,	querida.	Ahn	
-	Dilma:	Seguinte,	eu	tô	mandando	o	'Bessias'	junto	com	o	papel	pra	gente	ter	ele,	e	só	usa	
em	caso	de	necessidade,	que	é	o	termo	de	posse,	tá?!	
-	Lula:	Uhum.	Tá	bom,	tá	bom.	
-	Dilma:	Só	isso,	você	espera	aí	que	ele	tá	indo	aí.	
-	Lula:	Tá	bom,	eu	tô	aqui,	fico	aguardando.	
-	Dilma:	Tá?!	
-	Lula:	Tá	bom.	
-	Dilma:	Tchau.	
-	Lula:	Tchau,	querida.	
[1:00		-	torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Os	grampos	têm	indícios	fortes	de	que	o	objetivo	da	ida	de	Lula	para	ministério	foi	mesmo	
tirá-lo	do	alcance	do	juiz	Moro,	
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[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	e	indicam	que	o	ex-presidente	tentou	influenciar	várias	autoridades	para	se	proteger.	
[torso-shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Uma	edição	extra	do	Diário	Oficial	publica	a	nomeação	do	agora	ministro	Lula.	
[torso-shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Quarta-feira,	17	de	março:		
[full	studio	shot	from	above]	
WB:	O	Jornal	Nacional	está	começando		
[graphic	with	logotype;	music]	
[full	studio	shot,	zooming	in	slowly	on	WB	until	torso-and-desk	shot]	
WB:	Nesta	quarta-feira	crise	que	envolve	governo	Dilma	Rousseff	atingiu	ponto	mais	alto	desde	o	
início.	
Antes	que	o	Diario	Oficial	efetivasse		
[WB	turns	halfway	towards	RV	and	RV	then	turns	towards	WB,	before	WB	breaks	eye-contact	
again	and	looks	towards	camera;	RV	remains	turned	towards	WB]	
a	nomeação	de	Lula	como	ministro,	o	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	retirou	o	sigilo	de	toda	a	investigação	sobre	
o	ex-presidente,	e	com	isso	tornaram-se	públicas	no	fim	da	tarde	conversas	telefônicas	de	Lula.	
Os	integrantes	da	Lava	Jato	afirmam	que	há	indícios	de	uma	ação	para		
[WB	stresses	each	syllable]	
a-tra-pal-har	as	investigações.	
Ainda	nesta	edição	Jornal	Nacional	vai	mostrar	o	conteúdo	desses	grampos	e	as	reações	que	eles	
provocaram.	
[2:00	-	WB	looks	to	the	left,	câmera	shifts	to	torso-shot]	
WB:	A	nomeação	de	Luiz	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva	como	novo	Ministro-Chefe	da	Casa	Civil,	seis	dias	
depois	de	promotores	estaduais	de	São	Paulo	terem	pedido	a	prisão	dele,	foi	anunciada	no	início	
da	tarde.	Mas	começou	a	se	concretizar	na	noite	de	terça-feira	numa	reunião	no	Palácio	da	
Alvorada.	
[footage	of	the	Alvorada	in	the	distance	at	night-time]	
Reporter	VO	Delis	Ortiz:	Foi	uma	decisão	demorada	mais	de	quatro	horas	na	Alvorada.		
[grainy	zoomed-in	footage	of	a	staircase	in	the	palace,	visible	from	the	outside,	of	Dilma	and	Lula	
walking	down]		
Os	principais	ministros	do	Planalto,	Dilma,	e	o	ex-presidente	Lula	saíram	tarde	da	noite,	
despistando	a	imprensa,	ainda	sem	nenhuma	certeza	-	em	jogo,	segundo	governistas	
[footage	of	the	palace	gates,	Alvorada	visible	behind	the	bars	of	the	gate,	gates	slowly	opening	
and	letting	a	car	out]	
os	questionamentos	do	Lula	sobre	os	poderes	que	passariam	ter	como	alcance	de	condução	da	
economia,		
[close-up	footage	of	the	car	front	window,	Lula	visible	in	the	back]	
e	se	a	presença	dele	no	governo	recuperaria	de	fato	a	duvidosa	fidelidade	de	base	aliado	no	
Congresso,		
[car	on	the	road	outside	of	the	Palace]	
a	do	PMDB	principalmente.	
[footage	of	the	entrance	of	the	Royal	Tulip	hotel,	neighbour	of	the	Alvorada	palace,	and	close-ups	
of	supposedly	Carvalho	talking	to	the	porter]	
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As	tratativas	seguiram	madrugada	dentro	os	velhos	conselheiros	do	ex-presidente,	como	ex-
ministro	Gilberto	Carvalho,	madrugaram	no	hotel	onde	ele	estava	hospedado.		
[3:00		-	footage	of	the	Alvorada	in	daylight,	and	cars	on	the	road	leading	inside	the	palace	gates]	
Dilma	nem	pedalou,	como	de	costume,	retomou	a	conversa	com	Lula	no	café	da	manhã	com	
ministros.	
Ainda	precisaram	de	quase	três	horas	de	conversa	para	chegar	finalmente	a	um	termo.	
[graphic	of	a	workstation	with	a	computer	screen,	zooming	in,	on	a	twitter-like	feed	in	red,	
indicating	PT	leaders’	feeds,	quoting	“Lula	novo	ministro	da	pasta!”]	
Mal	acabou	a	reunião,	e	líderes	do	PT	no	Congresso	já	anunciavam	a	decisão	pela	internet.		
[footage	of	Lula	going	into	a	car	in	front	of	Alvorada]	
Lula	voltou	pra	São	Paulo;		
[footage	of	Wagner	at	press	conference,	torso-shot]	
Jacques	Wagner	viajou	pra	Bahia;	
[footage	of	the	entrance	ramp	to	the	Planalto	palace,	shot	towards	the	Congress]	
Houve	um	entra-e-sai	de	petistas	e	ministros	no	Planalto.	
No	inicio	da	tarde	veio	o	anúncio	discreto:	
[graphic	of	a	desktop	with	document	on	top]	
Uma	nota	de	treze	linhas	oficializou	Lula	para	Ministro-Chefe	de	Casa	Civil	
Jacques	Wagner,	Chefe	de	Gabinete	de	Dilma,		
e	Mauro	Lopes	de	PMDB	para	Secretaria	de	Avião	Civil	
Reporter	Delis	Ortiz,	on-site:	O	governo	tenta	convencer	que	a	nomeação	do	ex-presidente	tem	
caráter	estrutural	de	reforço	para	alterar	os	rumos	de	economia	e	de	ânimo	para	relação	com	o	
Congresso.	Argumentos	à	parte,	fato	é	que	Lula	no	ministério	implica	o	direito	ao	foro	privilegiado,	
ou	seja,		
[4:00]	
ele	escapa	das	mãos	do	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	em	Curitiba,	porque	a	investigação	contra	ele	passará	
para	o	Procurador-Geral	da	República,	Rodrigo	Janot,	e	o	juiz	do	caso	será	o	ministro	Teori	
Zavascki	do	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.		
[footage	of	delegate	Igor	Romario	de	Paula]	
Igor	Romario	de	Paula:	Os	autos	são,	são,	encerrados	no	estado	em	que	se	encontram,	e	
entregados	ao	juízo	da	13O	Vara,	que	automaticamente	encaminha	isso	tudo	pro	Supremo	para	
apreciar.	
[footage	of	Renan	Calheiros,	Rose	de	Freitas	and	other	PMDB	bosses,	together	with	Lula,	exiting	
the	house	of	Renan]	
Reporter	VO	Deliz	Ortiz:	Lula	seguirá	trabalhando	na	sedução	dos	caciques	do	PMDB.	Já	recebeu	
do	Presidente	do	Senado,	Renan	Calheiros,	o	aceno	de	que	pode	irem	frente.	Eles	ainda	terão	um	
encontro.	
O	vice,	Michel	Temer,	também	é	alvo	da	investida	de	Lula	nessa	articulação.		
[studio,	RV	in	desk-and-torso	shot]	
RV:	O	presidente	Lula	já	estava	em	São	Paulo	quando,	no	fim	do	dia,	o	Palácio	do	Planalto	
publicou	uma	edição	extra	do	Diário	Oficial.	
[footage	of	Diario	Oficial	document,	parts	highlighted	in	the	document	swoops	closer	to	the	
spectator]	
RV	VO:	O	documento	é	o	que	garante	a	posse	do	ex-presidente	no	cargo	de	ministro.	A	edição	
extra,	no	mesmo	dia	do	anúncio	da	nomeação,	não	é	usual.		
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[5:00]	
Normalmente,	a	presidente	Dilma	assina	o	termo	de	posse	na	cerimônia	de	posse,	e	só	depois	o	
documento	é	publicado	no	Diário	Oficial.	
[studio,	WB	in	desk-and-torso	shot]]	
WB:	A	entrada	de	Lula	no	governo	repercutiu	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	e	no	Congresso.	
[footage	of	impromptu	press	meeting	with	Afonso	Florence	in	Congress	antehall]	
Reporter,	VO,	Zileida	Silva:	No	Congresso	foi	o	líder	do	PT	na	Câmara	que	deu	a	noticia.	Lula	pediu	
para	que	antes	do	anúncio	formal,	todos	lideres	dos	partidos	que	apoiam	o	presidente	fossem	
informados	da	nomeação.		
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	Lula	avisou	que	quer	se	reunir	com	os	lideres	na	semana	que	vem,	
após	a	posse.	Quem	conversou	com	o	ex-presidente	diz	que	deixou	claro	que	quer	mudar	a	
relação	com	a	base	aqui	no	Congresso,	e	para	alguns	parlamentares,	a	presidente	Dilma	não	tinha	
a	mesma	outra	saída	-	que	o	governo	dela	precisa	ser	reinventado.	
[interview	in	Camara	with	deputado	José	Guimares	(PT)	
Guimares:	Vai	ser	um	braço	forte,	junto	a	presidenta	Dilma,	para	agilizar	e	tomar	as	medidas	que	
foram	necessárias	para	retomar	do	crescimento	e,	principalmente,	do	emprego.		
[footage	of	senator	Humberto	Costa	in	corridor	at	the	Congress]	
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	Governistas	negaram	que	o	ex-presidente	tem	aceitado		
[6:00,	close-up	of	Costa]	ser	ministro	para	ter	foro	privilegiado	
Humberto	Costa:	Vindo	para	o	ministério	ele	estará	sujeito	a	responder	qualquer	inquérito	e	
investigação	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.	
[cut	in	footage]	
É	áte	um	desrespeito	ao	Supremo	esse	tipo	de	argumentação.		
[footage	of	impromptu	press	meeting	with	Pauderny	Avelino	of	DEM	in	Camara	antehall]	
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	Mas	a	oposição	vai	insistir,	e	entrou	com	um	serie	de	ações	
populares	na	Justiça	Federal	para	tentar	impedir	a	posse	do	ex-presidente.	
Avelino:		A	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	está	se	utilizando	de	um	ato	lícito	para	promover	um	ato	
ilícito	que	é	nomear	uma	pessoa	que	está	denunciado	na	justiça,	e	uma	pessoa	que	pode	se	
transformar	em	réu	de	momento	para	outro	para	um	cargo	apenas	
[cut]	
para	blindar-lo	junto	a	Justiça	Federal	
[footage	of	Aécio	and	?	in	a	crowded	room]	
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	O	senador	Aécio	Neves,	presidente	do	PSDB,	diz	que	na	prática	
está	abdicando	do	seu	mandato,	e	que	é	absolutamente	condenável	a	nomeação	do	ex-presidente	
Lula	para	Casa	Civil.	
[7:00,	head-shot	of	Neves	in	the	midst	of	interview]	
Neves:	A	razão	da	posse	do	presidente	Lula	no	ministério	tem	um	sentido	que	supera	todos	os	
outros:	
[cut	in	footage]	
É	impedir	o	bom	andamento	das	investigações,	seja	no	Operação	Lava	Jato,	daquelas	conduzidas	
pelo	Ministério	Público,	eh,	de	São	Paulo.		
[footage	of	Camara	floor,	few	persons	in	the	room]	
Reporter	on-site,	Zileida	Silva:	No	início	da	noite,	o	PRB,	que	tem	21	deputados,	um	senador,	e	o	
Ministro	do	Esporte,	George	Hilton,	anunciou	que	vai	deixar	a	base	aliada.		
[footage	of	Camara	central	panel]	
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[footage	outside	of	STF]	
A	nomeação	de	Lula	também	repercutiu	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal:	
[footage	of	STF	session,	Supreme	Justice	Gilmar	Mendes	at	his	desk	in	the	plenary]	
Mendes:	A	crise	só	piorou.	Só	se	agravou,	a	ponto	de	agora	a	presidente	busca	inclusive	um	tutor	
para,	--	colocar,	no,	no,	no	seu	lugar	de	presidente,	e	ela	assumiu	um	outro	papel.	
[cut	in	footage]	
...e	um	tutor	que	vem	com	problemas	criminais	muito	sérios,	mudando	inclusive	a	competência	
do,	eh,	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	–	tema	que	nos	vamos	ter	aqui	discutir	-	mudando	inclusive	a	
competência	da	justiça	federal.		
[8:00,	footage	of	interview	with	Supreme	Justice	Marco	Aurélio	Mello]	
MAM:	Eu	não	vejo	como	alguém	aceitaria	um	cargo	depois	ter	sido	presidente	da	Republica	
apenas	para	buscar	a	prerrogativa	se	é	que	a	prerrogativa	de	ser	julgado	pelo	Supremo	
[cut	in	footage]	
Eu	vejo	essa	saída	do	presidente	como	uma	tentativa	de	sairmos	do	impasse	nacional.		
[studio,	both	anchors	at	the	desk,	slowly	zooming	in	and	panning	right,	RV	gets	up	from	the	chair	
and	walks	towards	screen	on	the	right]	
RV:	Vamos	agora	ao	vivo	à	Brasília	porque	o	repórter	Fernando	Rego	Barros	tem	informações	
deste	momento	–	olá	Fernando,	boa	noite,	manifestantes	protestam	agora	em	frente	ao	Palácio	
do	Planalto?	
Reporter	on-site,	Fernando	Rego:	Boa	noite	Renata,	boa	noite	a	todos.	Os	manifestantes	
começaram	a	chegar	aqui	ao	Palácio	do	Planalto	por	volta	das	cinco	horas	da	tarde,	bem	antes	até	
da	divulgação	da	gravação	entre	a	presidente	Dilma	e		
[helicopter	footage	of	protests	in	front	of	Planalto]	
Reporter	on-site,	Fernando	Rego	VO:	o	ex-presidente	Lula,	que	foi	divulgada	um	pouco	depois.	
Esses	manifestantes	vieram	aqui	para	protestar	contra	nomeação	pela	presidente	Dilma	do	ex-
presidente	Lula	como	Ministro-Chefe	da	Casa	Civil.	A	gente	vê	essas	imagens	aéreas	aí	[explosions	
of	fireworks]	nesse	momento	aqui	em	frente	ao	Palácio	do	Planalto.	
[9:00]	
Segundo	Polícia	Militar,	cerca	de	duas	mil	e	500	pessoas	–	esse	numero	até	foi	atualizado	agora	há	
pouco	-	para	cinco	mil	pessoas	postadas	aqui	em	frente	ao	Palácio	do	Planalto.	
A	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	saiu	daqui	do	Planalto	por	volta	da	6	e	35	da	noite	e	foi	para	Palácio	
da	Alvorada,	mas	as	manifestantes	continuam	aqui.	Eles	não	aceitam	a	nomeação	do	ex-
presidente	Lula	como	Ministro-Chefe	da	Casa	Civil.	Os	protestos	são	pacíficos	e	em	nenhum	
momento	houve	violência,	nem	por	parte	da	Polícia	Militar,	nem	por	parte	dos	manifestantes.	Os	
manifestantes	só	não	podem...	a,	a,	a	Guarda	Presidencial	está	postada	logo	depois	da	mureta	de	
proteção	para	evitar	qualquer	invasão	–	mas	não	houve	essa	invasão.		
Um	grupo	de	deputados	da	oposição	chegou	aqui	logo	depois	do	início	do	protesto,	mas	demorou	
pouco	foi,	m,	foi	logo	embora;	
E	houve	alguns	deputados,	bem	que	chegaram,	foram	expulsos	pelos	manifestantes		
[10:00]	
que	não	queriam	a	presença	de,	de	alguns	deputados	protestando	aqui	junto	com	eles.	
Reporter	on-site,	Fernando	Rego:	A	gente	tá	acompanhando	aqui	esse	movimentação	ainda	em	
frente	aqui	ao	Palácio	do	Planalto.	Bonner,	Renata...	
[Studio,	RV	still	standing	in	front	of	screen]	
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RV:	Fernando	Rego	Barros	mostrando	cerca	de	5000	pessoas	protestando	nesse	momento	em	
frente	do	Palácio	do	Planalto;	e	de	Brasília,	a	gente	vai	agora	a	São	Paulo;		
[RV	turns	halfway	looking	out	to	the	right,	standing	in	profile;	while	the	screen	behind	her	changes	
to	helicopter	footage	of	Avenida	Paulista	and	people	walking	on	the	street]	
Repórter	Tiago	Elz,	também	tem	informações	para	gente	–	Thiago	que	é	que	Você	ver	nesse	
momento?			
[helicopter	footage	continued	in	full-screen;	7	seconds	of	traffic	noise]	
Reporter	VO,	Tiago	Elz:	Há	um	grande	protesto	já	na	Avenida	Paulista	nesse	momento.	Vale	
lembrar	que	começou	antes	do	anúncio	da	divulgação	do	grampo	da	ligação	entre	o	ex-presidente	
Lula	e	a	presidente	Dilma.	Varias	pessoas	já	se	dirigiram	aqui	para	Avenida	Paulista	para	protestar	
contra	a	nomeação	do	ex-presidente;	essa	manifestação	começou	a	ganhar	mais	corpo	–		
[11:00]	
agora	noite	depois	da	divulgação	desse	áudio	-	depois	da	divulgação	do	grampo.	Às	8	horas,	por	
volta	das	8	horas	da	noite	a	Avenida	Paulista	foi	fechada,	e	ela	segue	fechada	e	com	manifestantes	
ocupando	os	dois	lados	da	Avenida	aí	em	frente	a	FIESP,	que	Você	vê	aí	com	essa	bandeira	com	a	
faixa	preta.	
Renata,	Bonner;	-	
[Studio,	RV	still	standing	in	front	of	screen]	
RV:	Tiago	Elz,	mostrando	ao	vivo	da	Avenida	Paulista,	um	protesto	em	frente	da	Federação	das	
indústrias	de	São	Paulo,		
[RV	turns	and	câmera	changes,	torso	shot	with	the	News	room	in	the	background]	
e	ainda	nesta	edição:	A	crise	politica	no	auge	em	Brasília.	
[desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB,	slow	zoom]	
WB:	A	justiça	torna	publica	um	diálogo	entre	Lula	e	a	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	
[RV	standing,	torso-shot]	
RV:	A	polícia	federal	afirma	ver	indícios	de	ações	para	atrapalhar	as	investigações	da	Lava	Jato	
[desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB,	slow	zoom]	
WB:	E	a	seguir,	você	vai	o	que	diz	a	presidente	Dilma	sobre	nomeação	de	Lula	para	o	cargo	de	
ministro.	
[Graphics	of	G1	/	JN	url,	JN	jingle	music]		
WB:	A	nomeação	do	ex-presidente	Lula	para	ministério	foi	feito	de	uma	maneira	muita	discreta,	
numa	nota	de	13	linhas	–	e	depois	disso	veio	silencio.		
[12:00]	
Silencio	isso	que	só	foi	quebrado	no	meio	da	tarde.	
A	presidente	Dilma	deu	uma	entrevista	no	Palácio	Planalto,	e	logo	no	início,	a	presidente	foi	
questionada	se,	com	essa	nomeação,	Lula	teria	a	virar	uma	espécie	de	super-ministro	e	ela	iria	
perder	poder.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Eu	vou	ter	a	riso	porque,	tem	quatro	anos	de	governo	mais	um	cinco;	estou	entrando	no	
sexto.	Tem	seis	anos	que	Vocês	tentam	[porque]	tentam	me	separar	de	Lula.	A	minha	relação	com	
Lula	não	é	uma	relação	de	poderes	ou	super-poderes	–	a	minha	relação	com	Lula	e	uma	sórdida	
relação	de	quem	constrói	um	projeto	junto.	Então,	o	presidente	Lula,	no	meu	governo,	terá	os	
poderes	necessários	para	nós	ajudar	–	para	ajudar	o	Brasil,	sobretudo	Brasil.	Tudo	que	ele	pode	
fazer	pra	ajudar	o	Brasil	será	feito.	
[13:00]	
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Punto!	
[studio,	RV	desk-and-torso	shot]	
RV:	A	presidente	Dilma	também	foi	questionada	sobre	as	negociações	para	que	Lula	aceitar	seu	
cargo.	Junto	com	os	rumores	de	que	ele	seria	nomeado,	surgiram	informações	de	que	Lula	estaria	
fazendo	exigências	para	aceitar	o	cargo.	A	presidente	negou.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Eu	digo	para	Vocês	que	isso	não	é	do	perfil	do	presidente	Lula.	Presidente	Lula	não	age	
dessa	forma.	
[cut	in	footage]	
Porque	o	presidente	Lula	tinha	dúvidas	se	ele	deveria	ou	não	assumir	o	cargo.	Dúvidas	essas	-	mais	
ligadas	a	situação,	eh,	do,	do	confronto	que	a	oposição	poderia	fazer	sobre	as	suas	razões	do	que	
sobre	esse	tipo	de	questão.		
[cut	in	footage]	
E	acho	que	essas,	essas	dúvidas,	foram	integralmente,	eh,	superadas,	e	nós,	já	ontem,	já	ontem!	-	
tínhamos	a	decisão.	Mas	nós	aprofundamos	hoje	porque	[indecipherable]	tentamos	de	vários	
assuntos...	
[14:00;	repórter	interrupts]	
Reporter	off-screen:	Presidente...	
Dilma:	Mais	práticos.	
[Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Quando	o	repórter	perguntou	se	o	fato	de	Lula	está	sendo	investigado	na	Operação	Lava	Jato	
causaria	algum	constrangimento,	a	presidente	voltou	a	defendê-lo	e	disse	que	estranha	a	forma	
como	as	investigações	sobre	o	Lula	têm	sido	conduzidas.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	os	critérios	de	investigação	são	extremamente	estranhos	em	relação	ao	presidente	Lula.	
Muito	estranhos.	Por	quê?	Porque	o	presidente	Lula	nega	que	tem	o	tríplex,	nega	que	tem	o	sítio,	
e	deu	explicações	suficientes;	não	se	recusa	dar	explicações	–	sempre	foi	chamado,	foi,	foi...	
informou,	e	acho	estranho	–	já,	já	manifestei	isso	–	que	ele	tinha	lev-		se	que	-		seja	levado	
coercitivamente	ou	que	seja	pedida	preventiva	dele,	sem	base	num	fato	que	caracteriza	isso.	Não	
só	eu,	mas,	um	opção	de	juristas	falaram	isso.		
[15:00	-	cut	in	footage]	
Acho	que	não	está	certo	isso	–	mostra	minha	confiança	na	trajetória	dele,	na	biografia	dele,	no	
compromisso	dele	–	que	eu	conheço	ele	–	um	compromisso	com	todas	as	praticas	corretas	e	
idôneas.		
[Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Uma	das	criticas	da	oposição	sobre	a	nomeação	de	Lula	é	que	como	ministro,	ele	ganha	foro	
privilegiado,	ou	seja,	deixe	de	ser	investigado	em	Curitiba	pelo	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	e	passa	a	ser	
investigado	em	Brasília	pelo	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.	A	presidente	Dilma	rebateu	esse	
argumento.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Prerrogativa	de	foro	não	é	impedir	investigação.	É	fazê-la	em	determinada	instância	e	não	
em	outra.	E,	a,	o	tropo	de	que	eu	vou	achar	de	investigação	do,	do,	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	é	melhor	do	
que	a,	a	investigação	do	Supremo,	essa	é	uma-	,	é	uma	inversão	da	hierarquia,	me	desculpa,	eu	
não	posso	acrescentar	mais	nada	uma	resposta	dessas	
[16:00	–	cut	in	footage]	
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Então,	eu	não	entendo	porque,	quando	chega	na	ca-,	no,	no	nesse	caso,	criam	essa	hipótese;	a	
minha	desculpa,	mas	eu	acho	que	se	essa	hipótese	-	ele	é	apenas	uma,	uma	sombrinha;	uma	
proteção	ao	fato	de	que	-	vou	falar	a	verdade	-	a	vinda	do	Lula,	pro	meu	governo	–	fortaleza	o	meu	
governo.	Tem	gente	que	não	quer	que	ele	seja	fortalezado	–	o	que	que	eu	possa	fazer?	
[many	interruptions	of	reporters	off-screen]	
[Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	A	presidente	Dilma	também	falou	sobre	crise	econômica.	Ela	negou	que	o	governo	vá	usar	
reservas	internacionais	–	uma	espécie	de	poupança	que	Brasil	tem	no	exterior,	para	incentivar	o	
crescimento	da	economia	ou	a	queda	da	inflação.	
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Nós	jamais	teremos	uma	pauta	de	uso	dessas	reservas	para	alvo	que	não	seja	proteção	do	
país,	contra	flutuações	internacionais.	E	essas	reservas	também,	elas	podem,	eh,		
[17:00]	
dê	um	papel	em	relação	à	divida.	Mas	elas	não	são	a	forma	adequada	de	se	solucionar	questões	
de	investimento;	portanto,	as	especulações	que	existem	quando	esse	fato	do	uso	das	reservas	são	
isso:	Especulações.	E	elas,	infelizmente,	só	beneficiam	os	poucos	que	lu-,	que	lucram	com	ela.	Que	
lucre,	que	tentam	um,	um,	uma,	uma	–	eu	acho	criar	uma	situação	de	especulação.		
[cut	in	footage]	
Nós	temos	de	fazer	buscar	estabilidade	fiscal	–	Por	quê	é	que	se	acham	que	eu	falei	do	
compromisso	do	Lula	com	estabilidade	fiscal?	Porque	ele	é	real!	Se	sabem	disso.	Olha	
retrospectiva	do	presidente.	Que	historia	esse	do	presidente	não	mantém	compromisso	com	
estabilidade	fiscal.	Que	historia	é	esse	que	ele	não	mantém	compromisso	com	controle	da	
inflação?	Eu	acho	que	é	demissível	–	tudo	é	demissível	–	mas	tem	coisas	que	passa	
[18:00]	
eu	diria	se	que	tal	por	kima	cima	do	noticiário	especulativo.		
[Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	A	presidente	Dilma	também	assegurou	que	não	haverá	mudanças	na	equipe	econômica.		
[footage	of	interview	with	Dilma	in	Planalto]	
Dilma:	Não	se	demite,	porque	cria	turbulência	na	economia;	me	desculpe,	isso	tem	um	sentido	
especulativo.	Nem	o	Ministro	Nelson	Barbosa,	nem	o	Ministro	Tombini	estão	com	alguma,	alguma,	
ouve,	alguma	ou	alguém	ou	qualquer	coisa	que	levantou	a	possibilidade	de	sair	do	governo.	Pelo	
contrário,	eles	estão	mais	dentro	do	que	há	nunca.	
[Studio,	shot	of	both	anchors	at	desk]	
WB:	A	seguir,	a	crise	política	no	auge	em	Brasília:	
RV:	A	Justiça	torna	público	um	diálogo	entre	Lula	e	a	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	
WB:	e	a	Polícia	Federal	afirma	ver	indícios	de	ações	para	atrapalhar	as	investigações	da	Lava	Jato		
[cut	for	commercials;	Graphics	of	G1	/	JN	url,	JN	jingle	music]		
WB:	O	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	manteve	as	regras	estabelecidas	ao	fim	do	ano	passado	para	
tramitação	de	pedido	da	abertura	de	processo	do	impeachment	no	Congresso	contra	a	presidente	
Dilma	Rousseff.	
[19:00]	
[TV	Justiça	footage	of	STF,	Supreme	Justice	Luís	Roberto	Barroso	speaking	at	his	desk	next	to	Rosa	
Weber,	camera	slowly	zooming	out	and	panning	towards	rest	of	plenary]	
Reporter	VO	Marcos	Losekann:	O	Ministro	relator	Luís	Roberto	Barroso	manteve	o	voto	de	
dezembro.	Rejeitou	os	recursos	da	Câmara	dos	Deputados	contra	o	rito	do	impeachment	
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[Shot	from	opposite	angle,	Barroso	reading	his	verdict]	
Barroso:	Cabe	às	instâncias	políticas	deliberar	sobre	a	permanência	ou	afastamento	do	Chefe	de	
Estado.	O	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	toca	tal	somente	zela	pelo	cumprimento	da	Constituição	e	
das	demais	normas	aplicáveis.	
[shot	of	the	whole	STF	plenary]	
Reporter	VO	Marcos	Losekann:	Oito	ministros	seguiram	o	relator.	Entenderam	que	não	houve	
omissão,	nem	contradição	nas	decisões	do	tribunal	e	que	o	recurso	da	Câmara	não	poderia	ser	
usado	pra	julgar	tudo	de	novo.	
[footage	of	Supreme	Justice	Teori	Zavascki	at	desk	in	the	plenary]	
Teori:	Fato	simplesmente	não	aceito	do	agrado	da	parte	que	não	viu	atendido	se	o	interesse	não	
se	justifica,	por	si	só	provocará	um	novo	julgamento	a	causa	–		
[20:00]	
a	causa	está	julgado.	
[footage	of	Supreme	Justice	Luiz	Fux	at	desk	in	the	plenary]	
Fux:	O	que	a	corte	fez	foi	manter	a	integridade	e	a	interessa	das	[indecipherable]	jurisprudência	já	
sedimentada	após	a	Constituição	de	1988.	
[footage	of	other	Justices	and	the	plenary	seen	from	above]	
Reporter	VO:	Gilmar	Mendes	e	Dias	Toffoli	foram	os	únicos	a	discordar.	Toffoli	disse	que	há	
contradição,	porque	com	a	indicação	das	integrantes	da	comissão	do	impeachment	pelos	lideres	
partidários,	e	sem	chapa	avulsa,	não	há	eleição		
[footage	of	Supreme	Justice	Dias	Toffoli	at	his	desk	in	the	plenary]	
Toffoli:	Nós	estamos	trocando	a	representação	de	513	por	28	lideres	partidários.	Ou	menos,	
porque	há	os	blocos,	e	aí	nos	blocos	quem	indicam	são	os	lideres	dos	respectivos	blocos.	
[Reporter	on-site	at	the	Planalto,	looking	towards	the	Camara]	
Reporter	Marcos	Losekann:	Essa	posição	final	no	Supremo	é	na	pratica	um	sinal	verde	para	
Câmara.	Os	deputados	poderão	retomar	o	processo	de	impeachment	da	presidente	Dilma	
Rousseff,	desde	que	as	regras	determinadas	pelo	STF	sejam	obedecidas.		
[21:00]	
E	se	surgirem	divergências,	acorde	por	ser	acionada	de	novo.		
[footage	of	the	Eixo	Monumental	in	Brasilia,	centred	on	the	Congress,	with	graphic	overlay,	
morphing	into	next	shot]	
	Reporter	Marcos	Losekann	VO:		Como	a	rejeição	do	recurso	a	Comissão	Especial	na	Câmara	que	
analisa	a	pedido	de	abertura	do	processo	deve	ser		
[footage	of	empty	commission	meeting	room	in	Câmara]	
eleita	com	voto	aberto.	
[letters	spelling	“voto	aberto”	appears	levitating	on	desk	in	the	empty	meeting	room]	
Os	nomes	serão	indicados	pelos	lideres	dos	partidos,		
[letters	spelling	“indicados	pelos	lideres”	appears,	followed	by	“sem	chapa	alternativa”]	
e	não	poderão	haver	chapa	alternativa	
[the	meeting	room	diminishes	into	a	window,	and	the	Eixo	appears	again	as	background	of	
graphics	of	a	pie	chart	showing	impeachment	process	voting	requirements]	
Se	dois	terços	da	Câmara	aceitarem	abertura	do	processo,	o	Senado	poderá	decidir	por	maioria	
simples,	pelo	arquivamento	ou	pela	continuidade.	
[letters	spelling	“O	afastamento	da	presidente	somente	após	Senado	abrir	processo”	appears	on	
the	background	of	the	Eixo	Monumental	in	Brasília]	
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O	afastamento	da	Presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	do	cargo	ocorrerá	somente	depois	do	plenário	do	
senado	decidir	pela	abertura	do	processo	de	impeachment	por	maioria	simples.				
[studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	RV]	
RV:	Nesta	quarta-feira	crise	politico	atingiu	ponto	mais	alto.	O	juiz	Sérgio	Moro	suspendeu,	no	fim	
da	tarde,	o	sigilo	da	24o	fase	da	Operação	Lava	Jato,	e	com	isso,	conversas	com	ex-presidente	Lula	
se	tornaram	públicas	
[22:00,	RV	turns	to	another	angle	and	camera	shifts	to	a	head	shot	of	RV]	
Integrantes	da	operação	Lava	Jato	afirmaram	que	há	indícios	de	uma	ação	para	atrapalhar	as	
investigações.		
[footage	from	various	angles	of	Paraná	PF	station]	
Reporter	VO:	As	interceptações	telefônicas	foram	feitas	com	autorização	da	justiça,	começaram	
no	dia	19	de	fevereiro	e	continuavam	até	hoje.	Numa	conversa	gravada	em	27	de	fevereiro,	dias	
antes	da	condução	coercitiva	de	Lula	em	4	de	março,		
[footage	of	Lula	exiting	car	in	the	midst	of	many	people,	one	of	them	supposedly	Falcão]	
o	ex-presidente	conversa	com	Rui	Falcão,	presidente	do	PT.	
[graphic	of	refinery	tubes,	with	the	BR	logo	visible	in	the	background.	In	the	foreground,	a	
document	with	federal	police	stamps	at	the	top	is	overlayered,	while	Money	bundles	well	out	
from	the	oil	line.	Highlighted	parts	of	the	document	appear	in	yellow]	
Lula	disse:		É,	eu	tô	esperando	segunda-feira.	Eu	tô	esperando	segunda-feira	a	Operação	de	busca	
e	apreensão	na	minha	casa,	do	meu	filho	Marcos,	do	meu	filho	Fábio,	do	meu	filho	Sandro,	do	
meu	filho	Claudio.	E	Rui	Falcão	respondeu:	É,	eu	vi	esse	noticiário	aqui.	
Reporter	on-site	Vladimir	Netto:	Investigadores	dizem	que	essa	conversa	e	outros	que	foram	
interceptadas	indicam	que	Lula	podem	fica	sabendo	contra	ele	e	tentava	atrapalhar	os	trabalhos	
da	Lava	Jato.	Lula	teria	inclusive	buscado	influenciar	ou	conseguir	ajuda	de	autoridades	do	
Ministério	Público	Federal	e	até	de	ministros	do	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal.	
[23:00	-	footage	of	Lula,	standing	at	a	pulpit,	reading	from	documents	at	a	press	conference]	
Reporter	VO	Vladimir	Netto:	Numa	conversa	gravada	no	dia	27	de	fevereiro,	o	ex-presidente	fala	
com	Paula	de	Tarso	Vannuchi,		
[footage	of	Lula	in	armchair	during	interview]	
ex-Ministro	da	Secretaria	de	direitos	humanos	no	governo	Lula	
[footage	of	police	station]	
De	acordo	com	a	Polícia	Federal	há	indícios	de	que	no	diálogo,	Lula	esteja	se	referindo	ao	Ministro	
indicado	da	Justiça	Eugenio	Aragão	que	também	é	sub-Procurador-Geral	de	República		
[graphic	of	refinery	tubes	again]	
Lula	disse:	“O	problema	é	o	seguinte,	Paulinho,	nós	temos	que	comprar	essa	briga,	eu	sei	que	é	
difícil,	sabe?!	Eu	as	vezes	fico	pensando	até	que	o	Aragão	deveria	cumprir	um	papel	de	homem,	
porque	o	Aragão	parece	nosso	amigo,	parece,	parece,	mas	tá	sempre	dizendo	‘olha...’”	
[helicopter	footage	of	parking	lot	in	front	of	Congonhas	airport	of	SP]	
Logo	depois	de	saído	de	depoimento	de	Polícia	Federal	no	dia	de	operação	“Aletheia”	em	4	de	
março,		
[footage	of	Dilma	standing	in	TV	show,	being	instructed	before	broadcast]	
Lula	falou	com	Dilma	sobre	um	pedido	dos	advogados	dele	
[Footage	shot	in	front	of	STF	sign]	
que	estava	no	Supremo	Tribunal	Federal	
[Footage	shot	in	front	of	STF]	
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Questionando	quem	deveria	investigá-lo			
[Footage,	shot	from	the	ground	up,	in	front	of	justice	statue	in	Praça	dos	Tres	Poderes	]	
se	o	Ministério	Publico	de	São	Paulo	ou	a	força-tarefa	da	Lava	Jato	em	Curitiba	
[new	graphic	of	refinery	tubes,	still	Money	bundles	flowing	and	BR	sign	visible;	document	again	
highlighting	text]	
Lula	falou:	Eu	acho	que	eles	queriam	antecipar	o	pedido	nosso	que	tá	na	Suprema	Corte,	que	tá	na	
mão	da	Rosa	Weber	
[24:00	-	footage	of	police	station	in	Paraná]	
Após	a	conversa	com	Dilma,	Lula	conversa	com	então	ministro-chefe	da	Casa	Civil	Jacques	Wagner	
e	solicita	que	ele	conversa	com	Dilma	a	respeito	do	negocio	com	Rosa	Weber	
[graphic	of	the	inside	of	a	oil	tube	with	smudgy	Money	bills,	document	text	again	swooping	
towards	spectator:]	
Lula	falou:	“Mas	viu,	querido,	ela	tá	falando	dessa	reunião,	ô	Wagner,	que	queria	que	você	visse	
agora,	falar	com	ela,	já	que	ela	tá	aí,	falar	o	negócio	da	Rosa	Weber,	que	tá	na	mão	dela	pra	
decidir.	Se	homem	não	tem	saco,	que	sabe	uma	mulher	corajosa	possa	fazer	o	que	os	homens	não	
fizeram.”	
[helicopter	footage	of	police	station	in	Paraná]	
A	ministra	Rosa	Weber	negou	o	pedido	da	defesa	de	Lula	porque	entendeu	que	não	houve	
ilegalidade	nas	duas	investigações.		
[footage	of	police	station	in	Paraná]	
Em	outro	telefonema,	o	homem	identificado	como	Roberto	Carlos	deixa	claro	que	o	ministério	
serve	de	foro	privilegiado	para	Lula.	
Roberto	Carlos	fala:	“Eu	acho,	tá,	tem	uma	coisa	que	tá	na	mão	de	vocês.	É	ministério,	acabou.”		
Roberto	Carlos	continua:	“Agora	você	tem	uma	coisa	na	tua	mão,	você,	o	PT,	a	Dilma...	Vai	ter	
porrada?	Vão	criticar?	E	daí?	Numa	boa,	você	resolve	outro	problema,	que	é	o	problema	da	
governabilidade.“	
[24:00	-	Studio,	desk-and-torso	shot	of	WB]	
WB:	Numa	conversa	gravada	na	27	de	fevereiro	o	ex-presidente	Lula	fala	com	fala	com	Paula	de	
Tarso	Vannuchi,	ex-Ministro	da	Secretaria	de	Direitos	Humanos	no	governo	Lula.	De	acordo	com	a	
policia	federal,	há	indícios	de	que	no	dialogo,	Lula	esteja	se	referindo	ao	novo	Ministro	da	Justiça,	
Eugênio	Aragão	que	também	é	sub-Procurador-Geral	de	República.		
Lula	disse	assim	abre	aspas:	Lula	disse:	O	problema	é	o	seguinte,	Paulinho,	nós	temos	que	comprar	
essa	briga,	eu	sei	que	é	difícil,	sabe?!	Eu	as	vezes	fico	pensando	até	que	o	Aragão	deveria	cumprir	
um	papel	de	homem	naquela...”	-	e	o	presidente	disse	um	palavrão	-		“...porque	o	Aragão	parece	
nosso	amigo,	parece,	parece,	mas	tá	sempre	dizendo	‘olha...’”	fecha	aspas.	
[RV	in	desk-and-torso	shot]	
RV:	Na	introdução	da	de	gravação	de	uma	conversa	entre	Lula	e	o	advogado	Luiz	Carlos	
Sigmaringa	Seixas,	ocorrida	no	dia	7	de	março,	os	investigadores	dizem	que	nesse	trecho,	Lula	diz	
que		
[26:00]	
o	PGR	recusou	4	pedidos	de	investigação	do	Aécio,	de	Aécio	Neves,	e	aceitou	o	único	pedido	da	
investigação	da	LILS.	Ele	fala	que	essa	é	a	gratidão	do	PGR	por	ser	nomeado	Procurador.	
Sigmaringa	que	vai	fazer	uma	petição	formal	e	jogar	pra	imprensa	pra	constranger	o	PGR:	
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[graphic	of	a	futuristic	sound-scanner	instrument,	divided	into	two,	with	a	picture	of	Dilma	and	a	
picture	of	Lula	–	the	sound	of	their	recorded	dialogue	is	muted,	but	still	accompanied	by	text	in	
the	middle	of	each	instrument	section]	
RV	voice-over:	Lula	diz	abre	aspas:	“Eu	não	sei	o	quê	que	eu	pedi	pra	você	de	manhã.	Mas	era	
uma	coisa	simples	que	não	precisava	de	formalidade.”	
[RV	in	studio,	desk-and-torso]	
RV:	Sigmaringa	Seixas	pergunta:	“Não.	Mas	simples	ele	vai	dizer	não.	Ele	não	vai	receber.	Eu	
conversei	com	gente	só.”		
Lula	diz:	“É	porque	ele	recusou	quatro	pedidos	de	investigação	ao	Aécio	e	aceitou	a	primeira	de	
um	bandido	do	Acre	contra	mim.”	
Sigmaringa	responde:	
[27:00]	
“Pois	é...	mas	se	fizer	uma	petição...”	Lula	diz:	“Essa	é	a	gratidão...Essa	é	a	gratidão	dele	por	ele	ser	
Procurador.”	Sigmaringa	responde:	“Pois	é.		Mas	ele	se	tiver...	se	a	gente	formalizar,	inclusive,		
jogando	pra	imprensa,	ele	vai	ficar	constrangido.	Se	for	lá	conversar	com	ele	diz	não	e	pronto.	Ou	
não	diz	né.”	Lula	diz	a	Sigmaringa:	“Então	conversa	com	o	Cristiano.”	
[WB	headshot]	
WB:	No	dia	7	do	março	a	policia	federal	interceptou	entre	o	ex-presidente	Lula	e	o	prefeito	do	Rio	
Eduardo	Paes.	O	prefeito	diz	que	está	sofrendo	e	Lula	rebate,	dizendo	que	ele	é	abençoado	por	
Deus	por	causa	das	Olimpíadas.	O	prefeito	Eduardo	Paes	afirma	então	que	fazendo	Olimpíada	com	
Lula	e	com	Sergio	Cabral	é	uma	coisa,	mas	segurar	com	aquele	bon-mot	da	Dilma	e	do	Pezão	-	Lula	
comenta:	“Não	é	fácil,	querida.”	A	conversa	seque	e	o	prefeito	do	Rio	afirma:	“Agora,	da	próxima	
vez	o	senhor	me	para	com	essa	vida	de	pobre,	com	essa	tua	alma	de	pobre	comprando“	esses	
barco	de	M	–		
[28:00]	
ele	usou	o	palavra	que	eu	não	preciso	repetir	aqui	-	“sitiozinho	vagabundo”,	e	aí	diz	um	palavrão.	
Isso	a	palavra	do	prefeito	do	Rio	Eduardo	Paes.	Ai	o	ex-pref,	o	ex-presidente	Lula	ri	e	Eduardo	Paes	
continua:	“O	senhor	é	uma	alma	de	pobre.		Eu,	todo	mundo	que	fala	aqui	
no	meio,	eu	falo	o	seguinte:	imagina	se	fosse	aqui	no	Rio	esse	sítio	dele,	não	é	em	Petrópolis,	não	
é	em	Itaipava.	É	como	se	fosse	em	Maricá.”	E	o	prefeito	diz	alguns	palavrões.	E	Lula,	mais	uma	vez,	
ri.		
[headshot	of	RV]	
RV:	Em	uma	das	ligações	interceptadas	pela	polícia	federal	o	ex-presidente	Lula	fala	para	o	
ministro	da	Fazenda	Nelson	Barbosa	acompanhar	o	que	a	Receita	Federal	está	fazendo	junto	com	
a	Polícia	Federal.	No	diálogo,	Lula	fala	o	seguinte:	abre	aspas	“O	Nels-,	O	Nelson,	vou	te	falar	uma	
coisa	por	telefone,	isso	daqui.	O	importante	é	que	a	Polícia	Federal	esteja	gravando.	É	preciso	
acompanhar	o	que	a	receita	tá	fazendo	junto	com	a	Polícia	Federal,	bicho!”	
[29:00]	
Nelson	Barbosa	responde:	“Não,	é...	Gagueja	um	pouco	e	depois	prossegue.	Eles	fazem	parte.”	
Lula	retruque:	“É,	mas	você	precisa	se	inteirar	do	que	eles	estão	fazendo	no	instituto.	Se	eles	
fizessem	isso	com	meia	dúzia	de	grandes	empresas,	resolvia	o	problema	de	arrecadação	do	
Estado.”	Nelson	Barbosa	responde:	“Uhumm,	sei.”	Lula	continua:	“Sabe?	Eu	acho	que	está	faz-	eu	
acho	que	eles	estão	sendo”	–	e	fala	um	palavrão.	Nelson	Barbosa	responde:	“Tá.”	Lula	
complementa:	“Tão	procurando	pelo	em	ovo.	Eu	acho...	eu	vou	pedir	pro	Paulo	Okamotto	botar	
tudo	no	papel,	porque	era	preciso	você	chamar	o	responsável	e	falar”	ele	fala	um	palavrão	"Vocês	
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estão	fazendo		o	mesmo	com	a	Globo,	com	Instituto	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso,	o	mesmo	com	
Gerdau,	o	mesmo	com	o	SBT,	o	mesmo	com	a	Record?!	Ou	só	com	Lula?”,	e	o	ex-presidente	fala	
um	palavrão;	e	logo	em	seguida	outro	palavrão.	
[30:00]	
E	Nelson	Barbosa	responde:	“Tá,	pede	pro	Paulo	colocar”.	
	
[end	of	transcript	at	30:05]	
	
